

ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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ISLAM IN COMMUNIST CHINA

I. The Moslem Peoples of China

Although the contrary view may be widely held, China is not a nation inhabited by a single people speaking a single language. While 90 to 95 per cent of the total population are Han Chinese (i.e., Chinese proper), the remainder comprise an intricate mosaic of races, languages, cultures and religions. The Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek fostered the theory that China was inhabited by a single Chunghua (Chinese) nation; but the Communists, led by Chen Po-ta, a leading Communist theoretician, have realistically admitted China's character as a multinational state. Various Chinese Communist sources have noted the existence of over 60 minority nationalities, ranging from 1,000 Olunchuns to more than six million Chuangs, while the Academia Sinica has recorded 34 languages for research purposes.

The present regime recognizes ten Moslem nationalities: Hui, 1/ Uighur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Tatar, Uzbek, Tunghsiang, Paoan, 2/ and Sala (or Salar), each with its own culture, history, traditions, and language. 3/ Official Communist sources indicate that they number approximately ten million, distributed as follows: 4/

Hui	3,559,350	Tunghsiang	140,000
Uighur	3,640,125	Salar	30,000
Kazakh	470,000	Uzbek	13,000
Kirghiz	80,000	Tatar	6,000
Tajik	15,000	Paoan	4,000

It is impossible to say how accurate these figures are since no reliable census of Moslems has ever been taken. Almost every writer on the subject has his own idea as to China's Moslem population and very seldom do their figures agree, varying from less than 10 million to as high as 50 million. The latter figure is that generally cited by Moslem writers 5/ and by Moslem Chinese themselves, although Chinese Moslem spokesmen today dutifully echo the 10 million figure officially recognized by the regime. In between are such estimates as

15 million by Forman, 6/ 18 million by Bodde, 7/ and 23 million by Lindbeck. 8/

Roughly half of China's Moslems are located in the five northwestern provinces of Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia and Shensi, where they comprise about half of the total population. The greatest concentration is in Sinkiang where almost 94 per cent of the people are Moslem, with the Uighurs alone accounting for 74 per cent of the whole. The remainder are scattered throughout the land, with every province without exception having its Moslem colony, either small or large. In Yunnan Province, in southwest China, is the second largest concentration, where they account for about 25 per cent of the total population of the province. 9/ Peking, the capital, counts more than 70,000, served by 49 mosques; Mukden, in Manchuria, with 40,000 Moslems and eight large mosques, is virtually a Moslem city; in Shanghai are to be found 120,000 believers with 14 cathedral mosques. Similarly, every other large city has its own colony. That in Canton, numbering 2,500, is said to be the oldest in China, dating back to Arab contacts with T'ang China in the seventh century.

As was mentioned above, the Uighurs are concentrated in Sinkiang, where they form a majority. The Kazakhs and Tatars are found chiefly in the Ashan, Ili, Tacheng, Urumchi and Hami areas of that province, with other Kazakh groups being located in Minho hsien of Chinghai. The Kirghiz and Uzbeks inhabit various hsien in Sinkiang, while the Tajiks are chiefly in the Puli, Soche, and Pucheh hsien of the Pamir plateau in Sinkiang. The Tunghsiangs and Salars are chiefly to be found in the Kansu-Chinghai border area, while the Paoans live in areas near Tibet. The Hui comprise the greater majority of Moslems elsewhere in China.

The 10 nationalities mentioned above represent several racial strains. The Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tatars are of Turkish stock akin to the peoples of Soviet Central Asia, and speak related Turkic dialects. The Tajiks are Iranian and are related to the people of Soviet Tadzhikistan. The Salars are descendants of immigrants from Samarkand, while the Paoans are Tibetans. The Hui are essentially Chinese by race but, in many cases, with a considerable admixture of other racial strains: Turkish, Arab and Mongolian. In northwest China, it might be noted, Moslems who are Chinese by language and culture, as well as by race, are known as Tungans;

and between them and other Moslems as well as Han Chinese there is a latent antipathy which has, in the past, frequently flared into open conflict.

Aside from their common faith, China's Moslems are solidified by occupational factors, for they have monopolized jade work and the fur trade, animal husbandry, horse-dealing and butchering. They provide most carters, muleteers, and cameleers, and are said to be the best restaurateurs and inn-keepers in China. In matters of dress, 10/ manners and customs, Moslems--especially the Hui--are frequently indistinguishable from other Chinese; often the avoidance of pork--a favorite food with Han Chinese--is the only major difference between them and the Han peoples.

Isolated from the main body of Islam for many centuries the Chinese Moslems have developed along their own lines, quite untouched by influences affecting the rest of Islam, and have become quite lax in matters of religious observances. The Five Pillars of the Faith are still recognized and observed but not always in a manner that would be regarded as orthodox by other Moslems. This isolation has also served to make them immune to any attraction by the Pan-Islam concept, which for them has no meaning. As elsewhere in the Moslem World there is no cleric hierarchy. Each mosque is independent, and the Moslems are in reality only a collection of separate congregations bound together by a common creed. The idea of a caliph is meaningless to the Chinese Moslem; to him the highest earthly spiritual authority is his own ahung. 11/

In matters of faith, Chinese Moslems are all Sunnites, with some Sufi influences, who follow the Hanafi school of law. But while all are Sunnites, they are divided into a number of sects which differ as to how prescribed Sunni rituals should be practiced. The "Old Sect" is the most conservative and, at the same time, most lax in dietary and moral habits. The "New Sect," already several hundred years old, tends to be more mystical and more ritualistic, opposing such things as opium smoking and wine drinking which the Old Sect is inclined to overlook. Other differences can be adduced. In general, the New Sect insists on a return to traditional Islamic ways, while the Old Sect prefers the modified customs and forms which have developed in China during the centuries of isolation. Thus, the New Sect insists that a chapter of the Koran be recited only once instead of three times as held by the Old Sect; that at prayer clasped hands should be raised

once instead of twice; that after meals there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting; and that in singing the praises of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. The New Sect does not allow any substitute for an ahung in preaching while the Old Sect does. Finally, the two groups disagree on the proper basis for calculating the ritual fasting period, the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arab method, the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar calendar.

A third main group, known as the Modern Sect, was founded about 80 years ago by a reformer who declared himself to be Christ returned to earth to prepare for the return of Mohammed. It is the most liberal of the three. In education it stresses religious ethics rather than the traditional memorizing of the Koran, and in the interpretation of the Koran maintains that the spirit rather than the letter should be observed. In personal habits it advocates modernism, such as the wearing of European clothes.

In the northwest area there also are many small sects, for example, the "Brand New Sect" and a number of Sufi orders such as the Che-ho-yeh (Jariyah). 12/

II. Communist Policies

A. Minority Policy

Under the Kuomintang regime the Moslems as well as other non-Han peoples were frequently oppressed and persecuted as a result of the KMT policy of Sinofication. The Communist regime has been less harsh in this respect, for it has pursued a deliberate policy of recognizing the existence and seeking the support of the many minority groups. The Moslems have profited thereby since the Reds treat them not only as a religious minority but also as minority nationalities. Thus they have escaped the harsh treatment accorded to Christians, whom the regime is apparently determined to reduce to impotence if not eradicate completely. Even the Buddhists, except in Tibet and adjacent areas, have been subjected to pressures which the Moslems have thus far escaped.

The Communist Chinese policy toward minorities is based on the early Russian nationalities policy (before it was corrupted and perverted by Great Russian chauvinism) and on Stalin's two sets of theses on the nationality problem as

accepted by the X and XII Congresses of the CPSU in 1921 and 1923. The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which guided the policies of the CCP until the promulgation of a constitution in 1954, explicitly declares that all minorities are to be free to develop their own national languages, customs, religions and traditions, and states in Article 51 that:

Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy organizations shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power. 13/

During the period in which the Communists were winning China from the Nationalist regime, they were careful to respect the rights of minorities. Upon entering areas inhabited by Moslems, Communist soldiers received special instructions to respect Moslem beliefs and customs, to avoid molestation of mosques and priests, and to avoid disturbing religious beliefs. Care also was taken to avoid feeding pork to Moslem units, while arrangements were made for Moslem soldiers to observe their religious obligations without hindrance.

The new Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, approved for promulgation on 14 June 1954, repeats the essential features of the Common Program. Sections 2 and 3 of Article 3 guarantee equal treatment to all nationalities, prohibit race discrimination, racial oppression, and activities that would destroy the friendly unity among them, and assure them the right to develop their own language and to preserve or reform their own customs and religion. Section 4 of the same article provides that national minorities are to have regional autonomy in areas where they are predominant. It is made clear, however, that these areas are inseparable parts of China and that the first loyalty of every citizen is to the People's Republic.

The minorities policy is carried out by the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress, 14/ which works closely with the CCP and the People's Revolutionary Military

Council. The Commission holds periodic conferences of representatives from various national areas to consider their problems, but its most important task is to train Red cadres from minority groups, whose duty it is to insure party control in their areas. 15/ Within the State Council, or cabinet, there is also a Religious Affairs Bureau headed by Ho Cheng-hsiang. No information as to its mission is available, but it presumably handles government policy toward religious groups, which would include Islamic as well as Christian, Buddhist and others.

The policy directed by the above groups have fostered, as in the Soviet Union, the creation of individual alphabets (for those languages previously without one), the publication of books in national languages, and the organization of dance and art groups and other cultural activities. Medical care and communications in minority areas have been improved, and schools--primary, secondary, and advanced--established. In Peking there is now a Central Institute for Nationalities, while eight subordinate Institutes for Nationalities have been established throughout the country.

B. Benefits to Moslems

In the wooing of minority groups, the Moslems apparently have been especially favored. Mosques have been exempted from real estate taxes, while those of historical importance have been repaired at government expense. On 6 December 1950, the government issued a special order remitting the slaughter tax on cows and sheep killed by Moslems in connection with the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet and the festivals of Shakar Bairam (Id al-Fitr) and Qorban Bairam (Id al-Adha). During these same festivals state-owned stores and cooperative trading agencies gave special discounts to Moslems on such items as beef, mutton, rice, flour, tea, sugar and cloth. This favoritism apparently was not confined to festivals since Moslems in Peking reportedly were given adequate supplies of beef and mutton in the winter of 1953 even though there was a general meat shortage.

By government order, no Moslem student, worker or state employee is forced to work on a Moslem religious holiday. During the 1955 Bairams, Moslems were given a three-day holiday. At every state banquet and representative assembly there are special tables with Moslem food. The same convenience is

also provided at many railway stations.

In the cultural field the Moslems have also made gains. In Peking an Institute of Islamic Theology has been established and also an Institute for Hui People which has more than one thousand students. The students at the Central Institute for Nationalities as well as at the subordinate regional institutes are largely Moslem. Moslems are also free to enter any other school. Mosques reportedly have been allowed to retain their religious schools. The Nationalities Publishing House is issuing a steady stream of publications in Moslem minority languages, although most of them are translations of Communist texts. Sinkiang has eight newspapers and three periodicals in Uighur and five newspapers in Kazakh. Both languages are now being used for radio broadcasts, and Uighur for the Sinkiang telegraphic service as well as on currency.

C. Disadvantages to Moslems

All this is not to say that the Moslems are free or that their customs and beliefs have not been affected by the Communist regime. Take marriage for example. The new marriage law of 1 May 1950 provides for marriage "based on free choice of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes" and prohibits "polygamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference with the remarriage of widows, and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage." These provisions strike at many facets of Moslem marriage practices. Moslems in China as elsewhere practiced polygamy. Parents also arranged marriages, now forbidden, and betrothed their children, which is now forbidden. ^{16/} The institution of bride-price or of dowery was likewise observed. The Koran also lays down certain restrictions as regards remarriage, which presumably can no longer be enforced among Moslem societies.

A more fundamental tenet of Islamic society everywhere--that no Moslem, particularly no Moslem girl, should marry outside the faith--is also apparently under attack. The government reportedly was encouraging Red cadres, in early 1954, to marry Moslems and, if such marriages were opposed by parents, to cite the provisions of the marriage law. Between January and July 1954, 40 such marriages are said to have occurred in the Harbin area alone. This would appear to be part of the Communist policy to disrupt the traditional family relationship and might well, were it pushed far and long enough, result in the absorption of the Moslem minorities.

Although, as already noted, Moslem dietary laws appear to be tolerated and even abetted, the following incident reportedly occurred. The Peking regime decreed that animals should be electrocuted before being slaughtered. This procedure makes the meat unclean according to the rules prescribed by the Koran, and in February 1954 Moslems in Peking, Mukden and Harbin protested against the ruling in vain. It is probable that the decree had little effect in the heavily Moslem areas of northwest China, where many of the Moslems are animal raisers and therefore probably slaughter their own meat. However, as those areas become industrialized and modernized, more and more Moslems may be forced to eat meat which according to their religions precepts is unclean.

Refugees who have escaped from Sinkiang and various underground reports from China indicate that the Communists have closed down many mosques and seized them for use as museums, stores or barracks. Religious courts also are reported to have been abolished. It is difficult to evaluate these reports on the state of Islam in China, for Moslem spokesmen such as Burhan and Mohammed Makien continually are stressing the freedom with which Moslems practice their faith, and in this they are supported by many Moslems from other countries who have visited Red China in recent years.

The explanation may well lie in the existence of different sets of circumstances in Sinkiang and in the rest of China where foreigners are allowed to travel. Very few Westerners have seen Sinkiang since the Communist take-over, but reports have filtered out that the province today is controlled by the Soviets rather than the Chinese Communists and that the garrison troops, for example, belong to the Red Army rather than to the Chinese Communist Army. If this is true, it may well be that the Soviets are applying in Sinkiang the same type of campaign they applied in the Moslem areas of the Soviet Union, where the Moslem clergy has been largely eliminated and the majority of mosques closed.

Although the Chinese Communists deprecate religion, they have not announced an avowed campaign against religion as such or launched any organized drive to persuade Moslems to abandon their faith. ^{17/} There is, however, evidence that the Peking regime is attempting to control the content of mosque sermons. In 1953 the regime assigned a Moslem (presumably a reliable Communist) secretary to each mosque in Peking to

observe and report on all activities. Each week, before the Friday sermon, the secretary gave the chief priest a copy of the week's important news, received from his superiors, which the priest was expected to incorporate into his sermon. The sermon itself had to be prepared in advance and submitted to the secretary for approval who was frequently asked by the chief priest to prepare it. Available information does not indicate whether this system is still in effect or whether it is peculiar to the Peking area.

The Communists also are making plans to control future Moslem clerics. Those graduated by the new Institute of Islamic Theology will be well indoctrinated. In early 1953 the regime ordered each mosque in Peking to select and send one student to a course of study at the Peking Moslem College, who, after graduation, would return to the original mosque to preach. Two principal qualifications for selection were listed: clear-mindedness and progressiveness; but nothing was said about proficiency in Arabic, which any qualified Moslem cleric must have. From early 1953 to July 1954, the government reportedly sent 60 Moslems, in groups of 20, to the USSR for training.

III. Moslem Resistance

From the Yenan days the CCP has made strenuous efforts to attract the support of China's Moslems. ^{18/} Success consistently eluded the Communists. Since achieving power in 1949, the Reds have made considerable concessions to that same end, and there are indications that complete success has still not been attained. Their parallel attempts to impose control and Communist discipline on people whose faith and discipline is already strong has created difficulties not encountered elsewhere.

Islamic exclusiveness based on claims of absolute religious truth and social values, buttressed by prohibition against marriage outside the faith, aloofness from religious and social activities of others, a self-segregated pattern of social life, and a well-developed solidarity and communal self-sufficiency makes friendly cooperation between Moslems and Chinese possible only on Moslem terms. Yet such aloofness is detrimental to China's national unity and modernization. In order to carry through national programs of reform, education and reconstruction

and to meet external ideological and military threats, the activities of all groups in China need to be and are being collectivized and brought under national control.

Although the Communists may have won political and military control over China's Moslem areas, they have still to solve the problem of defining the status of China's Moslems and reconciling their aspirations and interests with their own demands. The Communists refuse to recognize the unique role of religion, which serves China's Moslems not only as a basis for communal life, but also as the critical differentiating factor between the Chinese-speaking Moslems and other Chinese and as the primary unifying force among the culturally and racially diverse peoples in China who are adherents to Islam. For ideological reasons the Communists are unable to offer the Moslems real religious freedom. They are willing to respect certain forms of religious beliefs and habits of individuals and groups, but they cannot accept a religiously ordered society without forgetting the establishment of their own political and economic system. This they are unwilling to do. It is cultural diversity, not Islam, which the Communists are willing to champion.

The Communists have not been able to solve the problem of the status of China's Moslems because the primary aim of their policies has been to promote their own power. Communist policies to win the voluntary support of the Moslems are inadequate because they are designed not to advance the interests of the Moslems but to use the Moslems. Only if Communists were willing to frame a broader program to safeguard religious unity and the racial diversity of the Moslems, could they succeed in reconciling Moslem interests and those of the CCP. Minority autonomy provides no solution, for such autonomy, if it is to be real and meaningful, is only possible after the Moslems have become loyal and participating members of the national state.

Although committed to respecting the autonomy of Moslem groups (as national minorities rather than as Moslems as such), the Communists still consider them as integral parts of Chinese society and therefore subject to the laws of the new regime. While there is no available data relative to this particular point, the elimination of so-called people's enemies probably has proceeded apace in Moslem areas as in other parts of China. Among the more than 20 million Chinese said to have

been subjected to hsiao mieh, i.e., liquidation, there have undoubtedly been a proportionate number of Moslems. Forced delivery of crops and livestock, execution of landlords and rich peasants, and other aspects of Communist terror have been applied to them as to Han Chinese. Sinkiang and other areas of northwest China have witnessed mass public trials and executions just as have the large cities and areas of Eastern China.

There are indications that the blood-letting has perhaps been even greater among Moslems. The land reform class struggle has lagged behind in Moslem areas. The Communists made some provision for Moslem sentiments in this regard, 19/ but the concession made was not sufficient to prevent Moslem peasants from opposing other aspects of the program and from refusing to join in the persecution and condemnation of fellow Moslems who fell into the Communist classification of "rich" peasants. The Moslem areas also have been involved in reports of revolt and resistance. The largest open rebellion yet admitted by the Reds since they seized power was staged by more than 20,000 Moslems in Kansu Province between April and July 1952, where the rebels killed over 3,000 party cadres, civilians and military officers before being put down. 20/

The same area was also the scene of a serious revolt in 1950. On 28 March of that year, a congress of 1,000 Kazakh leaders at Barkol proclaimed an autonomous Kazakh government with Janim Khan as governor and Osman Batur as military commander. In mid-April, Communist forces swept down on Barkol and more than 12,600 of the 15,000 assembled Kazakhs were killed, captured, or dispersed. Janim Khan was captured shortly thereafter and taken to Urumchi where he was publicly executed in February 1951. Osman Batur met the same fate two months later. 21/

As a result of these incidents and of general dislike of the Communist regime, thousands of Kazakhs, as well as other Moslem tribesmen, have attempted to escape from Sinkiang to India, over the fearsome mountain barriers. Of one group of 22,000, only 3,000 reached safety in Kashmir. Those who have reached the outside world tell of thousands of others who have died in the attempt from cold and hunger or at the hands of Communist soldiers. They also tell of other thousands who would make the attempt if opportunity presented itself.

Reports of these refugees and of their leaders such as Mohammed Amin Bughra, former Deputy Governor of Sinkiang, and Yusuf Isa Aliptakin, although perhaps somewhat colored and exaggerated, make it quite clear that the Red reign of terror has not bypassed the Moslem areas. 22/ The specific oppressive measures are probably neither more stringent nor more lenient than for the rest of China; it is only that Moslem resistance is greater and more tenacious.

IV. Regional Autonomy

The Chinese Communists have resolutely pushed the autonomy program outlined in the Common Program and in the Constitution, so that today the administrative boundaries of the country present a complex array of autonomous regions (ch'u), districts (chou) and counties (hsien) mingled with regular administrative units. As of 1955, China had 22 provinces, three autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet), and the centrally administered cities of Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai. The provinces and autonomous regions, in turn, were divided into 25 autonomous chou, 2,100 hsien or equivalent units, about 50 autonomous hsien, and about 170 cities under provincial jurisdiction.

Among the autonomous areas are many inhabited by Moslem peoples; for example, Tunghsiang and Paoan areas in Kansu; Hui areas in Kansu, Chinghai and Suiyan; Kazakh and Kirghiz areas in Sinkiang; as well as a number of others in addition to those with mixed populations. The autonomy accorded, however, would seem to be more apparent than real, for most minority group officials have empty titles and no power. The official Communist organ People's Daily admitted on 9 September 1953 that it was common practice for minorities not to be consulted by governmental organs dealing with their affairs and that often governors at a higher level ignored the autonomous areas under them.

Toward the end of 1949 the Peking regime inaugurated a system of regional governments, apparently designed to bind provincial governments closer to Peking and to aid in overcoming the handicaps which China's vast size, imperfect communications and general backwardness placed in the way of centralized administration. Five regional areas were created

including that of Northwest China which embraced the five provinces of Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia and Shensi. Under the previous system of regular provincial governments Moslems could rightfully expect to exercise control in Sinkiang, perhaps also in Kansu and/or Chinghai. But within the area encompassed in the new regional government they represented something less than half the total population and were therefore condemned to function within that area and its centralized government as a permanent minority.

The situation improved in June 1954 when the regional administrative areas were abolished. On 1 October 1954, the province of Sinkiang was proclaimed the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, with Uighurs serving as chairman and a majority of the members of the Region's People's Council. As an autonomous region, it has the same status as a province but with additional powers. It can, for example, with the approval of the State Council in Peking, set up governmental bodies through which local autonomy can be exercised including the administration of its own finances and public security forces. Autonomy for non-Uighur peoples is assured by five autonomous chou and six autonomous hsien within the Region's borders.

It is extremely doubtful that the province's new status has materially helped its inhabitants. The political leaders are still subject to Communist orders--Saifudin, chairman of the People's Council is a CCP member--and if Peking is not exercising firm control there, it appears that the Soviets are.

V. Moslem Participation in Government

Moslems have not been conspicuous by their presence at the highest levels of government in Communist China. The most influential Moslem is perhaps Saifudin, formerly vice-chairman of the Sinkiang provincial government, who today is chairman of the People's Council of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and one of the two Moslem members of the State Council. Sharing honors with Saifudin is Burhan, who today is chairman of the China Islamic Association and who in the past has served as chairman of the Sinkiang provincial government and as vice-chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the CPPCC.

The second Moslem member of the State Council is Liu Ke-ping, who also holds the posts of chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress and of chairman of the China Hui Cultural Association. Other prominent Moslems are Sheikh Nur Mohammed (Ta Pu-sheng), a vice-chairman of the China Islamic Association, who previously was a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC and served as a member of the Chinese delegation attending the Bandung Conference in April 1954; and Mohammed Makien (Ma Chien), a professor of Arabic at Peking University and a graduate of Cairo's al-Azhar University. He is a leading committee member of the China Islamic Association and also served as a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC.

At the inception of the Communist regime, Moslems were represented in the CPPCC both in the "democratic religious circles" category (one delegate) and in the "minority nationalities" group (four delegates). The CPPCC's Nationalities Affairs Commission had three vice-chairmen of whom two were Moslem (a Hui and a Uighur), and 22 ordinary members of whom 18 were non-Chinese. (Available information does not indicate the number of Moslems among those 18.) When the First National People's Congress met in 1954, its members included 41 Moslems. Of the 85 members of its Nationalities Affairs Commission, 16 were Moslems.

On the local level in predominantly Moslem areas, the Islamic contingents are much greater; and in autonomous Moslem regions Moslems presumably constitute the greater majority of government officials. Nevertheless, in Communist China, as in the Soviet Union, there are few Moslems with national reputations or national responsibilities.

VI. Cultural Organizations

Communist China is a country of organizations--numerous, large and varied. The Communist leaders have found it expedient to accomplish their ends and to change the face and social structure of China by working through an endless variety of "mass organizations." Such groups as the New Democratic Youth, All-China Federation of Democratic Youth, All-China Students' Federation, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, All-China Democratic Women's Federation, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and countless others number their members in the millions. The cooperative and peasants' associations reportedly have over 150 million members.

These mass organizations today command much of the leisure time of the Chinese citizen. While there are no available figures on the breakdown of their memberships, these organizations probably include many Moslems. Branches in an area like Sinkiang, for example, where virtually the entire population is Moslem, would have primarily Moslem members.

The major purely Moslem organization is the China Islamic Association, 23/ formally inaugurated on 9 May 1953. The groundwork for the organization was laid at a Preparatory Conference in Peking on 27-31 July 1952, which had been called at the initiative of eight prominent Moslems, including Saifudin and Mohammed Makien. This conference was attended by 53 delegates from all parts of the country and represented the various Moslem nationalities. A 40-man preparatory committee was elected, headed by Burhan, with the task of getting the new organization into operation.

The China Islamic Association is a lay organization designed "to help the people's government to implement the policy of religious belief as laid down in the Common Program," and "to develop love for the Motherland ... and participate in the movement for the defense of world peace." In practice the association serves as an agency for handling the racial, religious, cultural and political relations of Moslems with the Communist regime, and as a convenient propaganda instrument for improving Chinese relations with countries of the Moslem world.

A second national Moslem organization is the China Hui Cultural Association, 24/ established on 14 May 1953, with the task of promoting the culture of the Hui people. The May 1953 conference which inaugurated the association, in a message addressed to Mao Tse-tung, expressed its mission in these words: "The China Hui Cultural Association will assist the People's Government in the study and development of the culture and education of the Hui people through strengthening patriotic education and mobilizing the Hui people to acquire scientific knowledge, production know-how, and advanced production experiences so as more effectively to contribute themselves in the large-scale economic construction of the Fatherland, which has already begun."

Both associations seem largely to serve political rather than cultural purposes, especially as regards China's relations with countries of the Moslem World. In its first two

years of existence, the China Islamic Association was host to leaders from the Near and Middle East and Africa on 15 different occasions. When foreign Moslem dignitaries are invited to China these guests, whether religious leaders, journalists, government leaders, labor leaders or businessmen, are feted and guided by leaders of the two groups. Chinese cultural missions to Moslem countries are led by, or include as members, leaders of these groups; for example, the current Chinese delegation in the Middle East is headed by Burhan.

Among China's numerous organizations are a number of "friendship associations." Here, too, Moslem leaders are used when a Moslem country is concerned. Burhan was a founder and currently serves as chairman of the China-Indonesia Friendship Association, while its vice-chairmen include Ma Yu-huai, one of Burhan's colleagues in the China Islamic Association. Liu Ke-ping and Ma Sung-ting, chairman and vice-chairman respectively of the China Hui Cultural Association, fill the same posts in the China-Pakistan Friendship Association.

Another example of the propaganda use of these organizations to curry favor among Moslems abroad is the action of the second plenary committee meeting of the China Islamic Association in November 1955, attended by 184 imams, mullahs and other leaders of the 10 Moslem nationalities, in adopting a resolution supporting independence for the Moslem peoples of North Africa.

The leaders of the two associations are used to inform the Moslem World how free China is and how much religious freedom is accorded Moslems there. Radio Peking frequently broadcasts statements to this effect attributed to Chinese Moslem leaders, and the good relations which China enjoys with Moslem countries. The diplomatic recognition recently extended by Egypt suggests that these propaganda efforts have not been entirely unsuccessful.

Along strictly religious and cultural lines the two associations also have been active to a degree. The China Islamic Association, for example, is charged with organizing the annual hajj to Mecca which in 1955 was led by Sheikh Nur Mohammed. The association also was instrumental in the establishment in Peking of the Institute of Islamic Theology, and has also arranged for the printing of a Chinese translation

of the Koran. In its first two years, the association held 22 meetings of imams and other Moslems to discuss religious questions and to celebrate, with due publicity abroad, Moslem festivals. Other activities include the translation of the new constitution into Arabic, the making of a documentary film on Moslem life in Peking, and the publication of a book depicting Moslem life in China.

There is no available information regarding the specific activities of the China Hui Cultural Association.

VII. Notes

1. Moslems who are Chinese by race. The term is not to be confused with Hui Hui or Hui Chiao Jen which are used to denote China's Moslems collectively.
2. Tibetan-speaking Moslems.
3. The common language for all of China's Moslems is a-la-bi (Arabic), which is taught in all Moslem schools. Like Moslems everywhere China's Moslems refuse to recognize the validity of the Koran or of Moslem prayers in any language but Arabic.
4. Figures are taken from Theodore Shabad, China's Changing Map (New York, 1956). See also People's China, 6 June 1955.
5. For example, Ahmed Ali, Muslim China (Karachi, 1949).
6. Harrison Forman, "China's Moslemia," Canadian Geographical Journal XXXVII (September, 1948).
7. Dirk Bodde, "China's Moslem Minority," Far Eastern Survey XV (11 September 1946).
8. John M. H. Lindbeck, "Communism, Islam, and Nationalism," Review of Politics XII (October, 1950).
9. The Moslems of Yunnan Province are sometimes referred to as Panthays.
10. The jen min chuang (people's uniform) is today common to all citizens of China.
11. Derived from the Persian word akhund, a scholar learned in Islamic law and theology. The ahungs show their status by a white turban or skull cap.
12. The best available account of China's Moslem sects is found in Chan Wing-tsit, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York, 1953).
13. See China Islamic Association, Moslems in China (Peking, 1953). The text of other pertinent articles is also given.

14. Headed by Liu Ke-ping, a Hui Moslem. The former Nationalities Affairs Commission of the CPPCC was headed by Li Wei-han, also known as Lo Mai, who served at the same time as vice-chairman of the government's Committee of Financial and Economic Affairs and as head of the CCP's United Front Work Department.
15. Walker states that to date more than 100,000 such cadres have been trained, most of them youths. See Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism: The First Five Years (New Haven, Conn., 1955), p. 185.
16. The law fixes the legal age for marriage at 20 for men and 18 for women.
17. There have been reports of a Chinese Society for the Propagation of Political and Scientific Knowledge, apparently patterned after the Soviet atheistic organization of the same name.
18. For an account of Communist attempts to win over China's Moslems in the years before seizure of power in 1949, see Lindbeck, op. cit.
19. Moslem resistance to the land reform program was foreseen, and the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1950 provided, in Article 3, that "Some or all land owned by Moslems may be retained by them subject to the consent of the Moslems residing in the area."
20. See Walker, op. cit., p. 187. A Spanish missionary who reached the Free World from Kansu Province in late 1952 reported that the Moslem rebellion in Northwest China still continued, that anti-Communists had controlled a mountainous area in Eastern Kansu for about 18 months, and that for political reasons the Chinese Communist leaders had not yet launched an all-out attack to crush it. However, the New York Times on 8 April 1953 carried a report that the Communists had made peace with the Kazakhs by promising them a tract of land to call their own and that Kazakh leaders had been among the chiefs of seven minority tribes in Northwest China to send their respects to Mao.
21. For an account of the Barkol rebellion, see Milton J. Clark, "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom," National Geographic Magazine C (November, 1954).

22. Bughra has written an account of present conditions in Sinkiang, giving many details of Communist oppression and terroristic measures. See Mohammed Amin Bughra, Dogu Turkistan: Tarihi, cografi ve simdiki durumu / Eastern Turkistan: Its History, Geography, and Present Condition (Istanbul, 1952).
23. Not to be confused with the China Moslem Association, a pro-Chiang organization with headquarters in Taipei, Formosa, which was founded in Changchow in 1938 as the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation and which adopted its present name in 1942, after having absorbed all other existing Chinese Moslem organizations. See Appendix A for a list of the officers and committee members of the China Islamic Association.
24. The names China Islamic Cultural Association, or China Moslem Cultural Association, or Chinese Association for the Promotion of the Hui People's Culture are also used. See Appendix B for a list of officers and members.

APPENDIX A

CHINA ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS 1/

<u>Name 2/</u>	<u>Numeral Code</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
	<u>Chairman</u>	
Pao Erh-han <u>3/</u> *		Uighur
	<u>Vice-Chairmen</u>	
Yang Ching-jen*	2799/7234/0088	Hui
Ma Yu-huai <u>4/</u> *	7456/3768/2849	Hui
Ta Pu-sheng <u>5/</u> *	6671/3184/3932	Hui
Ma Chen-wu*	7456/7201/2976	Hui
I-ming-ma-ho-su-mu <u>6/</u> *	0181/2494/7456/0678/ 5684/2606	Uighur
	<u>Secretary General</u>	
Chang Yu-tseng <u>7/</u>		
	<u>Deputy Secretary General</u>	
Ma Ming-chi*	7456/2494/1015	

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1. FBID Daily Report, 20 May 1953.
 2. An asterisk denotes membership also on the Preparatory Committee. See FBID Daily Report, 6 August 1952.
 3. Usually known as Burhan. Chairman of the Preparatory Committee.
 4. Also known as Yusf. Was Secretary General of Preparatory Committee.
 5. Also known as Sheikh Nur Mohammed.
 6. The 6 August FBID report gives his name as I-ming-ma-ho-lu-mu.
 7. Also known as Mohammed Ali.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Numeral Code</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
	<u>Members</u>	
Chang Yu-chen 8/*	1728/3768/3791	Hui
Ma Chien 9/*	7456/1017	Hui
Pang Shih-chien	7894/1102/6179	Hui
Ma Yeng-....	7456/7685/5294	Hui
Ma Ping-fu*	7456/1627/3940	Hui
Tzu Tzu Chien	0459/1311/5329	Hui
Ma Chung-yung*	7456/6850/0932	Hui
Ma Pei-ching*	7456/1014/7230	Salar
Fa Chen	3127/4176	Hui
Shan Hsia-hsi	3088/6667/3556	Hui
Mu-ha-te-li	2606/07.1/1779/6849	Kazakh
Ma Yu-tsai	7456/6735/7872	Hui
Chou Kuan-chun	0719/0385/6511	Hui
Ma Chi-shan*	7456/1477/1472	Tunghsiang
Han Cheng-kang	7181/2973/4857	Paoan
Ho-chia-ni-yu-tzu-a-chi*	0149/0502/1441/3660/ 1320/7093/.679	Uighur
A-jai-sa	7093/5337/3097	Uighur
A-pu-yu-jo-hsi-ti*	7093/0008/6757/3583/ 6000/....	Uighur

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8. Served as Deputy Secretary General of Preparatory Committee.
 9. Or Mohammed Makien. Served as Deputy Secretary General of Preparatory Committee.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Numeral Code</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
A-tai-erh-ti-pai	0761/1769/3643/6849/ 2157	Uighur
A-pu-li-tzu-ni-ya-tzu	7093,0008/0500/1320/ 14.1/3660/1320	Uighur
Mu A-shih	2606/0761/0087	Kazakh
- - - -/..../....	Kazakh
Ma Liang-chun	7456/5328/7486	Hui
Chao Yun-lung*	6392/7189/7893	Hui
Yu-nu-wu	3768/0505/3527	Uzbek
Hsia Ko-erh*	1115/0344/3643	Tatar
- -to-kua-ha-tzu- ko-erh	0124/..../3660/0960/ 1139/0761/1320/2688	Uzbek
Han I-shan	3063/0122/0819	Tajik
Na Ssu-erh	6719/1835/3643	Uighur
Yen-mu-li-ha	6056/2606/0500/0761	Kazakh
Ya-sheng-ho-ta-pai- erh-ti	3660/3932/0735/1129/ 2157/3643/4104	Uighur
Hsi-i-ta-a-fu	3097/0131/1795/7093/ 6059	Uighur
Ma Fang-chi	7456/2455/1015	Tunghsiang
Ma Pa-lo	7456/.572/3157	Hui
Han-ssu-shih-san/093./0577/0005	Salar
Mai Cheng-chang	6314/2052/4545	Hui
Ma Wen-kuei	7456/2429/7608	Hui
Ma Chen-tung*	7456/2182/2639	Hui

<u>Name</u>	<u>Numeral Code</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
Chin Feng-shan	6855/7658/1472	Hui
Wang Hung-kuei	3769/3163/1145	Hui
Hu Hsieh-lan	579./1331/3482	Hui
Shou Chien-chih	7446/0256/....	Hui
Lin Ting-hsiang	2651/2019/4382	Hui
Na Cheng-chai	4780/2502/7872	Hui
Chin Chuan-te	6855/0356/1795	Hui
Yang Te-ming	2700/1795/....	Hui
Ma Yuan-wu*	7456/6663/0063	Hui
Chang Chu-chien	1738/.999/0578	Hui
Li Chia-yung	2621/13.1/2837	---
Wang Kun-chou	3769/1507/0719	Hui
Ma Pai-san*	7802/0160/1115	Hui
Keng Chen-chun	5105/1957/0689	Hui
Ma Jen-feng/0088/1496	Hui
Li Chen-min	2621/2182/3046	Hui
Tsung Tai-tung	1350/2760/2768	Hui
Tsung Tai-tang*	1350/2769/2769	Hui
Wang Shou-jen	3769/1108/0088	Hui
Yang Shih-chieh	2799/0013/0267	Hui
Li Ching-yu/2417/3342	Hui
Yang Te-chun*	2799/1795/2504	Hui
Chen Yu-chi	7115/3768/3823	Hui

<u>Name</u>	<u>Numeral Code</u>	<u>Nationality</u>
Liu Shao-lung	0491/4801/7893	Hui
Mei Ching-chai	2734/2417/7872	Hui
Ma Hung-yu	7456/7703/3731	Hui
Chu Yueh-po	2612/2588/3134	Hui
Wang Ching-i	3769/417./0001	Hui
Ma Shih-fen*	7456/0013/5358	Hui
Cheng Lung-hui	6774/7127/1979	Hui
Yang Ming-yuan*	2799/2494/6678	Hui
Yu I	1626/....	Hui
Wang Hsiao-hsi*	3769/4607/3305	Hui
Liu Yuan-i /0756/0001	Hui
His Neng-i	3097/1125/1732	Hui
Wang Shun-liao	3769/2504/.055	Hui
Tao Tieh-shan	1497/6993/1472	Hui
Ma Cheng*	7456/2052	Hui
Li Wen-hsuan /2429/....	Hui
Wang Ko	3769/0344	Hui
Han Tao-san	7281/6670/0088	Hui
Chin Hsiao-tsun	6855/2556/2625	Hui
----- /.... /....	Hui
Ma Shun-tien	7456/.... /....	Hui

APPENDIX B

CHINA HUI CULTURAL ASSOCIATION
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS 1/

Chairman

Liu Ke-ping 0491/2706/1627

Vice-Chairmen

Wang Hsing-jang	2760/5281/6245	Wu Hung-pin	0702/7703/6333
Ma Teng-ai	7456/7506/7224	Chang Po-chuan	1728/0514/1557
Chao Chung-chi	6392/6945/1142	Pai Shou-i	4101/1108/1744
Ma Sung-ting <u>2/</u>	7456/2646/0080		

Members

Ting Chen-te	0002/2182/1795	Yu Te-hai	0060/1795/3189
Yu I	1626/0001	Wang Tzu-chiang	2769/5261/1730
Wang Ping-chieh	3769/0393/0204	Wang Lien-fang	2769/6647/5364
Wang Ko	3769/0344	Fang Chu-ju	2455/4554/1172
Pa Yu-tzu	1572/3768/1964	Ku Hsiu-ying*	0657/4423/5391
Pai Chun-chang	4101/0193/4545	Pai Yen-ting	4101/1693/1694
Pai Feng-kang	4101/7685/1511	Tien Ching-Ching	3944/1777/7230
---lei/7191	Shih Yu-hsia*	4258/3768/7209
Mi Chang-mou	4717/7022/5399	Wu Te-kung	0124/3676/0361

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1. FBID Daily Report, 25 May 1953. (An asterisk after a name denotes a woman.)
 2. Also known as Hachih Abudurakhem.

Li Hsiao-ying	2621/1331/4134	Yu Tsun-yung	0151/1317/3057
Tu Hu-wu	2629/0395/2976	Li Wei-tung	2621/2417/3342
Li Shu	2621/1859	Li Chang-meng	2621/7022/3718
Shen Hsia-hsi	3088/6667/3556	Wu ...-yeh	0702/7703/2814
Wu Yu-tai	0702/1547/3141	Wu Wen-yu	0702/2429/0147
Che Ching-hsiang	5074/2973/4382	Yu Chan-li	4416/0594/2651
Hu Kao-shan	5706/1520/1472	Chin Mou-yao	6855/5399/1471
Chin Mo-sheng	6855/7817/3932	Pai Jang-hua	2157/5980/5478
Wei Chih-tang	1201/4949/1016	Ma Ching-nien	7456/7230/1628
Ma Ssu-i	7456/1835/5030	Malushihsan	7456/0362/0577/ 0005
Ma Feng-tu	7456/7685/0956	Ma Ju-lin	7456/3067/6775
Ma Chen-hua	7456/2182/5478	Ma Chih-ang	7456/1807/7122
Ma Pei-lieh	7456/0012/3525	Ma Chu-hsien*	7456/4554/6513
Ma Hsiao	7456/1321	Ma Lu-wen	7456/6922/2429
Ma Yung-chen	7456/3057/4394	Ma Tzu-shih	7456/1311/1395
Ma Ching-tien	7456/1777/3944	Ma Lo-ting	7456/2867/0800
Ma Yu-huai	7456/3768/2849	Ma Cho-chou	7456/0587/3166
Ma Wu-pen	7456/0523/2609	Ma Shu-hsiu*	7456/2579/4423
Ma Yun-wu	7456/6663/0063	Ma Kung-chin	7456/0361/3866
Ma Chung-ying*	7456/1813/5391	Ma Chai-ju	7456/3419/....
Ma Teng-chiu	7456/7506/0046	Ma Shih-fen	7456/0013/5358
Ma Feng-wen	7456/6785/5254	Ma Chieh-jen	7456/0267/0086
Ma Chun-i	7456/7486	Shan I-chang*	7026/2034/2490
Sung Shih-chieh	1327/0013/3954	Na Chang-chi	4780/7022/7784

Hsia Wen-hsuan	1115/2429/6693	Chang Yu-chang	1455/3768/4545
Tsao Meng-lin	2580/1125/7792	Chang Yu-chen	1728/3768/3791
Chang Hua-tung	1728/0553/2639	Cheng Yao*	4453/3852
Chang Yung-ching	1728/3057/3237	Wen Shao-hao	3306/1421/7729
Yang Chih	2799/1492	Yang Chia-shan	2799/4471/1472
Yang Tsou-tung*	2799/4371/1749	Yang Ko-ying	2799/2654/5391
Yang Hsin	2799/6580	Yang Chao-chun	2799/0340/6874
Yang Nien-chin*	2799/1819/6000	Chao Chun-lu	6392/1317/4389
I Chih-chiang*	7392/1807/1730	Chao Lung-chang	6392/7893/4545
Liu Huan-chang	0491/3562/4545	Liu Hsiu-feng	0491/4423/7364
Liu Shu-ying* / 3219/6391	Mu Jui-mou	4476/3843/5399
Lu Hsueh-chung	4151/1331/1813	Han Tao-jen	7281/6670/0088
Su Pao-chiao	5685/2128/2884	Su Peing*	5685/0393
Lan Ta-keng	5695/1129/6972	Lan Pei-kang	5695/1014/2704

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COMMUNIST DOCTRINE ON RELIGION

Summary:

Recent events in Eastern Europe demonstrate clearly that the existence of a Communist state is incompatible with anything approaching religious freedom. Communists cannot and will not tolerate an unsubmitive religious sect. Communism may preach that religion is a "private affair" for non-Communists, a matter for the individual alone to decide, but the fact remains that Communism is, virtually by definition, pledged to the propagation of atheism and to the destruction first, of organized religion, and, ultimately, of religion itself.

Atheism is propagated actively wherever Communists are in power. Communists conceal or deny the fundamental irreconcilability between religion and Communism only when such a denial is essential for tactical purposes -- when, for example, it would otherwise be impossible to gain mass support for Communist aims in a predominantly Catholic country. For the Communist there is no real contradiction between Marxist advocacy of atheism and the Party policy of catering at a particular moment to religious believers in some states. The first is the goal, the second merely a means to that end. Communists have only one goal as far as religion is concerned and that is its complete eradication.

I. Communist Doctrine on Religion.

The working philosophy of Communism is the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of materialism. Marxism not only incorporates the hostility of materialism toward religion -- in line with its search for a purely material explanation of all natural phenomena -- but extends that hostility to the point of active combat with religious beliefs. Marxism's avowed intention is the eradication of all religions.

Communists do not attempt to conceal this intention from the inner circles of the Party. In fact, the official program of the Soviet Communist Party specifically outlines the methods by which the eradication of religion is to be achieved. Communist literature is replete with attacks on religion and with support of atheism. The following are typical examples of this anti-religious position.

Regardless of the date of origin, these quotations are still cited in contemporary Soviet sources to justify and explain the Party's stand on the religious question. Their contemporary usage also shows once again that there has been no fundamental change in the Communist viewpoint on religion since the days of Lenin.

"Dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and the theoretical foundation of the Communist Party, is incompatible with religion....The world outlook of the Party is based on scientific data, whereas religion contradicts science. As the Party bases its activity on scientific foundations, it is bound to oppose religion. (Molodoi Bolshhevik - Young Bolshhevik - No. 5-6, 1946, p. 58.) For the conception of the world from a religious point of view is incorrect....It is a mutilated understanding of the world and of the mutual relationships of men. (Yaroslavsky, Chief of League of Militant Atheists, Religion in USSR, Moscow, 1939.) The world outlook (of communism) is irreconcilable to any kind of superstition, religion or idealism. (On Soviet Socialist Society - Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1948, p. 400.)

"But while Marxism as materialism is absolutely atheistic and resolutely hostile to all religion....it goes farther than earlier materialist schools by applying the materialist philosophy to the field of history, to the field of social sciences. We must combat religion: that is the rudiment of all materialism, and consequently of Marxism....But Marxism goes further. It says: We must know how to combat religion, and in order to do so we must explain the source of faith and religion among the masses materialistically. The fight against religion must not be confined to abstract ideological preaching or reduced to such preaching. The fight must be linked up with the concrete practical work of the class movement, which aims at eliminating the social roots of religion. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers Party Toward Religion", 1908. Selected Works, Int'l Publishers, New York, 1943, vol. XI, p. 666.)

"(For) religion is the opium of the people. Religion is a kind of spiritual gin in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to any decent human life. (Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," 1905, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 658.) Religion is a bandage over the eyes of men, preventing them from seeing the world as it actually is. (Yaroslavsky, op.cit.) There is no place or job for God in the universe. (Radio Moscow, June 11, 1948) Every religious idea, every idea of god, even flirting with the idea of god is unutterable vileness....of the most dangerous kind, "contagion" of the most abominable kind. Millions of sins, filthy deeds, acts of violence and physical contagions.... are far less dangerous than the subtle, spiritual ideas of a god decked out in the smartest "ideological" costumes. (Lenin, "Letter to Gorky," 1913, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 675-676.) It is not religion that creates man, but man who creates religion....religion is the groan of the down-trodden creature....it is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion, as an illusory happiness of the people, is a requisite of their real happiness. (Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law). Religion is the opium of the people - this dictum of Marx's is the cornerstone of the whole Marxist view on religion. Marxism has always

regarded all modern religions and churches and all religious organizations as instruments of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to drug the working class. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party Toward Religion", 1909, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 664.) The explanation of our program therefore necessarily includes an explanation of the true historical and economic roots of religious obscurantism. Our propaganda necessarily includes the propaganda of atheism...(Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," 1905, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 660.)"

II. Communists on Religion Before the Seizure of Power.

While there is no question as to Communism's ultimate aim in regard to religion, the means by which that aim is to be secured differ. They vary depending on whether or not the Communist Party is the Party in power, and if so, how firmly it is in control. Where the Party wields only minor political influence, where its control of the state is not complete, and where religion plays an important part in national life, the Party organization carefully avoids any public avowal of its antireligious program. Instead the religious question is sidetracked as completely as possible, church members are welcomed into the Party ranks and the Communists preach the compatibility of religion and Karl Marx. Efforts may be made to limit the temporal power of a church hierarchy, but even so, the rank and file are continually assured of the inviolability of their religious convictions. (Communist spokesmen are unanimous in their conviction that open war on religion is the best way of strengthening religious convictions and so must be avoided at all costs.) At the same time, Communist authorities may foster minor religious denominations as a means of dividing and weakening the dominant religious faction.

The temporary adherence to these tactics in no way lessens the basic Communist intention of eradicating religious beliefs; rather, it is another example of the use of any means to obtain an end. The moral aspects of this and other deliberate deceptions for tactical purposes is covered in the authoritative Soviet definition of morality -- "'moral' is anything which aids the cause of the Revolution" (Kratki Filosoficheski Slovar - Short Philosophical Dictionary - Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1941, p. 177).

"Why do we not declare in our programme that we are atheists? Why do we not refuse Christians and those who believe in God admission to our Party?....(Because) unity in the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed class for the creation of paradise on earth is more important to us than unity of opinion among the proletarians about a paradise in heaven. That is why we do not and must not proclaim our atheism in our programme; that is why we do not and must not forbid proletarians who still cherish certain relics of the old superstitions to approach our Party. (Lenin, "Socialism and Religion," 1905, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 660-661.)

"Engels frequently condemned the efforts of people who desired to.... introduce an explicit avowal of atheism, in the sense of declaring war on religion, into the programme of the worker's party....he stated that such a declaration of war was the best means of reviving interest in religion....Engels demanded that the worker's party should know how to work patiently at the task of organizing and educating the proletariat, and not venture into a political war on religion. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party Toward Religion", 1909, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 664-665.)

"The Communist Party is guided by the conviction that only the realization of conscious and systematic social and economic activity of the masses will lead to the disappearance of religious prejudices. The aim of the Party is finally to destroy the ties between the exploiting classes and the organization of religious propaganda, at the same time helping the toiling masses actually to liberate their minds from religious superstitions and organizing on a wide scale scientific-educational and anti-religious propaganda. It is however necessary carefully to avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of believers which leads only to the strengthening of religious fanaticism. (Program of Communist Party of the Soviet Union - First adopted at the VIII Congress of the Party, March 18-23, 1919 - still in force.) (For) religion is like a nail; the harder you hit it, the deeper it goes into the wood. (Lunacharski - Minister of Education of the RSFSR)

"Let us take an example. The proletariat in a given district and in a given branch of industry is divided, let us assume, into an advanced section of fairly class-conscious Communists, who are, of course, atheists, and rather backward workers who are still connected with the countryside and the peasantry, still believe in God, go to church, and are even under the influence of the local priest who, let us suppose, has organized a Christian labor union. Let us assume furthermore that the economic struggle in this locality has resulted in a strike. It is the duty of a Marxist to place the success of the strike movement above everything else, to combat vigorously such a division. Under such circumstances, atheistic propaganda may be both unnecessary and harmful - not from fear of scaring away the backward sections, of losing a seat in the elections, and so on, but from consideration for the real progress of the class struggle, which in the conditions of modern capitalist society is a hundred times better adapted to convert Christian workers to Communism and to atheism than is bald atheistic preaching. He who preached atheism at such a moment and in such circumstances would only be playing into the hands of the priest and priests, who desire nothing better than that the division of the workers according to their participation in the strike movement be replaced by their division according to their beliefs in God....A Marxist must be

a materialist, i.e., an enemy of religion but he must be a dialectical materialist, i.e., one who puts the fight against religion not abstractly, not on the basis of abstract, purely theoretical, unvarying propaganda, but concretely, on the basis of the class struggle which is going on in practice....

"It is from this standpoint that all particular questions concerning the attitude of Communism to religion must be determined....We must not only admit workers who preserve the belief in God into the Communist Party, but must deliberately set out to recruit them....in order to educate them in the spirit of our programme, and we will not permit an active struggle against our programme. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party Toward Religion", 1909, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 669-670.)

"Communism will protest against persecution of Catholicism and Protestantism, it will defend the right of nations to profess whatever religion they choose, but at the same time, proceeding from a thorough understanding of the interests of the proletariat it will agitate both against Catholicism and against Protestantism and against Orthodoxy so as to bring the triumph of the socialist world outlook. (Stalin - Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, p. 59., Int'l Publishers, New York, 1942.) "

III. Communists on Religion after Seizure of Power.

A. The Party

Once the Communist organization seizes political power and control of the state, religious manifestations on the part of Party members are no longer tolerated as before. The campaign to eliminate believers from the Party ranks becomes more open and more intense. Intra-Party propaganda increasingly stresses the atheistic aspects of Marxist philosophy; at the same time both direct and indirect pressure are exerted on those Party members who cling to old dogmas or rituals. Communists who continue their observance of religious rites despite these measures are eventually purged from the Party ranks and only convinced atheists accepted as candidates for membership.

B. The Public

For the general public, the fiction of Marxist compatibility with religion is dropped only after the Party has consolidated its hold on the political apparatus and can safely withstand widespread opposition to its policies. Religious organizations are thus deprived of their properties, the clergy are often put on the state payroll (in spite of Communist

championing of the separation of church and state) and are prohibited all educational activity. The nation's school system is completely secularized and religious instruction to the young curtailed. Eventually, propagation of religion among school children becomes a criminal offense, as in the USSR. At the same time, the state gears its entire educational and informational apparatus to the dissemination of a materialist philosophy and the atheism expressive of that philosophy.

Wherever possible, the Communist regime avoids open assaults on the clergy of any church, preferring to undermine clerical influence gradually through atheistic education of the young. If the clergy accept a Communist-dictated modus vivendi between church and state, the authorities permit it relative freedom of ritual, but abrogation of the right to give religious instruction is generally the price of that limited freedom. The eventual disintegration of the rite is assured by its inability to propagate itself.

The refusal of strongly organized religious sect to capitulate to state demands spotlights the doctrinal issue and focuses attention on religion, a situation the Communist state prefers to avoid. If church opposition assumes a definitive enough character, the general public is forced to recognize the basic irreconcilability between Marxist dogma and religious tenets, and to choose between the two. Communist authorities must then resort to active repression to eliminate the power of the church hierarchy and to divorce the public from its religious inclinations.

In the long run, the avowed goal of Communism is the eradication of religion. Any temporary modus vivendi concluded between church and state in a Communist controlled state only works to the advantage of the Communists by allowing them time to undermine, slowly but surely, the popular support of any particular sect and the foundations of religion in general.

A. The Party

"It is not to be tolerated that even the smallest manifestation of religiousness should be observed among Communists. (Zarya Vostoka - Dawn of the East - January 27-28, 1949.)

"There is no room in the ranks of the Party for 'Communists'.... who hinder the thorough development of anti-religious propaganda....A young man cannot be a member of the Young Communist League unless he is free of religious convictions. (Komsomolskaya Pravda - Young Communist Truth - October 18, 1947.) For us Communists, and Young Communists, religion never was and never will be a 'private matter'. The high status of Communist and Young Communist can be applied only to one who is not only completely free from religious prejudice, but who also considers it as his most important duty to educate Soviet people and Soviet youth in the real spirit of scientific Marxist-Leninist views. (Molodoi Bolshevik - Young Bolshevik - May 1948.)

"For a Komsomol it is impossible and inadmissible to believe in God and to observe religious rituals. (Komsomolskaya Pravda - Young Communist Truth - October 18, 1947.)

"Religion should be declared a private affair....But the meaning of these words must be precisely defined so as to leave no room for misunderstanding. We demand that religion should be a private affair as far as the state is concerned, but under no circumstances can we regard religion as a private affair as far as our own Party is concerned. (Lenin, "Socialism and Religion", Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 659-660.)

"In the course of 1948, forty-nine persons were excluded from the Party (Communist Party of Georgia) for the observance of religious rites. Characteristically, among them are persons with middle and even higher education. Thus, for example, a teacher of the Aspindza Raion seven-year school....and her husband, an inspector of the Statistical Administration of Georgia,....both with a higher education, baptised four of their children. Both were expelled from the Party. Also excluded from the Party was a kolkhoz member of the Engels' Kolkhoz in Sachkhere Raion who had a middle education....who in September of last year arranged a funeral to which he invited a priest and at the same time, on that very day, baptised two of his children. The facts again and again remind us of the necessity of strengthening the anti-religious propaganda among the population. (Zarya Vostoka - Dawn of the East - January 28, 1949.)

"A person cannot act correctly, cannot act in an organized manner as a Communist, as a Leninist, if his brain is poisoned by religion. (Yaroslavsky, op. cit.) Although the Party demands religion be considered a private matter as far as the state is concerned, it does not regard the fight against the opium of the people, the fight against religious superstition, etc., as a private matter. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party toward Religion," 1909, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 671.)

"Anti-religious propaganda forms an integral part of Communist education. We educate the youth in a materialistic world outlook, a scientific understanding of the phenomena of nature and of social life. Religious superstitions and prejudices are unscientific. That is why Young Communist League members must be not only convinced atheists and opponents of all superstition, but must actively combat the spread of superstitions and prejudices among youth. (Komsomolski Rabotnik - Young Communist Worker - Moscow, 1934, No. 11, June 1947, p. 27.)"

B. The Public

"The basic work in communist education and the overcoming of the survivals of religiousness must be carried out by the school teachers in the process of teaching the foundations of the sciences....the basic task of communist education and overcoming the survivals of religiousness in our present condition is to prove to the pupils the complete contrast and complete irreconcilability between science -- the real and correct reflection of the objectively existing world in the consciousness of the people -- and religion as a fantastic, distorted and, consequently, harmful reflection of the world in the consciousness of the people....the school must pose the question before parents who are believers as to the extreme harmfulness....and inadmissibility of imposing religious influence on children....Parents who are religious believers in the great majority of cases realize that they have no right and that it is not in their interest to maim their children morally and to place them in a dual situation by bringing them up at home on religious prejudices which are in radical contradiction with the true scientific instruction and education of the school. (Narodnoye Obrazovaniye - Popular Education - "Some Aspects of Education", April 1949.)

"The propaganda of atheism and the popularization of the scientific viewpoint has been a vital part of the activities of educational and cultural organizations in Soviet Russia from the first days of the Soviet regime. (Novy Mir - New World - No. 1-2, 1946, p. 183.)

"But the Communist Party never put the struggle against religious superstitions in the foreground. The Party believed that work in overcoming religious superstition should be subordinated to the principle task, the organization and consolidation of the working people in the struggle for the victory of Communism. (Molodoi Bolshevik - Young Bolshevik - No. 5-6, 1946, p. 58-59.) To declare war on religion....is the best means of reviving interest in religion. (Lenin, "Attitude of Workers' Party toward Religion" 1909, Selected Works, vol. XI, p. 664.) A persistent and patient propaganda of the scientific materialistic world outlook represents in present conditions the most reliable means of fighting religion. (Molodoi Bolshevik - Young Bolshevik - No. 5-6, 1946, p. 59-69.)

"The Party cannot be neutral toward religion and it does conduct anti-religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice....It will continue to carry on propaganda against religious prejudices because that is the

best way undermining the influence of the reactionary clergy who support the exploiting class and who preach submission to these classes....Anti-religious propaganda is the means by which the complete liquidation of the reactionary clergy must be brought about. (Stalin, "Interview with American Labor Delegation", 1927, Leninism, Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, Moscow, 1934; vol. I, p. 386.)"

C. Soviet Laws on Religion Now in Effect.

1. "Instruction of the under-aged or minors in religious doctrines in state or private educational institutions and schools or the violation of the rules established for this is punishable by corrective labor for a period of one year." (Article 122 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, enacted 1926)

2. "Religious Organizations are forbidden:

- (a) to create mutual assistance funds, cooperatives, or unions of producers;
- (b) to extend mutual support to their members;
- (c) to organize special prayer or other gatherings for children, youths, or women or to organize gatherings, groups, circles, or offices, either bible, literary, handiwork or labor for instruction of religion, etc.

The instruction of any religious faith whatsoever is not allowed in state, social or private educational institutions. Theological courses may be opened with the permission of the NKVD, or in Autonomous Republics, of the appropriate Central Executive Committee." (Law of April 1929 - RSFSR Code)

3. "Instruction of any type of religious doctrines given in schools to minors and the under-aged is one of the forms of infringement on the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the USSR constitution. For the commission of criminal action....the type and character of the religious doctrine taught are of no importance." (Trainin, A., Menshagin, V., and Vyshinskaya, Z., Commentaries on the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, 2nd edition, Moscow, 1946, p. 168.)

Soviet Definition of Religion

"Religion--Distorted, fantastic reflection in people's minds of the natural and social forces ruling over them; 'one type of spiritual oppression inflicted everywhere on the popular masses who are oppressed by eternal work for others, by want and loneliness' (Lenin, Vol. 10, p.65). The basic characteristics of all religion are a belief in supernatural powers, which supposedly rule the world, and submission to them. Religion has elements in common with philosophical realism and contains gnosiological roots: theories and hypotheses separated from nature, personification and sublimation of the forces of nature. Philosophical idealism is the form and method of the defense of religion.

"Religious beliefs and the rites and institutions (church and others) corresponding to them are not eternal. They arise and exist only under certain historical conditions. Over a very long period of human history, people did not know any religion. The appearance of religious beliefs in primitive society became possible with the development of thought and articulate speech. Religion arose as a reflex of the impotence of primitive man before natural phenomena which threatened him and which he did not understand. This impotence gave rise in the heads of primitive men to the thought of the existence in the surrounding world of special, supernatural beings capable of bestowing blessings or of delivering misfortune on people. Having personified objects of nature and giving them supernatural powers, the savage tried to influence them with incantations, magic, and ceremonial rites. Elements of magic are contained in all modern religions. In a class society the roots of religious beliefs are primarily class roots. The helplessness of people before the elemental processes of the development of an exploiting society inevitably breeds belief in miracles, in a better life beyond the grave. 'The social oppression of the toiling masses, their seemingly complete helplessness before the blind forces of capitalism, which inflicts daily and hourly a thousand times more horrible sufferings, a thousand times more savage tortures on the rank and file of the working people than any kind of unusual event like war, earthquake, etc.--this is the most basic present-day root of religion.' (Lenin, Vol. 15, pp. 374-375). In the absurd, ridiculous fairy tales of churchgoers and believers concerning God, Paradise, and the kingdom of heaven people look for salvation from the misfortunes and sufferings caused by the exploiting social system.

VIII. APPENDICES

- A. China Islamic Association Officers and Members
- B. China Hui Cultural Association Officers and Members

"As one of the elements of the superstructure, religion plays an active role in strengthening the economic base which gave rise to it, in strengthening the system founded on the enslavement and exploitation of man by man. Religion has always played a reactionary role, has fortified people's impotence before nature, has served as a weapon for oppressing the toilers, and in the present day in all bourgeois countries religion is the weapon of the imperialist bourgeoisie in the struggle against the camp of democracy and socialism. Propagating submissiveness, humility, rejection of the struggle to remake the world, to struggle for socialism, all in the name of being rewarded after death, 'in the other world', religion helps to strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie. Religion is the opium of the people--such is Marx' definition. Insisting that everything in nature and society occurs according to the will of the gods, rejecting the objective laws of phenomena, denying man's ability to get to know the surrounding world, religion prevents people from knowing the laws of nature and society and from using them in the interest of society. Religion has been and is the irreconcilable enemy of progress and science.

"Socialism destroys the material roots which nourish religious beliefs. Together with the disappearance of the social system which is based on the exploitation of man by man, the conditions which breed religion disappear also. However, one cannot overcome religious prejudices in the consciousness of people at one stroke. In its development consciousness lags behind the development of the material conditions of the life of people. Therefore, in the consciousness of backward people, religious prejudices remain as survivals of the capitalist past even after the destruction of capitalism. They can be and are actually overcome gradually, in the process of the active participation of the broad masses in the practical construction of a communist society, in the process of communist education. In the USSR and countries of people's democracies there is genuine freedom of conscience. In the USSR the church was separated from the state, and the school from the church, as far back as 1918. Each citizen can be a believer or a non-believer. That is a matter of his own conscience. The Communist Party, as the vanguard of the toilers which is fighting for their liberation from all oppression, cannot be neutral towards religion, because religion is a form of spiritual oppression. On all its activity the Communist Party helps the toilers to free themselves from religious superstitions and to master the scientific world-outlook. Of great importance in overcoming religious superstitions are the propagation of the Marxist-Leninist world-outlook, cultural-educational work, and extensive propaganda of natural-scientific and social-political knowledge. A profound illumination of questions of religion and of the attitude of the proletarian party to it is given in such articles by Lenin as Socialism and Religion, The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion, and others."

M. Rezentel' and P. Yudin, ed., Kratkiy Filosoficheskiy Slovar' (Short Philosophical Dictionary), 4th ed., State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1954, pp. 510-512.

"Religious Survivals" Impeding the Soviet Transition to Communism

Extracts from the entry on "Survivals of Capitalism in the Consciousness of People," in M. Rozenal' & P. Yudin, ed., Kratkiy Filosoficheskiy Slovar' (Short Philosophical Dictionary), 4th ed., State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1954, pp 448-450.

"Survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of a certain number of the toilers are manifested primarily in a non-socialist attitude towards work ... A non-socialist attitude towards social property, the squandering of social wealth, a negligent, unbusinesslike attitude towards it, the nonfulfillment of the instructions of organs of the Soviet government for safeguarding social property and socialist law and order--all these things are also serious survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of people. Survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of people also includes deceiving the Communist Party and the Soviet state, concealing and distorting the truth, violating state discipline, persecuting criticism, nationalism, fawning before foreign achievements, individualism, lack of discipline in private life, bureaucratism, et al. One of the survivals of the past are religious prejudices, which obscure the consciousness of the backward section of the toilers. ...

"Now, when the Soviet people are successfully carrying out the building of communism, the task of struggling against survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of people is of the first importance. Unless survivals of capitalism in people's consciousness are completely overcome, the transition from socialism to communism is impossible."

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECREE ON ATHEIST PROPAGANDA

Communist Party Central Committee Decree, "On Errors in Conducting Scientific-Atheist Propaganda Among The Public."

"In conformity with its program, the Communist Party is conducting scientific-educational propaganda of the materialist world outlook, directed toward constant raising of the consciousness of the toiling masses and toward their gradual liberation from religious convictions. In this the Party has always considered it necessary to avoid offending the feelings of believers in any way.

"The Party Central Committee is in possession of facts which testify that of late gross errors have been committed in scientific-atheist propaganda among the public in many localities.

"Instead of the development of systematic and painstaking work to spread knowledge of natural sciences and an ideological struggle against religion, some central and local newspapers and also the statements of some lecturers and speakers have contained insulting attacks upon the clergy and believers who perform religious rites. Cases occur when, in the press or in statements by propagandists, some ministers of religious cults and believers are depicted without justification as people unworthy of political trust. In a number of areas there have been cases of administrative interference by local organizations and individuals in the activity of religious associations and groups, and also of a rude attitude toward the clergy.

"Such errors in antireligious propaganda are fundamentally at variance with the program and policy of the Communist Party toward religion and believers, and they are a violation of the Party's repeated instructions on the impermissibility of offending the feelings of believers.

"The Party Central Committee considers it wrong that many Party organizations have held aloof from daily guidance of scientific-atheist propaganda and do not show concern for the careful selection of propaganda cadres. Articles in the press, lectures and reports are frequently allowed to be made by people who are ignorant in science and in questions of atheist propaganda, and sometimes even by hack workers who mainly know only anecdotes and tales about clergy-men. Such an irresponsible approach to the selection of authors of articles, lecturers and speakers and the absence of proper control by Party organizations over the correct direction of scientific-atheist propaganda do serious harm to the educational, cultural-enlightening work being conducted among the public.

"The Party Central Committee decrees:

"That province and territory Party committees, Party Central Committees of the Union republics and all Party organizations be required resolutely to eliminate errors in atheist propaganda and in

no want to permit future offending of the feelings of believers or clergymen or administrative interference in the activity of the church. It must be borne in mind that actions insulting the church, clergy and citizens who are believers are incompatible with the policy of the Party and state in the conducting of scientific-atheist propaganda and are contrary to the U.S.S.R. Constitution, which grants freedom of conscience to Soviet citizens.

"As a result of profound changes in the social-economic conditions of life, the liquidation of exploiter classes and the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., as a result of the successful development of science and the general rise in the level of culture in the country, the majority of the population of the Soviet Union has long been freed of religious survivals; the consciousness of the working people has grown immeasurably. At the same time, one cannot but take into account the fact that there are also many citizens who, while actively participating in the life of the country and honorably fulfilling their civic duty to the motherland, are still under the influence of various kinds of religious beliefs. The Party has always demanded and will continue to demand a considerate, mindful attitude toward these believers. All the more is it stupid and harmful to cast political doubt on Soviet citizens because of their religious convictions. Profound, patient, skillfully arranged scientific-atheist propaganda among believers will help them in the long run to free themselves from religious delusions. On the other hand, administrative measures of any kind and insulting attacks on believers and clergy can only do harm, can only lead to strengthening and even intensifying their religious convictions.

"In conducting scientific-atheist propaganda, account should be taken of the fact that it is impossible to identify the position of the church in the land of socialism with the position of the church in an exploiter society. In bourgeois society the church is a support and instrument of the ruling classes, who use it for the purpose of enslaving the working people. This does not preclude the possibility that individual clergymen even in a capitalist society may and do go over to the point of view of the working people on a number of important questions of politics. However, for behavior contrary to the interests of the exploiter classes these clergymen are generally subjected to persecutions of all kinds from the church and government circles of capitalist countries.

"In Tsarist Russia the church faithfully served the autocracy, the landlords and capitalists, justified the cruel exploitation of the masses and supported the exploiters in the struggle against the working people. It is also known that immediately after the victory of the October socialist revolution, during the years of the Civil War and later, many religious organizations and groups of the clergy remained hostile to the Soviet regime. Because of this, individual ministers of cults were prosecuted by the state not for their religious but for their antigovernment activity, directed against the interests of the Soviet people and for the benefit of internal counterrevolution and international imperialism. It is natural, therefore, that the Soviet people's struggle against the enemies of the socialist state

should have included a struggle against those reactionary representatives of the church who were engaged in activity hostile to the Soviet people. At the present time, as a result of the triumph of Socialism and liquidation of the exploiter classes in the U.S.S.R., the social roots of religion have been undermined and the base on which the church relied has been destroyed. The majority of clergymen, as the facts testify, now take a loyal stand with respect to the Soviet regime. Therefore, the struggle against religious beliefs should be regarded now as an ideological struggle of the scientific, materialist world outlook against an antiscientific, religious world outlook.

"Rectification of mistakes committed in antireligious propaganda must not lead to a relaxation of scientific-atheist propaganda, which is an integral part of the communist education of the working people and has as its aim the dissemination of scientific, materialist knowledge among the masses and the liberation of believers from the influence of religious beliefs.

"Whereas, in relation to the state, religion is a private matter, and therefore the church is separated from the state, the Communist Party, which bases itself on the only correct, scientific world outlook--Marxism-Leninism--and its theoretical foundation, dialectical materialism, cannot adopt an apathetic neutral attitude toward religion, an ideology which has nothing in common with science.

"Our party has always considered and considers it its indispensable duty to promote the development of natural, technical and social sciences by all opportunities and means. Only on the basis of modern progressive science is it possible to make thorough and full use of the riches of nature in the interests of all mankind. Only on the basis of science is it possible to achieve a fresh and considerable advance in development of industry and agriculture, to ensure higher labor productivity and thereby substantially promote the prosperity and cultural level of the people. Proceeding from this, the Communist Party educates Soviet people in a scientific world outlook and wages a struggle of ideas against religious ideology as an anti-scientific ideology. The fundamental opposition of science and religion is obvious. Whereas science relies on facts, scientific experiment and conclusions strictly checked and confirmed by life, any religion bases itself only on Biblical and other traditions, on fantastic fabrications. Modern scientific discoveries in the natural and social sciences convincingly refute religious dogmas. Science cannot be reconciled with fabricated religious concepts about the life of nature and man, hence it is incompatible with religion. Science helps mankind to delve more and more deeply into the objective laws of the development of nature and society, helps to place the forces of nature at the service of man; science helps to increase man's awareness and raise his culture; but religion clouds man's consciousness, condemning him to passivity in the face of the forces of nature and fettering his creative activeness and initiative.

"Taking all this into account, the Party considers profound, systematic scientific-atheist propaganda essential, without, however, permitting the religious feelings of believers and also of Clergymen to be offended.

"The Central Committee reminds us that the basis of scientific-atheist propaganda should be elucidation in popular form of the more important phenomena in the life of nature and society, of such questions as the formation of the universe and the origin of life and man on earth, of discoveries in astronomy, biology, physiology, physics, chemistry and other sciences which confirm the correctness of materialist views on the development of nature and society.

"The Party Central Committee emphasizes that scientific-atheist propaganda requires the greatest care and thought in the selection of lecturers, speakers and authors of articles and pamphlets on anti-religious subjects. In this work cadres should be enlisted which are particularly qualified in a scientific regard: school teachers, teachers of technical schools and higher educational establishments, doctors, agricultural specialists, workers in various scientific research institutions, literature and arts workers and others capable of explaining convincingly the antiscientific nature of religion from the standpoint of a materialist world outlook.

"The Party Central Committee considers that positive results in educational work directed toward overcoming religious survivals can be achieved only on condition of further development of all our cultural-enlightening work among the working people, of considerable improvement in the activity of culture centers, libraries, reading rooms, lecture halls, parks of culture and rest and other cultural-enlightenment institutions. Therefore the task of Party, state and public organizations consists in fundamentally improving cultural-enlightening work among the public and thereby achieving a further rise in the cultural level of the working people.--N. KHRUSHCHEV, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Nov. 10, 1954. "

(Pravda, Nov. 11, 1954)

The Soviet View on Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam

"BUDDHISM--one of the three most widespread religions (together with Christianity and Islam)

"Origin and Doctrines. Buddhist religious literature attributes the creation of Buddhism to the Buddha Sakya-Muni, who supposedly appeared in the 6-5th centuries B.C. in the figure of the Indian prince Gautama. Reactionary bourgeois science repeats this version. An analysis of Buddhist literature and archaeological materials of the 2nd-1st centuries B.C. bears irrefutable evidence to the fact that the myth of the Buddha Sakya-Muni was created by the Buddhist church comparatively late in order to propagate Buddhism more successfully. The earliest biography of Sakya-Muni was written in the 1st century A.D., and the most popular narrative about him, the 'Lalita-vistara,' was written in the 2nd-4th centuries A.D.

"Buddhism, like all other religions, was not created by any special person, but originated in the conditions of social life. In the 6th-5th centuries B.C. in India, especially in its northern part, the process of the development of slaveholding relations and the formation of large slaveholding states was intensified. This period is characterized by the appearance of various religious teachings on the equality of all people. The appearance of these teachings was a reflection of the dissatisfaction of the downtrodden and persecuted freeholders and lower classes of the slaveholding cities. Early Buddhism, equalizing all people in 'suffering' and in the right to 'salvation', was one of these teachings. As a result of its characteristic propagation of passivity and reconciliation with reality, the ruling class did not look upon Buddhism as a dangerous doctrine and not only did not subject it to persecution but, on the contrary, supported it. Moreover, the slaveholding aristocracy soon adopted Buddhism for its own ideological weapon, inasmuch as Brahmanism--a religion which had arisen in the epoch of the disintegration of the primitive-communal system and which sanctified tribal divisions--could not serve as a satisfactory ideological basis for the large slaveholding states which had been formed. In addition, the slaveholding aristocracy perceived in Buddhism an anti-priest tendency which was useful to it, inasmuch as Brahmanism propounded the privileged status of priests within the slaveholding aristocracy. With the growth of slaveholding and the formation of large states, the slaveholding aristocracy as a whole came out against special privileges for one of its component groups. In the 3rd century B.C., Asoka, the king of Magadha of the Maurya dynasty which had united the larger part of India, adopted Buddhism and zealously forwarded its propagation in India and beyond its borders. The teachings of humility and submissiveness became the main elements in Buddhism. In those parts of India where the process of the development of slaveholding relations proceeded with less intensity, the basic mass of the population continued to adhere to the old, communal religious views.

"Under the patronage of the Maurya kings the first Buddhist councils were called, at which representatives of various small sects and tendencies tried to establish agreement on problems of dogma and

organization. Buddhist monasteries began appearing from the 2nd to the 1st centuries B.C. The Buddhist cult was further developed; Buddhist temples were built, etc. ...

"Early Buddhism was called Hinayana ('small chariot' or 'narrow path' of salvation). In the 1st century A. D. in the northwestern part of India a new form of Buddhism arose--the Mahayana ('large chariot', 'wide path' of salvation), in the dogma and cult of which a large place is occupied by Bodhisatvas--deities which render help in 'salvation.' Buddhist worship included ancient popular invocations of numerous gods and spirits; in order to intensify emotional influences Buddhist ritual makes extensive use of the graphic arts, music, luxuriant trappings, ritual dances, etc.

"The ideologists of the exploiting classes tried to touch up Buddhism and declared it to be an 'atheistic' religion or a 'purely philosophical' system. In the epoch of imperialism bourgeois obscurantists, trying to place Buddhism at the service of a refined fideism, not only supported the positions of Buddhism in the colonial and dependent countries of the Orient, but propagated it in Europe and America. Only Soviet science was able correctly to expose the roots, the historical path, and the reactionary essence of Buddhism, to show its real role in exploiting the toiling masses. 'All religion is contradictory to science'. (I.V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 10, pp 132-133). The idealistic world-view of Buddhism is the darkest kind of mysticism. Materialist teachings in ancient India developed in the struggle against the idealistic mysticism of Buddhism. The idealistic mysticism of Buddhism teaches that the visible world is the manifestation of a stream of non-material, mystical 'particles'--of unknowable 'dharma's.' Certain 'combinations' of 'dharma's' generate individual consciousness. The outer world is declared to be merely an illusion of this consciousness. On the basis of the ancient Indian animistic ideas of the transmigration of souls, Buddhism propounded the doctrine of the reincarnation of living beings, affirming that the death of a living being is a manifestation of the disintegration of a certain 'combination' of 'dharma's,' after which a new 'combination' of 'dharma's' is formed. New 'combinations' of 'dharma's' are predetermined by 'karma'--the sum of all 'sins' and 'virtues' in the previous cycle of incarnations. A preponderance of 'virtues' over 'sins' guarantees a better reincarnation. The ideal, according to the teaching of Buddhism, is the attainment of 'nirvana' (literally, 'extinction')--the complete cessation of the process of reincarnation and liberation, therefore, from suffering, which, according to Buddhism, makes up the essence of life. Moreover, proponents of Buddhism are no different from proponents of Christianity, who '...proclaim all the villainies of the oppressors against the oppressed either as just punishment for the original and other sins or as trials which God in his great wisdom grants his stoning people.' (K.Marx, see K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol.5, p 173). Buddhism declared that the enslavement of the toilers was the result of their sins and 'errors' in former incarnations, and in this way, like all religions in a class society, trying to reconcile the toilers and oppressor to poverty and to their lack of rights, to instill in them the slave psychology of patience and submissiveness

in the name of a future illusory nirvana. Buddhist dogma on re-incarnation, which maintains that today's mighty ruler can be a slave or an animal in his next incarnation, and that a slave can be a rajah in his next incarnation, is designed to turn the oppressed away from the struggle against the exploiters, to defend the interests of the ruling classes, to suppress the class protest of the toilers.

"Hypocritically propagating non-resistance to violence, Buddhism, as the ideological weapon of the oppressors, became the defender of the violence of the exploiters towards the oppressed. The Buddhist pantheon consists of a tremendous collection of gods--buddhas and boddhisatvas. According to Buddhist concepts, the principle gods--buddhas--are surrounded by an assemblage of less important gods--assistants, among whom are terrible, furious guards who exterminate 'heretics and atheists.' Some Buddhist orders and sects place in the center of their worship the buddha Sakya-Muni; others give preference to the future buddha Maitreya, gigantic depictions of which are erected in temples. Still others made the buddha Amitaba, the leader of paradise, the main god. The complete bankruptcy of the thesis of bourgeois scholars of the 'atheism' of Buddhism is beyond question.

"Diffusion of Buddhism Outside India. The coexistence of Buddhism and Brahmanism in India gradually brought them closer and closer together and promoted the formulation of a new ideological system--the religion of Hinduism, which was more applicable to the feudalism which was developing in India with its peculiarities (the presence of survivals of primitive-communal relations, the stability of the rural community, the presence of slavery, the caste system, the differences in the level of the social-economic development of the various nationalities, et al.). In the period of the disintegration of slaveholding despotisms and the decline of cities in the early middle ages. Buddhism, which was not supported by the central authorities, gradually fell into decline and Buddhist monasteries, which had amassed tremendous wealth over the centuries, became an easy prey for the feudal lords during the frequent civil wars. Already by the beginning of the 10th century, Buddhism lost its importance in India. At the present time, the number of Buddhists in India is insignificant.

"Having lost its importance in India, Buddhism became widespread beyond its borders and for centuries played a large role in the feudal enslavement of the toilers of Central and Eastern Asia--in the island of Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, China, Mongolia, Japan, and other countries. Adapting itself to local conditions, the Buddhist church and monasteries, with their class-sharpened and flexible doctrines, with their organizational experience and emotional rites, became diffused in countries where the old religions lost their importance or where the class struggle demanded an intensification of the spiritual enslavement of the toiling masses. Engels wrote: 'Great historical turning points in history were accompanied by changes in religion only to the extent that one speaks of three world religions existing up to the present time: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam. The old spontaneously arising tribal or national religions did not have

"HINDUISM--the name of a religious system embracing a complex of the most varied beliefs of the majority of the population of present-day India, beginning with religions with complex theological doctrines and ending with primitive beliefs inherited from a primitive-communal system (animism, totemism, fetishism, etc.).

"The religious system of India was developed in the period of the early Indian middle ages as a most important element of the feudal ideological superstructure, designed to protect and strengthen the feudal base. A characteristic of the feudal society in India was the presence of significant remnants of slavery and of a primitive-communal system, and also of the historically developed caste divisions. Because of this, various and numerous religious beliefs continued to exist in India in the early middle ages. The priests--Brahmans--tried to reduce this great variety of beliefs to a unified system. They made as the basis of this system the most important doctrines of the ancient religions--Brahmanism and Buddhism--of the slaveholding society, which had served the exploiting classes as a weapon for the spiritual oppression of the toiling masses. These most important dogmas were dharma, karma, and shimsa.

"Dharma (literally, 'law') is the rule of life and conduct of every Indian, i.e., of the followers of the religion of Hinduism. According to the teaching of Hinduism, each caste has its own special dharma. For toilers, the main element in the dogma of dharma is the instruction to be content with their actual lot, the improvement of which during their lifetime was declared to be impossible in principle. Another basic doctrine of Hinduism was the dogma of karma, formulated, as was the case with dharma, in Brahmanism and Buddhism. This doctrine rests upon the animistic conception, which goes back into far antiquity, of the animation of the entire world surrounding man and of the transmigration of souls. According to the teaching of karma after a man dies his soul is reborn in a lower or higher social status depending upon the degree to which he submitted to the demands of his prescribed dharmas, i.e., on the unquestioning fulfillment of the obligations of his caste.

"Hinduism also included the doctrine of shimsa ('rejection of evil') which had been worked out in the religions of Buddhism and Jainism. The exploiting classes tried to instill this dogma into the consciousness of the exploited in order to convince them of the sin of all forms of struggle for their emancipation.

"All these doctrines of Hinduism were utilized by the feudal lords to hold the popular masses in a state of obedience and submissiveness to the exploiters, to reconcile them to want and to the deprivation of their rights. Social inequality was explained as 'eternal laws' established by the gods and according to which each man, from the point of view of the dogma of dharma, merely reaps the fruits in his present life of the 'sins' or 'virtues' of his former existences.

"Heading the pantheon of the gods of Hinduism was the trinity of the gods of Brahmanism (trimurti). Brahma is the god-creator; Vishnu, the god-preserver (the personification of eternally alive nature, his cult is closely linked with the ancient sun cult); and Shiva, the god-destroyer and builder (the personification of the alteration of life and death, his cult goes back to the most ancient cults of the gods of fertility). The image of Brahma did not have any roots in popular beliefs and was always only an artificial creation of Brahman theology, and he was never, therefore, widely revered. In its attempt to embrace the entire variety of religious beliefs existing in India in the period of the formation of feudal society, Hinduism recognized these beliefs as forms of the worship of Vishnu or Shiva; the deities of these religious beliefs were recognized as embodiments of Vishnu or Shiva or as their symbols....

"As a result, Hinduism absorbed the various tribal religions as well as the earlier religious ideologies of ancient slaveholding Indian society. In India Buddhism was completely dissolved in Hinduism, and Buddha merged with the image of Vishnu as one of the latter's incarnations.

"The vedas and other holy books of Brahmanism remained as such in Hinduism; the language of the cult remained Sanscrit, and the Brahmins remained as the sole guardians and interpreters of religious laws. This guaranteed for the Brahmins the highest place in the caste structure of Hindu feudal society.

"In spite of the complexity of Hindu theology, Hinduism is in essence extremely primitive. Inherent in it is idol-worship--worship of certain animals (especially the cow), deification of certain rivers (especially the Ganges), plants (the lotus, for example), mountains, etc. Hinduism is characteristic for its 'vulgar cult of nature, the degrading nature of which is particularly striking in the fact that man, this master of nature, reverentially falls on his knees before the monkey Hanuman and the cow Sabala.' (K. Marx, see the collection of K. Marx and F. Engels, On England, 1952, p 341). The basis of the cult of all the religions of Hinduism are sacrifices to the gods, ancestor worship, and pilgrimages to holy places. Much attention is given to the formal aspects of the ritual, which strengthens the influence of the professional priesthood all the more.

"The anti-feudal movement in the Indian middle ages often adopted various forms of religious sectarianism. The best known of the sects which came out against the class-caste system was the sect of the Sikhs, which developed in the beginning of the 16th century and which led the peasant wars in the Punjab in the second half of the 17th and the first half of the 18th centuries. Sikhism later lost its anti-feudal direction and became one of the religions of India. In the middle ages in certain sections of India there took place the conversion of Indians to Islam, as a result of measures of force and persuasion carried out by the Moslem rulers and feudal aristocrats who had come out from countries of Central Asia and the Near East.

Incidents of religious conflict between Hindus and Moslems took place in the middle ages, mainly among the feudal aristocracy. But the feudal lords--Hindu and Moslem alike--quickly forgot their religious differences when it became necessary to unite to suppress the resistance of the peasants and artisans professing various religions.

"The English colonizers, conquering India in the 18th and 19th centuries, tried to utilize the Hindu priesthood as one of the supports of their rule in the country. Hindu priests had various privileges. The English colonizers supported the caste oppression, sanctified by Hinduism, which doomed millions of Hindu Indians of the so-called untouchable castes to a semi-slave existence. With the growth of the national-liberation movement and class warfare in India, English imperialism utilized to a greater and greater extent the religious and caste divisions of the population of India to keep the popular masses disunited, playing off Indian Hindus against Indian Moslems through all kinds of provocations. In 1909 the English colonial rulers introduced a system of elections to so-called legislative organs of British India, built on the foundations of religious curiae. The extreme sharpening of class contradictions in the last quarter of the 19th century intensified the attempts of Indian landowners and bourgeoisie to utilize Hinduism to defend their class positions. In this period a multitude of religious-political organizations grew up. Regardless of whether they advocated a position of official Hinduism or whether they came out as reformist organizations, their aim was one and the same--to subordinate the Indian toilers, who had been awakened to active political struggle, to the influence of bourgeois national-reformism; to divide the popular masses and prevent the growth of their class self-consciousness; and to guide the popular movement into a channel which would not endanger the exploiting classes. The English authorities gave special protection to the most reactionary of these organizations ('Hindu Mahasabha', and others). Individual attempts (e.g., Tilak) to use Hinduism in the struggle against the English failed and only prevented the creation of a unified anti-imperialist front in the country.

"The leadership of the party of the liberal landowners and big capitalists--the National Congress Party, which, from the very moment of its creation (1885) declared that it represented the interests of all Indians regardless of their religious affiliations--was made up, in reality, mostly of Hindus and set itself off from the Moslems. At the same time, the official ideology of the party, Gandhism, borrowed the religious-mystical aspects of its teaching from Hinduism. All this enabled the English imperialists to inflame religious conflicts all the more and to divide India in 1947. After the division of India, Indian reactionaries have continued to utilize Hinduism and religious-chauvinistic slogans to draw the toilers away from the class struggle. With the growth of the political activity of the masses and the ever-widening spread in India of the advanced, progressive ideas of the scientific world-view, the role of Hinduism is gradually diminishing."

Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2nd ed., vol 18, 1953, pp 128-130.

a propagandistic character and had no power of resistance when the independence of the tribes or peoples was destroyed.' (F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, 1949, p 28). Spreading beyond India, Buddhism struck a bargain with the local religions, accepting the local gods into its own pantheon and augmenting its own rites with the local ceremonies. All this endowed Buddhism with great variety in the various countries. In China, Buddhism began to spread in the 1st century A. D. (in Tibet, later). A network of numerous and increasingly wealthy monasteries, which seized much land, sprang up throughout the country. In the 4th-7th centuries, the Buddhist church in China became a great economic and political force and played an important role in the early feudal states. Later, Buddhism gave way to the ruling religion, Confucianism, although it still continued to be rather widespread. Buddhism enjoyed the patronage of the Yuan dynasty in China (1280-1368). The Manchus, enslaving China and Mongolia in the 17th-18th centuries, also attributed great importance to Buddhism, along with Confucianism, and utilized Buddhism as a weapon for the ideological enslavement of the peoples of China and Mongolia. Buddhism entered Japan from China and Korea in the 6th century in the same role--as an ideological weapon of the exploiting classes. With the consolidation of feudalism in Japan, the Buddhist church began serving as a support of the feudal system, playing a very important role in its development. Buddhist monasteries became large feudal holdings. After the so-called revolution of the Meiji (1868) Shintoism became the principal religion of Japan, but Buddhism preserved important positions in the country. Buddhism penetrated Tibet in the 7th century and acquired there the peculiar characteristics of lamaism. In Tibet the monasteries became the main centers of the feudal exploitation of the toilers. Buddhism in the form of lamaism spread in Mongolia in the 16-17th centuries, and in Buryat-Mongolia in the 17-18th centuries. The upper strata of the Buddhist priesthood became an influential sector of the feudal class, and the monasteries became the feudal holdings of the Buddhist hierarchy.

"The Political Role of Present-Day Buddhism. The Buddhist priesthood has always been closely allied with the exploiting ruling apex of society and itself comprised a most influential sector of the exploiting classes. Buddhism plays a most reactionary role in the epoch of imperialism. During the Great October Socialist Revolution and civil war the lama priesthood in Russia was a counter-revolutionary force and supported the White Guardist bands and also the Japanese and Anglo-American interventionists. During the successful building of socialism, as a result of the liquidation of the oppression of man by man, the overwhelming majority of adherents of Buddhism in the Soviet Union was liberated from religious prejudices.

In the Mongolian People's Republic, the higher lamas converted the monasteries into support bases of the feudal counterrevolution and the imperialist intelligence services and were liquidated by the people's government of the MPR. The successful development of the Mongolian People's Republic, with the help of the Soviet Union, along the path to socialism, by-passing capitalism, led to the radical undermining of the influence of Buddhism-lamaism among

the Mongolian people. In countries of East Asia, the Buddhist priesthood emerged, for the most part, as agents of Japanese imperialism. The Buddhist church actively aided the aggression of Japanese imperialism against the USSR. Japanese Buddhist missionaries went to China, Thailand, Burma and other countries of East Asia in large numbers, entrusted with the task of uniting all Buddhists under the domination of imperialist Japan. The slogan of Pan-Buddhism served as a cover for the aggression of Japanese imperialism. Japanese imperialism tried to weaken the resistance of the peoples of Asia against their aggression through the Buddhist doctrine of passivity.

" Since the end of the second world war the American-English imperialists have been making extensive use of the reactionary leading elements of the Buddhist church in their aggressive policy in East Asia. The mystical idealism of Buddhism is being utilized by Anglo-American philosophical servants of imperialism for the struggle against materialism, in order to 'buttress' and provide a 'basis' for idealism and ideological obscurantism of all kinds. In Japan, Buddhism, like Shintoism, is a support of reaction and Japanese militarism, which is being revived with the help of the United States of America. In China, Buddhism, along with Confucianism, served as an ideological support of the now-shattered reactionary Kuomintang clique. The reactionary leadership of the Buddhist church in Lhasa is being used for aggressive ends by the English and American imperialists, who are trying to tear Tibet away from China and convert it into their own colony, into an arsenal for the struggle against the Chinese People's Republic. The Tibetan people, including broad strata of the lamahood and the patriotic sector of the higher priesthood, are coming out against the forces of imperialism and reaction which are trying to separate Tibet from China. Considerable strata of the Buddhist priesthood in countries of Asia, in spite of the plots of the reactionary leadership, are taking an ever-increasing role in the struggle for peace, supporting the world movement of peace partisans.

"In the course of the national-liberation struggle of the peoples of the East for peace, freedom and democracy, Buddhism is more and more losing its influence among the 'toiling people. The advanced, progressive ideas which are being increasingly assimilated by the toiling masses are counteracting the reactionary ideas of Buddhism, as well as of other religions."

Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (Large Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., vol 6, 1951, pp 228-230.

Islam--A religion which arose in the beginning of the 7th century in Arabia and later spread in the Near and Middle East, North Africa, and Southwest Europe as a result of Arab conquests. At the present time, Islam is widespread in countries of the Near and Middle East, in North Africa, Southeast Asia, and, to some extent, in countries of the Far East. Islam, like the other religions, has always played a reactionary role, being a weapon in the hands of the exploiting classes for the spiritual oppression of the toilers, and it has been utilized by the foreign imperialists to enslave the peoples of the East.

Origin of Islam

The rise of Islam was called forth by formation of a class society among the Arabs. In the 6th century Arabia, whose population consisted of nomad-herdsmen (Bedouins), settled farmers, merchants, and craftsmen, experienced a process of decay of its tribal-communal system. The economic and social contradictions characteristic of the stage of the decay of tribal-communal relations reached its highest development in the city of Mecca...The development of the inequality of wealth among the people of Mecca led to the strengthening of the power and influence of the local native aristocracy. This aristocracy engaged in a large-scale caravan trade (especially, slave trade) with neighboring countries, kept the people of Mecca and the neighboring Bedouin tribes in a state of continuous financial indebtedness, owned slaves, and possessed livestock and land in the oases. In addition, the Meccan native aristocracy usurped the priestly functions in the Meccan temple of Kabah. The tribes of Western Arabia, which were economically dependent on Mecca made an annual pilgrimage--hajj--to the temple of Kabah and traded with the Meccans during the hajj. Soviet scholars are not united in their views on the question of the nature of the production relations which developed in Western Arabia. Some investigators think that in Mecca, Medina and other areas the sixth century saw the development of a slave-owning system in the decayed tribal-communal system. Others believe that the process of the formation of a feudal society already took place in this period.

In connection with the formation of a class society in Arabia, there developed among the local tribes an economic and social crisis, a reflection of which was the rise of Islam, which was called upon to justify social and economic inequality and the system of exploitation which was taking form. The tribal aristocracy was attempting to solve the crisis by seizing new territories, and in order to do this it was necessary to unite all the Arab tribes. Islam, with its strict monotheism, expressed this attempt at unification. The process of fashioning a new ideology in the form of Islam was accelerated by the decline of the Meccan transit trade as a result of the establishment of the rule of the Ethiopians and Persians in South Arabia. This decline, in K. Marx's words, gave the impetus to the rise of Islam (V.K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol. 21, page 488). As a result of

the decline of the Meccan transit trade, the pressure of the Meccan merchants and money-lenders on the Bedouin tribes was intensified.

The development of Islam was greatly influenced by the primitive religious concepts of the Arab tribes, and also by Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism. The basic monument of early Islam is the Koran, which expounds the bases of the dogma, worship, and law of early Islam. The history of early Islam is usually divided into the Mecca and Medina periods, in conformity with the same division of the suras (chapters) of the Koran. In the Meccan chapters Allah (the Moslem god) foretells the early approach of the "end of the world", "of the day of judgement", and threatens with the tortures of hell the obstinate ones who do not recognize his all-powerful authority. He promises those who are submissive and patient sensual pleasures in a paradise after death. In the Meccan chapters slavery and material inequality are presented as phenomena established by the same all-powerful Allah, and which, therefore, are not subject to any change. The point of view advanced by certain apologists of Islam concerning the "communism" of early Islam and alleging that Mohammed, who is considered the founder of Islam, was a revolutionary and a great social reformer, is an attempt to conceal the real essence of Islam. The Koran, which diligently and consistently defends and justifies slavery (it is considered to have been established by Allah), exploitation, the material and social inequality of people, is the best refutation of this kind of falsification.

In Mecca the spread of Islam was very limited. The Kureishite aristocracy was hostile to the new religion, fearing that its success would lead to the liquidation of the cult of Kabha, to which the trade between the Meccans and the Arab tribes was tied. According to Arab tradition, in 622 Mohammed and his small group of followers resettled in Medina. In this agricultural oasis Islam quickly spread among two Arab tribes. Three so-called Jewish tribes (probably Arabs who professed Judaism) were driven out of Medina and partially exterminated, while their lands and dwellings were transferred to the Moslems. The Medina Moslems, headed by Mohammed, conducted an armed struggle against the Meccans. This struggle ended in a compromise in 630. An agreement was concluded whereby the Meccans adopted Islam and occupied a prominent place in the Moslem community, while the followers of Mohammed recognized Mecca as a holy city and the temple of Kabha as the principal sanctuary, to which pilgrimages were ordered. The followers of Mohammed also retained the cult of the ancient fetish of the "black rock", which was in the Kabha. The Moslem community was decisively formed in the Median period and was the nucleus of the Arab state. This community, uniting people on the basis of their adherence to the new religion, was radically different from earlier existing tribal organizations, in which people were united mainly by signs of blood relationship. The Medina suras regulated property and social relations in the conditions of the already established class society. In these suras special attention is devoted to the maintenance of private property and the defense of the rights of property-holders. "Islam", wrote F. Engels, "is a religion adapted for the inhabitants of the East, especially for the Arabs, that is, for the townspeople engaged in trade and commerce, on the one hand, and for the nomad-Bedouins, on the other." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, Vol. 16, part 2, page 410).

Each Moslem, the Koran teaches, must profess his belief in the one god--Allah and recognize Mohammed as "Allah's envoy". The Koran depicts people as weak-willed "slaves of Allah", required to be submissive and patient, to submit to Allah, to his "envoy", and to all those in power. The rites which each Mussulman is required to perform are directed mainly towards inculcating the believers with a feeling of helplessness before Allah and with dependence on him. According to the Koran's instructions, every Moslem must pray, observe the fast during the entire ninth month of the Moslem lunar year--the Ramadan, perform a pilgrimage to Mecca, and pay a state tax on the harvest, on an increase in livestock, and on commercial profit. In every way possible the Koran recommends and approves of a jihad, a "holy war", against "infidels"--non-moslems, the aim of which is to spread Islam.

Islam in the Period of Feudalism. In the 7th - 8th centuries the Arabs conquered Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, Transcaucasia, the Middle East, Egypt, North Africa, The Iberian Peninsula, and Northern India. Under the banner of a "holy war" the Arab usurpers spread Islam among the enslaved peoples in several conquered countries by fire and sword. In the conquered lands a vast state was formed--the Caliphate, in which Islam became the predominant religion. In this state all those who did not adopt Islam were required to pay a heavy so-called head tax. In the Caliphate, the Arab-conquerors were strongly influenced by the subjugated peoples, who lived under a feudal system. Thus, in the feudal Caliphate Islam became one of the "world religions". "The great historical turning-points," wrote F. Engels, "were accompanied by changes in religion only to the extent that one speaks of three world religions existing up to the present day--Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam." (F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, 1951, p.27) In the Caliphate under the conditions of developed feudal relations, Islam in its initial form, as expressed in the Koran, no longer satisfied the social-political interests of the ruling classes. Therefore, to augment the Koran there arose the Moslem "holy tradition," the Sunna which was composed of a great number of hadiths, i.e. stories, the subject of which were actions and judgments attributed to Mohammed. The Sunna, which, like the Koran too, justified the class system and exploitation, sanctioned all the innovations which appeared in the doctrines, cult, and ceremonies of Islam as a result of its development under the conditions of an early feudal society, including everything the Moslems borrowed from the religious beliefs, laws and customs of the subjugated peoples. On the basis of the Koran and the Sunna the Shariah was formulated also--a collection of feudal Moslem laws which regulated all aspects of the life of a Moslem through a variety of minute instructions. In the first century and a half in the existence of Islam, the Moslem spiritual leaders considered only the Koran and the Sunna as the source of faith and behavior in life. Accepted as an absolute tenet was the doctrine of predestination, according to which all acts of all men are predetermined by Allah.

A characteristic feature of the history of Islam is the struggle among various tendencies and sects. Already in the first century of its existence Islam broke down into two main trends--Sunnism and

Shi'ism. They arose through the internicine struggle among the successors and followers of Mohammed. Sunnism is the main, "orthodox" current of Islam, the adherents of which build their teaching on the Koran and Sunna and recognize as their spiritual leader the Caliph, who at first was considered Mohammed's deputy, and later as Allah's deputy on earth. Shi'ism developed mainly in Persia. The Shi'ites gave a special interpretation to the Koran, had their own holy tradition in lieu of the Sunna, did not recognize the Sunnite Caliphs, to whom they opposed their own dynasty of the 12 Imams, whom they considered the direct descendants of Mohammed. The last representative of this dynasty, "the hidden Imam", is considered the unseen leader of the Shi'ites, who await his second advent.

There arose both in Sunnism and Shi'ism a variety of sects which were an expression of the feeble protest of the toiling masses against class oppression and feudal exploitation. They were sometimes the expression of the struggle of various groupings of the ruling class. The earliest large sect of the Sunnite faith were the Khawarijites, who led the anti-feudal movement of the peasant and plebian masses in the Caliphate in the 7th and 8th centuries. The Ismailis, a Shi'ite sect which arose in the 8th century, derived support from the peasant anti-feudal movement, but the feudal lords seized the leadership of the sect. Anti-feudal strivings were expressed with particular emphasis in the movement of the Carmathians, which began in the 9th century.

Towards the beginning of the 9th century, when, as a result of the deepening of class contradictions in the Caliphate, more refined methods of influencing the toiling masses were required, a rationalist tendency appeared in Islam. Its first representatives were the Mutazillites. The 9th--10th centuries saw the beginnings of an orthodox Moslem theology, the Kalat, the founder of which is considered to be Ashari (874-935). This theologian and his students, trying to reconcile the doctrine of predestination and free will, attempted to persuade the believers that all of man's actions are predetermined by Allah, but since man is able to "acquire" his actions, he is responsible for them before Allah.

In the 10th - 11th centuries, in the process of the further development of Islam, there arose and received universal recognition the cult of the "holy ones", monasticism, mysticism. The cult of the "holy ones" was expressed in visits to their graves, in prayers and religious ceremonies at their graves, and in bringing gifts, which in actuality profited the spiritual leaders. As in the days before the advent of Islam, stones, trees, springs and wells associated with the names of the "holy ones" became objects of worship.

The intensification of feudal exploitation in this period, the suppression of anti-feudal uprisings, and inter-feudal wars, the onus of which fell on the shoulders of the popular masses, created favorable conditions for the diffusion of mysticism in Islam and of the asceticism associated with it. The spokesmen of the mystical-ascetic trend

in Islam--Sufiism--were the dervishes (Moslem monks), who united into fraternities in the 11th century, later organizing Sufist orders. At first Sufiism was characterized by opposition to "orthodox" Islam. The spiritual leaders accused the Sufis of infidelity and declared them heretics. The authorities persecuted them. Therefore, Sufi teachings became very popular among the popular masses, and the Sufis were respected and considered authorities. But Sufiism with its doctrine of renunciation of the world, of abstention and non-resistance, could easily be utilized as a means of stifling the class struggle. Therefore, the medieval Moslem theologian Ghazali used his authority to legalize the mystical and ascetic concepts of Sufiism and introduced them into the system of "orthodox" Islam.

With the strengthening of the Osman empire, which in the 16th century included the Arab lands, the leading position among the Moslems passed from the Arabs to the Turks. The Turkish sultans, who later took on the title of caliph, and also the Persian shahs used Islam to justify their predatory policy and to sanctify the exploitation of the oppressed peoples. "With particular cruelty the Persian and Turkish oppressors used Islam in their wars against the peoples of the Caucasus, against the Slavic peoples, against Russia. The seizure of Transcaucasia, of Georgian and Armenian lands, the mass destruction of historical monuments and cultural treasures, the extermination and enslavement of thousands of women, old people, and children--all these bestialities the Turkish and Persian invaders covered with the flag of the struggle for religion." (M.D. Bagirov, On the Question of the Movement of Muridism and Shamil, 1950, p.6)

Islam in the Period of Capitalism. As a result of the penetration of European capital into Islamic lands, of the colonial enslavement of these countries and the beginnings there of capitalist relations, there arose various Islamic currents and trends, the adherents of which tried to adapt Islam to the new social-economics conditions in order to keep it as a weapon of class oppression. The founders and adherents of these tendencies were the bourgeoisie, the liberal landowners, and the bourgeois-landowner intelligentsia.

The struggle of the popular masses in the countries of the East against the European colonizers, which was conducted under the slogan of Islam and led by the feudal lords and Moslem spiritual leaders, ended in the defeat of the popular masses and the victory of the feudal-clerical leaders, who came to terms with the colonizers.

Islam was utilized by the foreign colonizers, first of all by the English, for the enslavement of the peoples of the East and for the struggle against the national-liberation movement of these peoples. The English colonizers used Islam not only to organize mass fratricidal wars among the oppressed colonial peoples, but also the struggle against their competitors, especially Russia. England, together with sultan Turkey, made especially extensive use of Muridism,--the most reactionary and militant tendency in Islam, which carried religious intolerance, expressed in the idea of "jihad", a "holy war" against "infidels", to

extreme limits. Under the slogan of jihad predatory wars of the Anglo-Turkish agent Shamil were undertaken against Russia in the 19th century.

From the second half of the 19th century "Panislamism" became widespread in the countries of the East. Panislamism is a reactionary, religious-political teaching, propounding the unification of peoples who profess Islam for the struggle against "the attack of the Christian West". Panislamism, as Lenin characterized it, attempted "to unite the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with the vested interests of the Khans, landlords, Mullahs, ital." (Works, 4th ed., vol. 31, p. 127.)

The main goal of Panislamism was to replace class contradictions with a religious community and to preserve feudal relations.

Islam in Modern Times. After the victory of the great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, in the period of foreign intervention and civil war, Islam utilized the internal counter-revolution and foreign imperialists to struggle against the Soviet state. Thus, for example, in 1919 in the North Caucasus on the initiative of the English imperialists an "Emirate" was established, at the head of which was placed a Sheikh who announced his intention to rule according to the directives of the Shariah. In Turkestan the Moslem spiritual leaders, who were foreign agents, demanded that the country be ruled according to the Shariat, and under the guise of defending Islam and the Sharia they organized attacks against Soviet rule. During the period of the building of socialism in the USSR, the remnants of the exploiting classes tried to use Islam for the struggle against socialism. The Moslem spiritual leaders, as agents of these classes, conducted a struggle against the Soviet laws on the family and marriage, against the liberation of women, for retaining the yashnak and the parangah. They committed terrorist acts. The Koran and Shariah were used with special vigor in the Islamic areas of the USSR for the struggle against industrialization and collectivization. In the USSR, as a result of the victory of socialism and the liquidation of the exploiting classes, the social roots of Islam, as of all other religions, have been destroyed. In USSR Islam exists only as a remnant of one of the forms of the ideology of exploiting society. Moslems (as well as adherents of other religions) in the USSR are granted freedom to perform religious worship and religious ceremonies.

In countries of the East (in Turkey, the Arab countries, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia), where Islam is a state religion, it continues to be one of the weapons in the hands of local reaction and foreign imperialism. American-English imperialists utilize Islam to struggle against the revolutionary and national-liberation movement and against the movement of the peace partisans in countries where Islam is widespread (for example the British incitement of Hindu-Moslem enmity in India; Anglo-American plans for the creation of "Islamistan", i.e., a bloc or federation of states, the majority of whose population practice Islam, etc.) Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklyediya, 2nd ed., 1953, Vol. 18, pgs. 516 - 519.

Soviet Institutions and Communications Media in the Service
of the Communist Campaign Against Religion

"Freedom of conscience, unrestricted in any way, exists in the Soviet land. Article 124 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution states: 'In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.' This article in our Constitution is consistently and strictly enforced.

"However, many of our organizations which have the duty of working among the masses, including the trade unions, have drawn incorrect conclusions from this article of our Constitution. They have taken freedom of conscience to mean merely the freedom to worship and have forgotten their own direct duty—to spread scientific atheist propaganda. ...

"The heads of many trade union organizations have begun to turn a blind eye to the fact that trade union members are practicing religious ceremonies—marrying in church, christening their children and celebrating feast days. No one explains the harm of religion to the workers and employees, particularly the young ones; no one explains that religious beliefs demean man and spiritually cripple him. Yet it is well known that as soon as the struggle against bourgeois ideology slackens or, worse, is utterly neglected, the representatives of hostile ideology extend their activity.

"The trade unions and their cultural institutions have tremendous facilities for conducting militant scientific atheist propaganda. It is their duty to help the Communist Party constantly and actively to build up a scientific, atheistic outlook in Soviet people. For this purpose all means of mass enlightenment—lectures, talks, agitation with visual demonstrations, films, and libraries—must be used. ..."

"Develop Extensive Scientific Atheist Propaganda", Trud, 4 August 1954.

"... 'Fear created gods', Vladimir Il'yich Lenin said, quoting an old philosopher, in one of his articles. The Soviet system freed the workers from blind helplessness before the menacing forces of nature. With the abolition of exploiter classes, the roots which nourish religion disappeared in our country. But religious beliefs, though shattered and undermined by life, still make themselves felt. To this day these beliefs still poison the minds of part of the youth and hinder its active participation in building communism.

"Yet among many Young Communist League aktiv members there are incorrect, un-Marxist views that religion is a personal matter, that one cannot fight against religious beliefs; in the course of building communism religious ideology, they say, will fade and vanish of itself.

"The Communist Party has never viewed religion as a 'personal matter' of no concern. .i.

"What does it mean to fight against religious beliefs? Above all, to bring the light of authentic knowledge to the masses of young people and to conduct extensive and skillful natural science propaganda. Lectures, reports, discussions, books and popular science films, telling how the world was built, how life came into existence on earth, where religious beliefs came from and to whose advantage they are, must occupy a constant and prominent place in Y.C.L. work. It is the honorable duty of the young intelligentsia to be tireless propagandists of science and active fighters against ignorance and darkness. ...

"The practicing of religious rites and the celebration of religious holidays are accompanied by many days of drunkenness, absenteeism and mishaps. Great harm is caused to the interests of the state and the collective farms, and the personal interests of the workers also suffer greatly from this. This the Y.C.L. agitators and propagandists must explain to the workers, explain intelligently, concretely and with statistical computations in their hands.

"It is necessary to fight against religious beliefs thoughtfully and tactfully, and in no case insult the feelings of believers, but influence them by persuasion, by spreading scientific knowledge....

"All aspects of Soviet life open great possibilities before the Komsomol. The Party and Government spare nothing for the training and education of the growing generation. Everything is given to us in order completely to overcome in the minds of youth the remnants of capitalism, among them religious beliefs and superstitions, and in order to train each young person of the Soviet country to be an active, conscious builder of communism."

"The Young Communist League: Fighter Against Religious Beliefs", Komsomolskaya Pravda, 14 August 1954.

"A course of logic, if we include in it questions of atheism, can be of great help in training students for highly qualified atheistic work.

"There are great opportunities for anti-religious propaganda in the very essence of a course in elementary logic. ...

"We consider that the tasks involved in the development of atheistic propaganda should also be expressed to a certain extent in the programs on logic. Unfortunately, in the program approved by the Social Sciences Teaching Administration last year questions of atheistic propaganda in the course of logic were not dealt with. Strange as it may seem, the new programme even takes a certain step backwards in this respect compared with the draft program for 1953. In the latter, there was a particular point on the topic 'Basic stages of the development of Logic', entitled: 'Conversion of the logic of Aristotle into the

servant of theology in the Middle Ages'. This point does not appear in the new programme. That is wrong."

I.V. Novik, Candidate of Philosophical Services, Moscow State University, "Questions of Atheism in Logic courses", Vestnik Vysshey Shkoly (Higher-School Herald), #8, passed for publication 11 August 1955.

"The Central Committee of the CPSU in its resolutions has pointed out that scientific-atheistic propaganda must be carried out systematically and not in outbursts. Fulfilling these instructions of the Party Central Committee, the commanders and political officials of the Navy have achieved certain successes in disseminating a knowledge of natural sciences among the personnel of ships and units. However, of late scientific-atheistic propaganda in the Navy has visibly weakened. In particular, unforgivably few lectures on natural-science themes are being read by the propaganda lecturers of the Political Administration of the Black Sea Fleet. For a prolonged period they have been delivering only a single lecture on the subject 'Religion - The Enemy of Science and Progress'. Only now, after a great lapse of time, has a lecture been prepared on the harmfulness of religious prejudices and superstitions. This is clearly inadequate. ...

"In the Communist upbringing of sailors great importance attaches to the cultural-education institutions of the Navy. They must be centers of militant scientific-atheistic propaganda. This cannot, unfortunately, be said of the Officers' House, where the head is Comrade Afanasyev. Here scientific-atheistic propaganda is neglected. Things are no better either in certain other Officers' Houses and sailors' clubs. Such a situation cannot be tolerated. Cultural-educational institutions have an obligation to help commanders, political officials, Party and Komsomol organisations to bring up the personnel of ships and units in the spirit of militant atheism."

"Daily Attention to Scientific-Atheistic Propaganda", (Lead article), Sovetskiy Flot (Soviet Fleet), 9 September 1955.

Summary of 19 October 1955 broadcast by M. D. Zaslavskiy, lecturer of the Central Bureau of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture, on the cultural effects of religious survivals in the USSR:

The Communist Party teaches us that the position of the church in the USSR should not be compared with the position of the church in an exploiters' society.

In a bourgeois society, the church is the bulwark and the tool of ruling classes who use its services to enslave the working people. In our country, as a result of the liquidation of the exploiting classes, the old basis on which the church stood was destroyed.

The majority of the clergy in our country are loyal to the Soviet regime. This does not mean, however, that religious beliefs have ceased to be reactionary and that atheistic propaganda is not necessary. The Communist Party, which stands upon the only correct world outlook--Marxism-Leninism--cannot remain neutral in its attitude toward religion, an ideology which has nothing in common with science.

Persistent study of the laws of the development of society and nature convinces Soviet people that the fate of human race is decided by real conditions of the real development of society and nature and not by the will of supernatural, nonexistent forces. The complete liquidation of the exploiting classes, the cultural revolution, and the systematic propagation of the scientific world outlook have resulted in the fact that the great majority of Soviet people have become conscious builders of communism and have broken away from religion.

Socialist ideology predominates in the USSR and the new socialist economy has created in our country conditions which do not support religious beliefs, but, on the contrary, lead to the gradual dying out of these beliefs in the consciousness of the working people.

However, a certain number of our people are still attracted by the religious beliefs. As far as their nature is concerned, the religious beliefs and organizations, remnants of the old world and of the exploiters' superstructure, are the most (conservative?) elements of this superstructure which are still able to survive the conditions which brought them into being.

While it was possible, during the progress of the Revolution, to destroy the existing state administration, to prohibit propaganda of reactionary views, and to close down reactionary press organs, it was impossible to use the same means to destroy religious beliefs among the people, to close religious establishments and to prohibit religious services.

It would be naive to think that religious beliefs will die a natural death. Such views are anti-Marxist and anti-Party; religious beliefs are long-lived, an enormous force, and can become even stronger.

The great war conducted by the Soviet Union against the aggressors, the difficulties connected with this war, anxiety about fate of members of families, and other factors contributed to the strengthening of religious beliefs among the most backward part of the Soviet people. The weakness of scientific-atheistic propaganda during and after the war also contributed to the strengthening of religious beliefs. Simultaneously, churchmen and members of various sects intensified their propaganda.

There are other reasons for the survival of religious beliefs in our country. Such survivals result from the action of the general sociological law manifested in the fact that the development of human consciousness lags behind social development and economic conditions of life.

The vitality of the remnants of religious beliefs also can be explained by the existence of the imperialist camp which is interested in the survival of these beliefs and which is striving to revive and support them.

The unsatisfactory general standard of cultural development of a certain number of our people must also be blamed. A certain number of older believers are contaminating the younger generation with their religious prejudices. The force of a bad tradition, of a bad habit, is a terrific force.

The main reason, however, for the survival of religious beliefs is the weakening of scientific antireligious propaganda and intensification of religious propaganda by churchmen and members of religious sects.

In recent years church propagandists have devoted special attention to attracting young men and women to the church.

What is the harm of religious prejudices under the conditions of the construction of communism?

These prejudices are harmful because religion teaches humility and submission to a powerful god, poisons the consciousness of the Soviet people with lack of confidence in their own abilities, and kills their energy and joy in life. By promising a better future in another world, religion distracts the attention of Soviet people from the construction of communism.

All religions, without exception, reject science and replace it with blind faith. Religion kills the best human qualities, such as inquisitiveness, boldness, and courage, qualities particularly needed by the Soviet people who are marching toward communism.

The religious and national intolerance preached by religion is particularly harmful because it undermines the order established in our multinational state.

The unmasking of religious ethics which inflict much harm on Soviet society today is a most urgent necessity in the interest of Communist construction and in the interests of friendship among people of all countries. Work, which plays the decisive role in the progressive development of the human society, is proclaimed by religion as the curse of mankind.

Religion appeals to believers: Love your enemies and bless those who curse you. It is enough to remind you of the sufferings of our people during the war against the fascist invaders to prove the harmfulness of this teaching. Not love for fascist cannibals but hatred of them helped us to defeat our enemies and defend our freedom and country.

Religion teaches that a wife should fear her husband. It develops a feeling of weakness among women. Communist ethics reject such a contemptible attitude toward women. On the contrary, the Soviet regime has freed women, granted them full rights in political, social, and economic life.

Facts prove that religious people are also superstitious. The most highly developed superstition is manifested in fortune-telling, which is nothing but deceit and trickery.

Observance of religious rites and holidays is one of the most harmful remnants of the past. Let us consider baptism of children and church marriage. The baptism ceremony is based on old beliefs of protecting a child against evil spirits by submerging it in water. Church marriage is also based on various marriage ceremonies of the pre-Christian era. Both ceremonies reflect the beliefs of primitive people who, by various magic gestures, tried to protect a child or a young couple. The performance of these rites of savages in our time is the fruit of backwardness and lack of culture among certain people.

The origin of the majority of Christian holidays is the same. Christians believe that Easter is a holiday marking the resurrection of Christ. Science, however, has proved that Christ never existed and that the origin of this holiday can be clearly traced to the pre-Christian era.

Religious holidays often inflict harm on our national economy and on believers. Very often, as a result of these holidays, established periods for various types of farm work are violated and this results in losses of yield.

Many church-goers in our country do not go to church because they are believers but because they are following an old tradition. Despite this, Soviet society must conduct the struggle against religious superstitions which distract people from the struggle for the flourishing of our country and for higher cultural standards for our people.

It should be remembered that our constitution not only guarantees freedom of conscience, but also freedom of antireligious propaganda. The fact that religious organizations in our country are not acting

as a politically hostile force and that they are taking part in the struggle for peace should not result in the conclusion that we should abandon the struggle against religious ideology. Everyone who is of a different opinion forgets that despite the changed position of the church toward the socialist state, religious ideology has not lost its reactionary character and continues to be an obstacle on the road to the construction of communism.

The Nov. 10, 1954 decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the conducting of scientific-athoistic propaganda among the population stresses the need for this propaganda. This propaganda, however, should not offend religious beliefs and members of the clergy. It should always be remembered that offending actions against the clergy or direct interference by administrative organs in the work of religious organizations only lead to the strengthening of religious prejudices. The best means of struggle against religion is scientific ideological propaganda.

Part 2. POLITICAL

1. Central Government Minority Policies

The Chinese Communist regime has taken determined steps to deal with discontent among the minority nationalities. The Moslems were finally permitted to set up their Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region under rigid Chinese controls. An attempt is being made to bring Tibet, Sinkiang, Tsin-ghai, and Inner Mongolia under control by resettling Chinese peasants in these areas and strengthening local Chinese garrison forces.

Minority nationality cadres are encouraged to work for the regime. They are strongly urged to study Chinese in addition to socialism. Cadres among Chuang people, who have just been given a written language, are devoting their time to studying Chinese. Government and party organs, especially the latter, continue to claim industrial and agricultural achievements in the minority areas as a result of the "correct party policy on minorities."

In the course of attacking rightist Ma Chen-wu, it was revealed that there had been repeated outbreaks among the Moslems during the past few years. Evidently, the Chinese Communists had inherited the Moslem troubles which had plagued the Manchu and Kuomintang regimes for the past centuries. Little news comes out of Tibet, but it reflects a tense situation there.

The Hu-ho-hao-t'e Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao reported on 17 June 1958 that the first session of the second people's congress of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region had recently been concluded. In addition to receiving a lengthy political report delivered by Ulanfu, chairman of the region, the session passed resolutions accepting the report, the financial report for 1957, the budget for 1958, the 60-article Five-Year Plan for socialist construction, the judicial report, the 1956-1957 agricultural and livestock development program, and report of the bills committee.

Commenting on the political report, the session noted the achievements of the rectification and antirightist campaigns and the early fulfillment of the nation's First Five-Year Plan. It then called on the masses to overcome their superstition and conservatism in order to promote the big leap forward in production. The session also noted that the 1957 financial report showed a surplus and expressed the hope that it will do so again in 1958.

Editorially commenting on the work of the session, the newspaper of the same date pointed out that, although outstanding results have been achieved by the region in economic, social, and cultural progress, still many cadres are conservative while the broad masses are backward and

superstitious. It urged both cadres and broad masses to study and improve their ideology in order to comprehend the main line fully and to utilize it in the struggle for a big leap forward for the red flag in 1959.

Reporting on industrial progress, the Hsin-hua News Agency said on 31 October that some 1,640 factories have been organized in the Daghur, Evenki, and Orunchun banners (ch'i) to produce fertilizer, milk products, woolens, and hydroelectric power. It said the Orunchun people have been able to change from their nomadic life to socialism without having to undergo the tortuous development of the intermediate stages.

Industrial progress in other minority areas was reported in an item appearing in the 24 September issue of the Lhasa Tibet Jih-pao. It is reported that to promote the construction of Tibet the Tibet Military Region has formally organized an army construction command headquarters with Fu T'ing-hsiu as commander and Ch'iao Chia-ch'ien as political commissar. This organization is now surveying the construction of a hydroelectric power plant at Na-chin, in the eastern suburbs of Lhasa. Ch'iao Chia-ch'ien called on the members of the staff to overcome superstition, improve their techniques, introduce innovations, and promote racial solidarity to assure the success of the project.

The 28 July 1958 issue of the Urumchi Sinkiang Jih-pao carried a directive of the Sinkiang party committee on the big leap forward in agricultural and livestock production in 1959. Point 1 of the directive called for the following targets: new land to be developed, 8 million mou; land to be placed under cultivation, 88.9 million mou; and land to be seeded, 35.9 million mou. Grain production is fixed at a total of 12-13.2 billion chin, with a per unit production of 500-550 chin and a per-capita production of 2,000-2,200 chin. Cotton production is fixed at 3.6-4.5 billion chin, with a per unit production of 120-150 chin and a per-capita production of 30-40 chin. The target for afforestation is 50 million mou. The target for livestock production is an over-all increase to 28,610,000 head, with a net increase of 15-17 percent in large animals and a 150 percent increase in hogs.

Point 2 of the directive called for the realization of these targets by expanding irrigation works, increased application of fertilizer, deep-plowing, innovations in farm implements, purebred seed selection, proper planting of winter wheat, development of virgin land, a greater effort for a big leap forward in livestock production, a vast afforestation program, and the intensive training of technical cadres.

Point 3 called on cadres to utilize their experiences in summer growing and those of Ma An-ying in the course of the third and fourth stages of the rectification movement to promote production. The directive urged cadres to take positive steps in leading the peasants by bold action.

Concluding, it pointed out that, as an over-all condition to achieving success in the implementation of the directive, all cadres must initiate a socialist education movement at the time of the autumn harvest in all agriculture and livestock areas in order to promote the main line of the party.

Revealing some of the problems arising from the implementation of this directive, another item in the same issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that cadres have completed the first stage of the studies on the main line and have taken final examinations in preparation for initiating studies on the second stage. However, the item pointed out, the examinations revealed serious shortcomings among the cadres. It urged the party to strengthen its leadership in order to overcome these weaknesses.

The 2 July issue of this paper carried an agitprop item entitled "Strengthen and Develop the People's Collective Ownership System of Socialism and the Dictatorship and the International Solidarity of the Proletariat," which warned against the "machinations" of US "imperialists" and Chiang Kai-shek, and called for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. It also called for the solidarity of the proletariat and the expansion of international Communism. It said that the socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union is growing stronger daily while the imperialist camp is growing weaker as the result of unemployment and falling production. Concluding, the item called on the masses to oppose imperialism, war, and the enslavement of people by struggling for world peace, national liberation, democracy, freedom, and socialism.

The 31 August issue of the Tibet Jih-pao reported that fast progress is being made in the cultural development of minority nationality areas. In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, it said, a vast movement is under way to expand the school network in order to fulfill the historic task of wiping out illiteracy. In the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, 546 intermediate agricultural schools were established during the previous 2 months in 60 cities and hsiens. In 17 hsiens, everyone has an elementary school education. In the Liu-chou, Nan-ning, and Pai-se areas of the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region, over 390,000 children are enrolled in school for the first time. Many minority schools are expanding their Chinese-language courses. All classes in the Yen-pien Korean Autonomous Chou have Chinese classes, and Chinese is used for instruction in some of the junior and senior middle school courses. Over 130,000 children of the Chuang, Yao, Miao, and T'ung nationalities are now studying Chinese in elementary schools, the paper reported.

On 17 May, the Hsin-hua News Agency reported that in Szechwan Province there are 295 schools in the Yi and Tibetan areas. Some of the Yi school children belong to slaves who gained their freedom with the liberation. Nomads in Szechwan now have mobile schools.

The agency report added that the Miao-Tung autonomous area in south-eastern Kweichow Province organized 82 middle schools and 651 primary schools in April and May 1958. These schools include courses in agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, sanitation, and sericulture. The area's cooperatives have allotted 2,600 hectares of farm land 1,800 oxen, and some farm implements to the schools for field operations; 93 percent of the school-age children are now in school.

In Inner Mongolia, the report said, 90 percent of the school-age children are getting a primary school education in half the region's hsien and cities. The total enrollment in primary schools has reached 12 million.

Issue No 34 of the Min-tzu Hua-pao (Nationalities Pictorial, Minzu Huabao), published in October 1958 in Peiping, reported that there is now one national and ten local national minority publishing houses. In 1957, over 1,763 minority nationality publications in various languages were published; this is 283.9 percent above the figure for 1952. The total run was 1,461 copies, or 221 percent above 1952. Between 1952 and 1957, over 61.2 million copies of 6,700 kinds of publications in over 10 languages were published. In addition to those on Marxism-Leninism and the works of Mao Tse-tung, there were numerous scientific, sociological, and cultural publications. These publications are promoting the big leap forward and the cultural revolution by overcoming superstitious beliefs among the minorities, the source said.

A 12 October news release of the Hsin-hua News Agency reported that while addressing a meeting to mark the second anniversary of the founding of the Tibet branch of the Chinese Buddhist Association, Gen Chang Ching-wu said, "The question of religious beliefs and social reform are two different things and cannot be mixed up. Still more impermissible is for religious circles to use religion as a pretext for opposing social reform. The existence of a system of exploitation is the main reason for Tibet's poverty and backwardness. The people's livelihood can be improved only through reforms, developing production, and building socialism by joint efforts." Present at this meeting was the Dalai Lama.

The 8 August issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that a group of Moslems from Sinkiang had returned after a pilgrimage to Mecca. In their travels, they visited Mongolia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Greece. The Urumchi party committee held a reception for the returning pilgrims.

Outwardly, the Chinese Communist regime continues to display a liberal attitude toward religion and the minorities. However, in the implementation of party policies and lines which conflict with this attitude, the regime will not hesitate to take stern measures to satisfy its demands.

2. Minority Reaction to Central Government Policies

While the Chinese Communist regime is attempting to wean the minorities away from their traditional mores, the established leadership of each nationality group is resisting the change, since it will endanger their paramountcy. The party therefore is attempting to drive a wedge between the leadership and the masses in the minority areas. The leadership is accused of stressing the "peculiarities" of the area in order to secure special privileges or exemptions.

However, the party is now finding itself in an awkward position. While denying that "peculiarities" exist, it "acceded" to the wish of the upper strata in Tibet and delayed social reforms there for 6 years because the people there were "not ready." Yet the party attacked Chiang Kai-shek for saying, "Everyone in China is Chinese," when it decided that autonomous minority areas were necessary because of the special needs of the people living there.

Such illogical reasoning makes it difficult to enforce party directives. When minority leaders are refused special privileges, they can claim racial discrimination. Therefore, the minority reaction of central government policies is far from satisfactory.

The Hsin-hua News Agency reported on 30 April that in the course of the rectification campaign national minority cadres thoroughly criticized local nationalism and took positive steps to strengthen racial solidarity. In the Yen-pien Korean Autonomous Chou, Chinese and Korean cadres are learning each other's language in order to improve their relations. Over 2,000 of these cadres are learning the proletarian viewpoint of working alongside the peasants in cooperatives in actual production or administrative activities. The working style of the national minority cadres has greatly improved after developing closer relationships with local masses as a result of the rectification movement.

After thoroughly studying Chairman Mao Tse-tung's speech "On Dealing With Contradictions Within the Ranks of the People," 160 Tibetan cadres of the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee took concrete steps to improve their work by holding public criticisms of their erroneous ideology, the news agency said.

The 14 July issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that commercial and industrial circles in Urumchi had met recently to discuss the struggle against local nationalism. Addressing the gatherings, Hsin Lan-t'ing pointed out that China has surpassed the US in grain production, and, in this atomic age, he said, it is best for businessmen to "ride the east wind" and reform themselves. He added that there is no doubting the success of socialism and therefore businessmen should not get involved in

capitalistic plots. Most businessmen are neither supporting the leftist Marxist interpretation of nationalism nor the bourgeois rightist interpretation. This is erroneous, he said; all businessmen must immediately swing to the left; otherwise, they will be drifting to the right. It is impossible to remain neutral. People who attempt to rationalize or become emotional on the subject of local nationalism are bound to make mistakes. They must be firm in the struggle against local nationalism.

The 9 August issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that party committees in Karasu, Aksu, and Khotan had recently held meetings to combat local nationalism. Minority leaders who are demanding a national independent republic were attacked for promoting separatism. They were charged with opposing Chinese cadres and Sinkiang production and construction army units. Wu-mai-erh A-pu-te-la Yu-fu, commissioner of the Aksu special district, utilized his position to employ counterrevolutionary elements and conduct local nationalist activities.

Another news item in the same issue featured the theme "strengthen national solidarity with the Chinese at the core" by citing achievements of the minority nationalities in Sinkiang under the guidance of the Chinese. In the previous 4 months, the item said, the minority nationals made brilliant achievements in industry, agriculture, and livestock grazing.

Lumping attacks against local nationalism with parochialism, the K'un-ming Yunnan Jih-pao editorially commented on 31 July 1958 "Yunnan Province has the characteristics of a border province where many minority people live and production techniques are deficient. However, the purpose of acknowledging these characteristics is to implement the policies and directives of the party Central Committee more fully in order to reach the fundamental common goal -- socialism and Communism. Some good cadres may believe the biased and blind theory of 'local peculiarities' but they can be corrected by persuasion and criticism. Parochialists, however, use the 'local peculiarity theory' to oppose the party Central Committee. On the argument that certain areas of nationalities are different from others, certain individuals oppose the party line in hopes of creating an independent kingdom."

Continuing, the editorial pointed out that parochialists utilize this theory to evade the party's organizational procedure by appointing local cadres to key positions in the party and government. This is a serious intraparty contradiction, since the major party line is not the localization, but the communization of cadres. Only cadres with a complete understanding of Communism can implement the party line and struggle for the masses. Striking at the heart of the question of parochialism, the editorial said, "One point must be emphatically pointed out. Local cadres generally mean members of the party who were underground at the time of the liberation. Most of these cadres were intellectuals who have not been

completely reformed. On the other hand, nonlocal cadres are worker and peasant as well as veteran intellectual cadres with sound indoctrination. Therefore, the question of local and outside nonlocal cadres is metamorphosed into intellectual versus worker-peasant cadres.... Parochialists try to place local intellectual cadres who are still not properly reformed on the same level with nonlocal cadres. This plot is easily exposed."

Continuing its chastizing, the editorial said, "In fact, intellectual cadres, whose only claim is that they speak the local dialect, are really not, 'local' at all.... Cadres without Communist ideology and having no feeling in common with the workers and peasants are not Communist cadres, even if they are 100 percent local people."

To further implement the party policy of national solidarity, a Hsin-hua News Agency dispatch dated 13 May said that Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Ch'eng-tu, Szechwan Province, had recently called a meeting of ranking members of minority nationalities in the armed forces. Over 204 delegates from the Tibetan, Yi, Chiang, Miao, and Li-hsu nationalities attended the meeting. Pledging to improve their work in self-defense and agricultural production, the delegates will take important roles in protecting the democratic transformation program, maintaining public peace, and safeguarding production. Of these delegates, 40 percent were slaves before the liberation, the dispatch said.

The 5 July issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that, despite the good record of many cadres who were transferred to Fou-k'ang Hsien, Sinkiang, to engage in production, some have never ceased complaining. A cadre who was transferred to a cooperative did nothing all day but harp on self-pity. He packed up his belongings twice and left for his old office. Another wanted to give up the revolution and go to Urumchi to sell milk. A young cadre complained that there was no future in the rural areas and said that he was wasting the best years of his life there. A large number of cadres mistakenly devoted all their attention to manual labor and ignored political training. They reasoned that since they were transferred for manual training, they had better stick to it and earn more work points. There are even some who think they are above everybody else and fail to follow orders, obey regulations, or work regularly. Finally, some failed to adjust to rural living conditions. Chinese cadres refused to live with minority nationals. In view of this situation, the party committee took firm action. It ordered transferred cadres to observe discipline, hold regular political meetings, make confessions, and sign a pledge, the paper said.

The 10 September 1958, No 9, issue of the Peiping periodical Chung-kuo Ma-szu-lin (Chinese Moslem) carried several letters from its readers on the question of intermarriage of Moslems and Chinese. These letters commented on an article in an earlier issue of the periodical and generally approved this type of marriage. In most cases, it was a matter of a Moslem woman marrying a Chinese man. The more forceful Moslems called for "educating" the Moslem community to favor such marriages, since the Moslem

community should not consider itself apart from the masses of China. Praising the leadership of the party, younger Moslems point out that present conditions are different from the old days. Now contract marriages are no longer the custom. The letters state that, although Moslem practices should be respected in mixed marriages, still the Moslems involved should not rigidly insist on their observance by non-Moslems. They pointed out that, with the socialist construction of new China, new opportunities are being opened for everyone and Moslems should take advantage of them.

An article in the same issue carried a critique of an earlier article in the periodical on Moslem history. The critique took exception to the statement, "Moslems the world over are one family." It said that this ideology is a remnant from the feudalistic exploiting class and that such thinking is in direct contradiction to the solidarity of the proletariat.

The 12 July issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that a minority work conference had been held in Peiping recently to review the work of teams engaged in a compilation of the histories of various minority nationalities. The meeting brought out serious local nationalism among the workers engaged in writing the history of peoples in Sinkiang. Instead of working closely with local party committees, the investigators repeated reactionary statements on nationalities by such bourgeois specialists as Fei Hsiao-t'ung, Wu Tse-lin, Huang Hsien-fan, Tsen Chia-wu, Li Yu-i, Yang K'un, and Yang Ch'eng-chih. Instead of adopting the principles of Marxism-Leninism in their investigation work, they used the subjective minority nationality point of view. In this respect the Sinkiang team committed the serious error of acting diametrically opposite to the instructions of the central government and the Sinkiang party committee. The conference decided to complete a brief history of the minorities in 3 years and comprehensive history in 4-7 years. In the course of the conference, the delegates heard reports by Wang Feng, deputy chief of the united front department and of the nationalities committee of the party Central Committee, and Hsieh Fu-min, deputy chairman of the nationalities committee of the All-China People's Congress.

3. The Moslem Movement in the Northwest

Moslem separatist movements in Shensi, Kansu, and Sinkiang provinces reached their height in 1864 when Yakub Beg and others were virtual masters of Kashgar and the Tarim Basin. It was not until the star of Tso Tsung-t'ang rose over the northwest that the Moslems in Shensi were pacified in 1870 and in Khotan, in Sinkiang Province, in 1878. General Tso Tsung-t'ang's military feats were equaled only by the Chinese generals of the Han and T'ang dynasties who brought these Moslem territories under Chinese rule.

Although the Chinese Communists met with little resistance in their occupation of the northwest and the far west, Moslem resistance to Communism is still strong in these areas. This resistance even extends across the western Chinese border into Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union. With the ascendancy of the Middle East, the homeland of Islam, Moslem unrest poses a serious threat to international Communism.

Despite their gains with the more backward minorities, the Chinese Communists are apparently unable to find a solution for the Moslem question. The Ho-fei Anhwei Jih-pao of 29 June denounced Moslem rightists for charging that the party nationality policy was designed to deceive the people of the nation and that a people's democratic dictatorship was a dictatorship over good people.

The newspaper said that the ideology of the Moslems was, "all Moslems belong to one family," "Moslems must fight for their religion, not their country," and "Moslems should unite and organize their own government."

The Moslem movement was very much in the public eye in 1958. Preparations for the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region have been under way for years. The region was finally organized in October 1958 under circumstances far from pleasant. During the year, unmitigated attacks were leveled at Moslem rightists. The China Association for the Promotion of Moslem Culture was disbanded. Ma Chen-wu, a powerful Moslem leader, was openly accused of misdeeds when he attended the Kansu People's Congress. He was charged with organizing Moslem uprisings in the northwest since 1952.

Issue No 34 of the Min-tzu Hua-pao, published in October 1958, carried an article by Han Tao-jen, deputy secretary-general of the Ningsia party work committee, on the establishment of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region. Praising the solidarity of the Moslems with the other nationalities in China, he said that the Moslems will make great economic and cultural progress with the establishment of a region especially for Moslems. He said that in this 17,800-square-kilometer area there are 2 million people, of whom 33 percent are Moslem. Arable land in this area amounts to 7 mou and 7 fen per person. The area is rich in shale and petroleum. A large field is now being worked at Wu-chuang. In contrast to the old Kuomintang days, the area is being rapidly developed through the united efforts of the Moslem and Chinese people so that its inhabitants will enjoy a bright future, the article said.

On 16 October, the Peiping Jen-min Jih-pao reported that the first plenary session of the party committee of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region was held in Yin-ch'uan on 12 October. Speakers at this session said that they were eager to study the works of Chairman Mao and the General Line and policy of the party. They pledged to participate enthusiastically in the manual labor program and to strengthen their ideology by remolding it.

The 25 October issue reported that the first people's congress of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region met on 24 October to select a slate of officers for the regional government. Among the delegates was Lin Pao-chu, a member of the party politburo, who represented the party Central Committee and Chairman Mao. The main address was given by Liu K'o-p'ing, chairman of the preparatory committee for the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region. His address traced the progress of the Moslems in the area under party leadership and

urged both cadres and the broad masses to study Marxism-Leninism and the works of Mao Tse-tung in order to liberate their minds. Pointing out that 95 percent of the peasant households now belong to people's communes, he urged early fulfillment of 1959 grain production targets. Concluding, he praised the party's religious policy which permits no interference with each person's beliefs.

The 24 October issue of the newspaper reported that in welcoming Lin Po-ch'u, Lin K'o-p'ing, chairman of the preparatory committee of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region, said, "From the beginning of preparations for the establishment of the region, the central authorities have given due consideration to all Moslems. The neighboring provinces and autonomous regions have also given warm support. China is making a giant and all-round big leap forward in socialist construction. Our various nationalities are continuously developing their friendship and solidarity along the victories scored in the socialist cause. This meeting, is another vivid expression of the close unity among the various nationalities of China."

On 27 October the newspaper reported that while addressing the second session of the congress Lin Po-ch'u reviewed the historical exploitation of the Moslems by their rulers and Chinese officials. Expressing the desire of the party to give full recognition to all Moslems, he said, "After the liberation, the Communist Party abolished the system of racial oppression by introducing racial equality. The party guarantees equality to Moslems who live in small numbers among other nationalities throughout the country. It has established four Moslem chous, nine autonomous hsiens, and several mixed Moslem minority hsiens. The party has led the Moslems in implementing the democratic and socialist revolutions, improving living standards, and developing the economy, in addition to training a large number of Moslem cadres. There has been a basic change in the Moslem society."

Continuing, he said, "In the spring of 1956, the party Central Committee proposed the establishment of an autonomous Moslem region at the provincial level to meet the long-standing desire of the Moslems. The establishment of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region supplies this need and is a triumph of the party's nationalities policy. The party's basic policy for the settlement of the nationality question is to provide regional autonomy for the various nationalities. The work of the past few years has resulted in regional autonomy for 35 nationalities totaling 25 million people. This is about 90 percent of the minority population living in compact areas."

Concluding, he reviewed the tasks of the newly organized region. He called on all nationalities in the region to unite in the struggle to implement the party's General Line for socialist construction, to carry out the socialist revolution thoroughly, and to strengthen the people's communes. The region was called on to take positive steps to promote the cultural and technological revolutions and to accelerate the development of an over-all big leap forward in socialist construction in order to bring about a basic change in the appearance of the region in the shortest possible time.

He closed his address with the following words: "Many people's communes have been established in the region. They are the basic unit of a socialist society and will also be the basic unit for the Communist society in China. Many people's communes in the region have both Moslem and Chinese members. Such multinational communes are the basis for unity and co-operation among the minorities."

On 28 October the newspaper reported that Wang Feng had recently told the people's congress of the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region that the interests of socialism and Communism should be taken into consideration in everything, that factors unfavorable for national unity should be overcome, and that vigilance should be sharpened against undermining of national unity by imperialists and counterrevolutionaries. "The mass line is the fundamental political and organizational line of the party," he continued. "The construction targets set for 1959 would be still higher, and to fulfill them, the masses should be widely mobilized."

On 24 October the newspaper gave the following data on the region. The Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region is located in the northeastern sector of Kansu Province. It includes 12 hsiens and shihs and covers a total of 77,800 square kilometers. It has a population of 2 million people of several nationalities, but the Moslems predominate; they constitute two thirds of the people. This former arid grazing area is rapidly being transformed into a highly productive agricultural area as well as an industrial center.

An editorial in the 10 September 1958 issue of the Peiping periodical Chung-kuo Mu-szu-lin make strong attacks against Ma Chen-wu. It said that his crimes were laid bare by the fifth session of the first Kansu people's congress in May 1958 when he was accused of oppressing Chinese and Moslems in Hsi-chi, Ku-yuan, Hai-yuan, Chin-chih, Chang-chia-ch'uan, and Wu-chung. He not only utilized his religious position to inflame the populace against the regime, but also sold so-called religious medical cures to poison and kill the people. Despite numerous warnings, he continued his crimes. He even presented himself as the earthly representative of Allah.

Reports appearing in the 7-17 May 1958 issues of the Lan-chou Kansu Jih-pao on the fifth session of the first Kansu Provincial People's Congress which opened on 6 May cited numerous speeches of the deputies attacking local nationalism among the Moslems in the area. In her attacks, deputy Li Lei said, "In the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region, many people are not conscious of national solidarity. Instead, they emphasize the differences between minorities in order to demand more privileges and to evade responsibility. In their relations with other nationalities, they insist on special rights. They drive out Chinese and other outside cadres, thus obstructing cooperation among the various nationalities. They negate the achievements of the party in minority areas, slander the party leadership, and attempt to sabotage relations between the minorities and the party. They oppose socialist transformation and do not care for self-improvement."

Deputy Wang Ting-chieh said, "Isolated cases still occur where the reactionaries do their utmost to retain feudal privileges and exploit the people. This obstructs and sabotages the production of the masses and directly affects production expansion as well as the livelihood and improvement of the minorities. We must resolutely and mercilessly struggle against reactionaries. As for those reactionaries with ulterior motives, they must be severely punished."

Ma Chu-hsuan, a Moslem woman deputy, pointed out that adventures in religious circles, taking advantage of their feudal privileges and completely disregarding the law of the land, have prevented women from participating in socialist construction and interfered with their freedom of marriage, thus inhibiting their active participation in socialist construction. The broad masses of women demand that this situation be corrected immediately. The Moslem areas must implement the marriage law. This is the desire of the Moslem masses, especially the young men and women, she said.

During the people's congress meeting on 9 May, the deputies concentrated their attack on Ma Chen-wu, a Moslem political "opportunist." He was accused of openly supporting land reforms, but secretly sabotaging the movement. He was said to have opposed the agriculture cooperativization movement although he owns 2,000 mou of land and thousands of heads of livestock. It was charged that he hired 110 workers whom he cruelly exploited. Deputy Na Chang-chi said accusingly, "To Ma Chen-wu, killing is second nature. He told people that those who have killed will go to heaven. A man tried to argue with him, and he sent people to cut off one of his ears. When Ma Chen-wu visited the villages, he would come back loaded with money. He fattened himself at the expense of the working masses. He lives on human flesh and blood."

Adding to the accusations Wang Tzu-hou said, "On the eve of the 8 May rioting, Ma Chen-wu called a meeting at P'ing-liang. No one knows what he said to the Imams. When I was at Ch'ang-hua Ch'u in Ku-yuan Hsien, Imam Ma Hsi-tsu told me that there was rioting and advised me not to leave."

Ma Feng-chieh said, "On the eve of the 2 April rioting in 1951, Ma Chen-wu sent his henchmen to Tung-shih, Hsi-chi-t'an, and Ku-yuan to direct activities. He touched off the rioting by slaughtering four animals to celebrate the Molib Nabawi festival."

The paper said that Ma Chen-wu spoke in his defense before the deputies by telling lies and stressing minor matters. He evaded all responsibility as well as the major issues involved in his rightist activities. However, as the deputies exposed the crimes committed by Ma Chen-wu and others, who had cruelly oppressed and exploited the masses through the exercise of their feudal privileges, there were indications that the struggle between the two roads of capitalism and socialism was still going on. This aroused the

vigilance of the deputies, who expressed a strong determination to wipe out the ideological influence of all remnant feudal forces by forcefully criticizing capitalist ideology, the paper said.

In the closing address before the congress, Chiang Tzu-hsin, secretary of the Kansu party committee, said, "As a result of the rectification campaign and the antirightist struggle, the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts has basically succeeded, and changes more favorable to socialism have occurred in the relation between classes. The struggle between the two roads, however, is still not completed. But following the expansion of the socialist revolution and the development of socialist construction, the class struggle in China will gradually diminish until finally it vanishes altogether. As for the ideological struggle to establish the proletariat and destroy the bourgeoisie, that will take longer. Failure to recognize this fact is dangerous."

The same newspaper reported that rightist activities among the Moslems dominated sessions of the Kansu Islamic Association since its first meeting on 11 August 1958. During subsequent sessions which lasted well into September, such leading Moslems as Ma Shun-t'ien, Lan Hsiu-chai, Chin Tzu-ch'ang, Ma Ju-lin, Fu Lien-sheng, Ma Ju-i, Chang Teng-t'ing, Ku Jui-t'ing, Ma Ming-te, and Ma Chi-ming were accused of attacking the party and socialism under the guise of promoting religion and safeguarding the interests of the minority nationalities.

The 23 August issue of the Kansu Jih-pao reported that rightists such as Ma Shun-t'ien slandered Imams who cooperated with the regime and abused minority cadres. Ma Ju-lin utilized "worship days" to stir up the masses and, in addition to threatening to kill party cadres, had managed to stop agricultural production for a month. Ma Shun-t'ien sheltered counterrevolutionaries in Moslem mosques. Ma Ju-i said, "The Communist party is suppressing innocent people and is treating them unjustly." When a landlord was executed during the land reforms, Lan Hsiu-chai said, "The Communists behave like bandits. They take people's property and injure them." La Shih-ming said, "If the Communist Party succeeds, the first person it will kill is the Imam." In an attempt to place religion above the state, he proposed the establishment of a "Ningsia Islamic Autonomous Chou."

On 26 August, the newspaper reported that Ma Shun-t'ien and Lan Hsiu-chai were accused of swindling the public by levying money for the repair of mosques and tombs, but actually dissipating the funds by lewd living. They even tried to restore Chiang Kai-shek and Ma Pu-fang to power. When Ma Liang openly revolted, Ma Shun-t'ien supported him by spreading rumors that Ma Liang had occupied Tibet, aircraft had arrived from Taiwan, new weapons had arrived, and the Communists would soon be finished. However, Ma Shun-t'ien still denied these accusations and threatened to arouse the masses if he were accused of being a rightist.

The newspaper reported on 27 August that Lan Hsiu-chai supported the revolt in P'ing-liang on 8 May 1952 and defended rightists by saying, "Ma Chen-wu is a religious man. He has nothing to do with politics."

The newspaper reported on 31 August that Ma Chen-wu was accused of plotting to set up a "Moslem Kingdom." During the Japanese occupation of China, he tried to organize an armed force and found a "Moslem Kingdom" with Japanese support. The "kingdom" covered Hsi-hai-ku, Ning-hsia, Ching-yuan, and Ching-ning. Ma Chen-wu cooperated with Ma Liang, the puppet governor of Shantung Province during the Japanese occupation, and worked through Baron Ogazawara in Tokyo. The plot fell through when the Japanese were defeated, it was said.

On 4 September, the newspaper said that Kuo Nan-p'u wrote a confession which indicated Ma Chen-wu to be the instigator of the outbreak on 2 April. A Hsin-hua News Agency report of 17 October said that Ma Chen-wu was formerly high in the councils of the party. He was formerly a member of the nationalities affairs committee of the former Northwest Military and Political Administrative Committee, chairman of the Ku-yuan Moslem Autonomous Chou, a member of the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative council, and deputy chairman of the China Islamic Association.

Calling for a purge of "black sheep" from Islamic circles, the newspaper editorially commented on 17 October, "Protection of freedom in religious belief is one of the basic policies of the party and government. We Communists are out-and-out atheists who believe in no religion. But realizing that religion is a product of the human society at a certain stage of development and that there is a law governing its origin, development, and elimination, we consistently stand for freedom of religious belief. This is expressly laid down in the constitution of our country. Over the past 9 years since the liberation, we have repeatedly declared that each citizen make his own decision as to whether he believes or does not believe in religion...the government will not only refrain from interfering in the freedom of religion, but will protect it....

"Simultaneous with this, we have repeatedly made it clear that religious believers must observe state laws and that no person may exploit religion for illegal activities. Freedom in religion and the utilization of religion for counterrevolutionary activities are two different things.... Any person who exploits religious beliefs for counterrevolutionary activities will be resolutely and ruthlessly suppressed by the government. Ma Chen-wu is a heinous reactionary who works under the cloak of religion."

On 9 November, the pro-Nationalist Yin-tu Jih-pao (Chinese Journal of India) of Calcutta, India, carried extracts from the Yin-ch'uan Jih-pao, published in Yin-ch'uan, Kansu Province, on the Moslem situation in that area. The extracts stated that the Peiping State Council had issued orders to Hopeh, Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu provinces which instructed each province

to raise a people's armed division of 10,000-15,000 Chinese to form a "land development army." This force will be settled among the Moslem communities in Yin-ch'uan, Wu-chung, Chung-ning, and Ching-t'ai in the Ningsia Moslem Autonomous Region of Kansu Province. Li Ching-lin, a party secretary, has been designated the political commissar of this army.

4. Unrest Among Local Minorities

Reports of unrest continue to be carried in the press. The Moslems in the northwest and the lamas in Inner Mongolia are continuing their resistance to Chinese political and economic infiltration.

Ulanfu, the leader of the Mongolians continues to prate the party line, but as early as 26 February 1958 Jen-min Jih-pao carried this quotation by him: "The most basic slogan of the local nationalists is, 'Oppose assimilation.' They point out that the ratio between the Mongolian and Chinese population in Inner Mongolia is now one to seven."

On 28 February, the Hsin-hua News Agency released an official report submitted to the Nationalities Committee of the All-China People's Congress which contained the following comment:

"The question of accepting or rejecting Chinese cadres and immigrants is equated with the question of accepting or rejecting socialism.... The chief reason given for rejecting the Chinese revolves around the so-called question of 'assimilation.... Natural assimilation among the nationalities will never be rejected because it represents a progressive trend in historical development."

The 30 July issue of the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao reported that Ulanfu, chairman and first party secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, had recently addressed a meeting of lamas of Silingol League (Meng). He called on them to rally around the party and government by promoting solidarity and following the path to socialism. Calling on the lamas to become progressive, Ulanfu pointed out that professional religious workers heretofore were handmaidens of the bourgeoisie. The lamas assisted the ruling clique to exploit the masses of Inner Mongolia. "Now" said Ulanfu, "the bourgeoisie and feudal classes are wiped out, but the lamas still remain. The lamas must now follow the road to socialism. Some of them have already joined agricultural and livestock cooperatives. This is best because socialism and capitalism cannot coexist. In his talk on dealing with contradictions within the ranks of the people, Chairman Mao stated six points to guide the lamas in their socialist reforms. The government's policy on the freedom of religion has not changed."

Ulanfu continued by explaining that the lamas must not sabotage socialism because such action constitutes contradictions which are not within the ranks of the people, but which are between the "enemy and ourselves." He continued by criticizing lamas who follow the third road.

"Since China's 600 million people are following the road to socialism, there is no alternative road," he pointed out. "The third road does not exist. All lamas must realize that the Mongolians suffered under the bourgeois feudalistic regime. Since the liberation, the masses have greatly improved their economic condition and they will oppose lamas who seek to return to the old ways. At present 100 percent of the lamas in the Lu-t'u, 96 percent in Wang-kai, and 85 percent in Ao-pao-t'u temple have joined agricultural cooperatives."

Ulanfu pointed out, "Lamas belonging to the Hung-hsing agricultural cooperative are supposed to work 260 days a year. They should actually work at least 220-240 days. They may gradually develop the manual labor program, but lamas must engage in agriculture. Otherwise, Inner Mongolia will lapse into economic chaos and even the lamas will not be able to continue to exist. To engage in manual labor does not necessarily mean working in the livestock industry. A doctor performing his duties or a craftsman engaged in handicraft production is included in the field of manual labor. Old lamas should receive financial relief from the government and may undertake light duties."

Concluding, Ulanfu told the lamas that participation in cooperatives would not interfere with their ordinary life. They could still recite their scriptures without any restrictions, and property handed over to the cooperative would still yield an income at a fixed rate of interest."

In response to Ulanfu's speech, several leading monks pledged the support of all lamas for the party's leadership. They said that the party is their savior and they will undergo reform in order to embark on the road to socialism.

An item in the 29 May issue of the Peiping Kuang-ming Jih-pao reported that during the past years local nationalism has developed among the 400,000 Moslems in Honan Province. They have shown hostility to outsiders, failed to cooperate with other nationalities, and rejected Chinese cadres and peasants. They attempted to create an all-Moslem area by driving out other nationalities. Moslems refused to join cooperatives with other nationalities. They exaggerated national differences and made unreasonable demands for special foods and holidays. They hoarded goods and illegally slaughtered draft animals. They even tried to undermine the solidarity of the party by creating nationality differences so that members would be divided along nationality lines. They refuse to learn from the Chinese and are constantly involved in quarrels with other nationalities. They refuse to give food to Chinese cadres and even beat them up. In Yeh-hsien

Hsien of Ts'ao-chuang Moslem Ch'u, Moslems were so busy illegally slaughtering cattle and dealing in the black market that work attendance was only 60 percent. These shortcomings are being corrected through socialist education.

On 31 October, the Hsin-hua News Agency reported that delegates to the second plenary conference of the China Association for the Promotion of Moslem Culture, held from 26 to 29 October 1958 in Yin-ch'uan, had approved the dissolution of the association. In his closing address, Li K'o-p'ing, chairman of the association, reviewed the development of the Moslems in China and the organization of the association with the comment, "Although the China Association for the Promotion of Moslem Culture has now wound up its work and organizational functions, all Moslems must further their solidarity and devote greater efforts to socialist construction in addition to striving for the transition from socialism to Communism."

In his report to the Tsinghai Provincial People's Congress, which was carried in the 4 July issue of the Hsi-ning Tsinghai Jih-pao, Yuan Jen-yuan attacked the dissension created by former governor Sun Tso-pin among the various nationalities in Tsinghai. Sun Tso-pin failed to implement party policies and even dropped the party membership designation in publishing lists of appointments. He and his henchmen opposed the rectification movement and said that, although the party knows nothing about law, it still tries to rule over everything.

Pointing out that the party observes its policy of freedom in religion, Yuan Jen-yuan attacked those who use religion as a cover to carry on counterrevolutionary activities. He praised the arrest of Hsia-jih-ch'ang, To-erh-chi, Cha-hsia, and others. Utilizing religion as their cloak, these culprits worked with "imperialist spies," converted mosques and temples into centers for counterrevolutionary activities, circulated all kinds of rumors, organized armed rebellion, promoted counterrevolutionary outbreaks, opposed socialism, attempted to overthrow the people's regime, violated the constitution, and endangered national security. He closed with a warning to the minority nationalities in the grazing areas against participation in counterrevolutionary activities:

In the 10 September issue of the Chung-kuo Mu-zsu-lin, Yang Cheng-ying wrote an article attacking Ma Chen-wu and other Moslem "turncoats" who instigated riots against the regime. Ma Chen-wu was accused of hiding Ma Chen-hua and other leaders of the 2 April 1956 uprising in a Moslem temple in Wu-chung Autonomous Chou. Ma Chen-wu pointed out that, since the outbreaks on 8 May, 2 April, and 4 April have failed, it will be necessary to have another outbreak on 1 June [no year given]. He printed 1,000 paper charms and distributed them to Moslems with the admonition that they must wear them while fighting so that they can go to heaven after death. He designated a word as the signal for the uprising and ordered 200,000 chin of grain stored in January 1958. He used the cover word "charcoal" for grain. On 8 May, he inspected his preparations and planned to stage an uprising at the first opportunity.

The 16 July issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that on 22 June the Kasghar intermediate and municipal courts held a joint session to try a group of criminals. Several Uighurs were sentenced to death for murder which had taken place during robberies and family quarrels. The son of a landlord was sentenced to prison for evading taxes, violating grain control regulations, and leading an immoral life.

The 26 July issue carried a report of the recent rectification movement conference of the Sinkiang party committee. While praising the achievements of the movement, the conference pointed out that it lacked depth and breadth. It ordered the third stage of the movement ended about the end of July 1958, when a review of the first three stages would be made. The conference called for a determined struggle against rightists exposed in the course of the movement. It urged cadres to study and improve their ideology in order to strengthen their leadership.

Part 2. POLITICAL

MINORITY NATIONALITY AFFAIRS

A. Central Government Minority Policies

Through the centuries, unrest among the minority nationalities inhabiting China's frontiers has always been of great concern to Chinese authorities. Remembering that the Chin Tartars, Mongols, and Manchus once ruled China, the authorities adhered to a policy of suppression to keep the minority nationalities in line. The Communist regime has not succeeded in improving the situation. The Tibetans traditionally remained aloof. The Outer Mongolians succeeded in achieving full independence from China with the upsurge of Soviet influence. The Uighurs in Sinkiang recently openly declared for independence.

The whole question of discontent among the minorities was serious enough to receive the attention of Mao Tse-tung. In his speech, "On Dealing With Contradictions Within the Ranks of the People," he succinctly pointed out that the people in Tibet were not ready for socialist transformation; therefore, such changes should be delayed for 6 years or longer. In July 1957, top government leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Ulanfu, held a conference in Tsingtao, Shantung Province, to discuss minority problems and work out a long-range policy for dealing with local nationalism.

An editorial entitled "Why Is It Necessary to Combat Local Nationalism?" appearing in the 27 June 1958 Peiping Jen-min Jih-pao was reprinted in full in the 29 June Hu-ho-hao-t'e Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao to lay down the party line for cadres. The editorial reviewed achievements of the party and government in Sinkiang and lashed out at local nationalists who are sowing seeds of discord among the nationalities as well as between them and the Chinese. Admitting the existence of vestiges of Chinese chauvinism, the editorial had the following to say about the activities of local nationalists.

"The policy of local autonomy for minority nationalities adopted by China is based on historical conditions and the current situation within the nation. This policy is fully compatible with the principles of Marxism and Leninism and is for the common welfare of all nationalities in the building of socialism"

The editorial adds, "Local nationalist activities against this policy are being carried out by landlord and bourgeois elements. Pretending to uphold the interests of minorities, they have actually done these groups great harm. They call themselves Marxist-Leninists, but they are peddling revisionism. They not only oppose the policies of centralized party leadership and national autonomy, but also the General Line of the party during the transitional period in hopes of remaking minority areas in the image of the bourgeoisie.

"Bourgeois rightists, who disguise themselves as nationalists, are agents of the landlords and bourgeoisie. They have the ideology of a fast disappearing class. Some have connections with imperialist elements which direct their sectarian activities."

Concluding, the editorial pointed out that "local nationalism is a vestige of the old society. To overcome this ideological influence, it is necessary to initiate a long-term struggle. Although some people engage in sectarian activities, most people in the minority areas are willing to follow the leadership of the party to socialism on the basis of national solidarity. Local nationalists must be educated patiently on the principle of unity-criticism-unity. Their mistakes must be pointed out clearly to them. They can then realize that only national unification and racial solidarity can develop the nation's socialist economy and culture so that the people of all nationalities can enjoy a bright and prosperous future."

To strengthen the illusion that China is a big, happy multinational family, the government sent a large delegation to the Afro-Asian writers conference in Tashkent, Uzbek SSR. The Jen-min Jih-pao reported on 13 October 1958 that members of the delegation included Mao Tun, the chief; Tzunung Hadir, a Uighur; Kurban Lai, a Kazakh; and Malchinfu and Saichaoteku, two Mongolians. In his opening speech to the conference, Mao Tun talked about a visit by Chang Chien to Tashkent sometime between 100 and 200 B. C., the introduction of Buddhism to China from Samarkand, and the travels of Fa Hsien and Hsuan Tsang to India. He also said, "We hope that the conference will make more contributions to upholding national independence, opposing colonialism, and protecting and developing national culture...."

An important phase of the central government's minority policy is the creation of written languages for the various minorities. A written language would presumably increase the efficiency of the minority cadres. Projects for creating written languages were subjected to long discussions at all levels.

The 22 January 1958 Nan-ning Kwangsi Jih-pao reported that the 63d plenary session of the State Council on 29 November 1957 approved the final plan for the written language of the Chuang nationality in Kwangsi Province. The popularization of the written Chuang language began in May 1957. After about half a year of study, over 350,000 students mastered this writing. A written knowledge will help to strengthen the management of cooperatives and thus improve production. Completely illiterate Chuang cadres can now record wage points, audit accounts, read newspapers, and write letters. This is a case of the realization of the nationality policy of the party and a concrete example of the party's solicitude for the cultural improvement of minority nationalities, the paper said.

The 19 April editorial of the Jen-min Jih-pao commented on the 28 March to 16 April 1958 second conference on Scientific Discussions of Linguistic Work Among Minority Nationalities by pointing out that, since the first conference in December 1955, the linguistic program for minorities had been basically realized. A "political principle" the editorial said, was resolved with the adoption of a Latin alphabet for the romanization of Chinese.

In his "Current Task of Language Reform," Premier Chou En-lai said, "While creating or reforming languages for the various nationalities, the writing must hereafter be based on the Latin alphabet and must conform to the phonetic system adopted for the Chinese language in the pronunciation and use of the Latin alphabet."

With this ideological point settled, linguistic personnel were urged to increase their efforts. They must plunge into a "3-year bitter struggle" to complete written language for multilingual minority nationals and to initiate programs for the reform of minority languages where necessary.

Pointing out that personnel engaged in linguistic work must promote harmony and not stress racial differences, the editorial attacked the "purists" who exclude expressions which were introduced from Chinese or other languages and are now in common use as a part of the minority language.

"Borrowed expressions do not negate, but enrich, national culture and are a development of the national language," the editorial pointed out, with an added comment that any attempt to exclude such borrowed expressions would be promoting racial differences.

Laying down the correct line for linguistic work, the editorial severely criticized subjectivism among the cadres who keep data to themselves by stamping them "scientific-secret" or who stake out a "field" and beat off any trespassers. "Errors in ideology and work," the editorial concluded, "were exposed during the second conference on the Scientific Discussions of Linguistic Work Among Minority Nationalities and were corrected in time."

A Hsin-hau (New China) News Agency dispatch dated 21 June 1958 said that the Sinkiang committee on minority languages has drafted Latin alphabets for the Uighur, Kazakh, Mongolian, Khakha, and Hsi-po languages of minorities living in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The Arabic written script now in use prevents these languages from meeting the needs of the development of socialist construction in the region. The adoption of a Latin alphabet will strengthen the nation as well as the solidarity of the nationalities. In the compilation of technical terms, due weight will be given to those terms borrowed from the Chinese language which are now in common use among the local nationalities.

The central government's policy of creating a written language was only one of the innovations planned for the national minorities. Economic, sociological, and cultural changes are being introduced relentlessly. The cadres were naturally confused when faced with the resistance of the minority nationals. Since they are inclined to follow the hard line, central authorities felt obligated to lay down the correct line for them.

The 3 April 1958 issue of the Peiping Kuang-ming Jih-pao carried an article by Wang K'e and Ts'ui Chien on the correct treatment of minority customs which presented an exhaustive analysis of practices among the minorities and their impact on socialism.

The writers warned cadres against such hasty conclusions as all minority practices are "good" or "bad," or that certain customs are generally observed throughout any one minority area. Such hasty decisions, they pointed out, play into the hands of local nationalists who create dissension within the minority group under the pretext of making concessions to common customs and practices and thus endanger the course of socialism adopted by the national minorities.

Continuing, the writers attacked such practices as offering oxen for sacrifices, not watering fields, accumulating fertilizer, not working on "taboo" days, and arranging marriages through matchmakers. Citing the case of Kawa nationals who now use monkey instead of human heads for sacrifices, they point out that abominable customs can be changed.

Concluding, they said, "If we think the customs and practices of the national minorities utterly bad, or even try to compel the minorities to change them, we will be guilty of reactionary Chinese chauvinism. This is trying to assimilate other nationalities forcibly. On the other hand, it is equally erroneous to think that respect for national customs and practices means that harmful practices must never be changed. Cadres must assist the minorities in making reforms. All party members and cadres belonging to national minorities must positively take the lead and reform bad customs in order to promote the development of socialism in minority areas."

A Hsin-hua News Agency dispatch dated 30 April 1958 said that since the adjournment of the nationality work conference in Tsingtao in July 1957, meetings have been held in minority areas in Kweichow, Yunnan, Tsinghai, Kansu, Honan, Hopeh, and Kirin provinces to study the reports of Premier Chou En-lai, Deputy Premier Ulanfu, and others. The facts reveal that local nationalists are ambitious elements who oppose the interests of the nationalities to launch criminal activities against the party and socialism in order to undermine the solidarity of the nationalities in China, the dispatch said.

Rectification and socialist education campaigns are being conducted in minority areas in the light of local conditions, according to the dispatch. In areas where the socialist transformation of the ownership of the tools of production is already completed, the masses and cadres should hold frank discussions on the two roads of socialism and capitalism, and antirightist struggle, and criticism of local nationalism.

The dispatch added that in minority areas which have basically completed democratic reforms and have begun programs of socialist transformation, patriotic education, tailored to local conditions, is being initiated. In minority areas where democratic reforms are still not implemented, cadres have initiated socialist propaganda for the masses. Patriotic socialist education began in Tibet in January 1958. Exhibitions contrasting past and present living conditions of the minorities have clearly demonstrated to the people in minority areas the bright prospects of socialism, according to the dispatch.

On 24 May 1958, the Jen-min Jih-pao reported that, in a speech marking the seventh anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet, General Chang Ching-wu pointed out that the central government had sent large numbers of Chinese to assist the Tibetans in carrying out economic, cultural, and other programs; that both civil and military Chinese personnel have energetically carried out the agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet and that the Chinese have respected the religious traditions of the Tibetans.

Pointing out that Chinese authorities were able to provide a working formula for Tibetan officials in Lhasa, Gyangtse, and Chamdo, General Chang Ching-wu according to the paper, said that Tibet's return to the homeland had wiped out the vestiges of imperialism in Tibet. Now, under the peaceful policy of the central government, cordial relations are maintained with India, Nepal, and other neighboring states, he said.

Commenting on the armed forces, General Chang Ching-wu said that although ranks of the regular army have been conferred on officers of the local Tibetan army, it is still necessary to improve the patriotic education of the local Tibetan troops before they can be reorganized as part of the national defense force.

Concluding, General Chang stressed the necessity for the establishment of a socialist society in Tibet and the formal organization of the Tibet Autonomous Region and warned against local as well as Chinese chauvinism and the schismatic plots of imperialists and counterrevolutionaries.

An item in the 30 June 1958 issue of the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao said that on 27 June 1958, the Inner Mongolia party committee called a meeting to map plans for the fourth stage of the rectification movement. Addressing the meeting, Wang Feng, secretary of the party committee, announced that the "theory and practice" stage of the movement had come to a close. He urged cadres to study carefully the speeches given before the second session of the Eighth Party Congress by Chairman Mao in order to overcome subjectivism, dogmatism, and empiricism. He called on educational circles to discuss emphasis on the old and new, on legal circles to discuss rightism and the class struggle, and on advanced institutions of learning to discuss the need to be "red and skilled."

As to the fourth stage of the rectification movement, Wang Feng declared that this was the last stage of the movement and it should not be allowed to slither out like a snake since the movement began with the roar of a lion. Listing the four points for this stage of the movement,

he said that cadres must study documents on rectification in order to strengthen their political stand, promulgate the party's main line, and correctly understand Marxism-Leninism. He also called on the cadres to promote frank discussions in order to arrive at a mutual understanding. They must write a summation of their self-criticism and submit it for review. Finally, they must work out a plan to be "red and skilled."

In Inner Mongolia, the Chinese authorities continued to promote their policies by criticizing the errors of local nationalism and offering rewards of "autonomy."

On 3 August 1958, the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao reported that the O-wen-k'o Autonomous Banner was formally established at the first people's congress held in Nan-t'un on 30 July 1958. The congress elected a people's council of 19 members, with T'u-meng-pa-ya-erh, an O-wen-k'o, as chairman; and Yu-li-chi and Meng-k'o, Mongolians, and Pi-li-k'o-t'u, a Daghur, as deputy chairmen.

In addition to passing resolutions attacking Anglo-American "aggression" in the Middle East, the congress sent greetings to Chairman Mao to report the formal establishment of the banner and to pledge national solidarity and full support of socialist construction.

"Under the guidance of the party and Chairman Mao," the message said, "and the brilliant light of the party's General Line, the banner will complete the assignments of the revised draft program of the development of agriculture and livestock growing in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region ahead of schedule."

A similar greeting to Ulanfu, chairman of the Inner Mongolia party committee, pointed out that the establishment of the O-wen-k'o Autonomous Banner was "another signal victory of the policies of the party and government."

The O-wen-k'o nationality includes peoples formerly included in the So-lun, Ya-k'u-te, and T'ung-ku-shih groups. Although a majority are concentrated in the six somons of the I-min Ho watershed, these nomads are scattered from Sinkiang to Heilungkiang. The newly organized banner, with its capital at Nan-t'un, has 2,457 people of the O-wen-k'o; 3,697 of the Mongolian; 1,869 of the Daghur; 1,265 of the Chinese; and 48 of the Moslem, Manchu, Tibetan, and Korean nationalities.

Editorially commenting on the establishment of the banner, the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao pointed out that during the feudal Manchu days nomads in the Hulunbuir plain were designated "Soluns" although the people called themselves "O-wen-k'o." These people are linked to the Ya-k'u-te and T'ung-ku-shih people by cultural ties. During the Manchu, warlord, and Japanese imperialist regimes, the nomads were ruthlessly exploited the editorial said. Concluding, the editorial laid down tasks for the reform and development of the livestock industry.

On 15 August 1958, the Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner was formerly inaugurated at Ni-erh-chi, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao reported 19 August 1958. After hearing work reports and future plans, the meeting elected Pa-t'u-pa-ya-erh, a Daghur, to be chairman; Ts'ui Hsi-hsien, a Chinese; and T'u-jung, an O-wen-k'o, to be deputy chairman; and Po-yen, and O-wen-k'o, to be chief of justice of the people's court of the Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner. The meeting sent greetings to Chairman Mao which said, "Since the revolution and under the correct leadership of the party, the banner has successfully completed the democratic and socialist revolutions, and has achieved outstanding results in the socialist revolution. Oppression, bias, and distrust have given way to equality, solidarity, and mutual cooperation...."

The Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner is located in the northern part of Inner Mongolia. The word "mo-li-ta-wa" in Daghur means "a mountain range which looks like a horse." The banner was formerly known as the Mo-li-ta-wa banner. Of the 63,944 people in the area, 14,929 are Daghurs; 46,024, Chinese; and 3,041, O-wen-k'o Mongolian, Moslem, Korean, or Orunchun.

Speaking at the founding ceremonies, Pa-t'u-pa-ya-erh, chief of the Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner, said that in the past 9 years oppression and bias against the minorities have changed to mutual trust and unity under the brilliant light of the party's nationality policy. He added that the multinational homeland has been able to improve its racial solidarity. However, he said, schismatic bourgeois local nationalist have demanded a Daghur chou despite the fact the Daghurs are few in number

and scattered. They complain that without an autonomous chou, the Daghurs cannot make economic, political, and cultural progress. They say that the economy of the mountain area is getting worse daily. They are wrecking national solidarity and party leadership under the guise of promoting the rights of nationalities. This erroneous thinking must be corrected by a thorough study of party documents and a rectification drive, he concluded.

Echoing these sentiments, Su Ch'ang-te, first party secretary of the Mo-li-ta-wa Daghur Autonomous Banner, pointed out that the founding of the autonomous banner was a signal victory of the party's nationality policy in the struggle against local nationalism. He noted that, in the struggle against the two paths in nationality affairs, attacks against Chinese chauvinism were strong while local nationalism was treated lightly. Su said that during the review of nationality affairs in 1952 and 1955, only Chinese chauvinism was criticized, with the result that in 1956 serious errors of local nationalism were committed during promotion of the Daghur autonomous banner. To correct this error, he added, the nationalities must treat their problems from the viewpoint dialectical materialism. The nationalities must learn from the experiences gained in the struggle against rightists and the rectification movement. To complete the tasks assigned to the banner under the nation's agricultural program, cadres and broad masses of the banner must study party policies and the experiences gained from various campaigns. They must overcome conservatism and hold frank discussions to deal with contradictions within the ranks of the people, Su concluded.

Editorially commenting on the founding of the banner, the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao praised the high quality of the Daghur people and their struggle against feudalistic oppression. It pointed out that the founding of the banner settled the question of the Daghur nationality which the party decided in 1956 should be a separate group. Although concentrations of Daghurs are scattered over wide areas, the government decided to locate the banner in the Mo-li-ta-wa plain. Now that these people have their own territory, they should guard against the errors of local nationalism as well as Chinese chauvinism by forever following the leadership of the party, the paper said.

B. Minority Reaction to Central Government Policies

Chinese Communist propaganda stresses "achievements" of the government's minority policy and gives the illusion to people at home and abroad not only that is "all well" with the minorities, but also that they are thriving and making spectacular socialist progress.

The Jen-min Jih-pao said on 19 May 1958 that people of the various minority nationalities throughout the country have raised their political ideological level through the rectification and socialist education campaigns. By learning to work together with the Chinese as well as with each other, the minority nationalities have overcome local nationalism and with heightened enthusiasm are actively promoting the big leap forward in production, the paper said.

Farmers from the minority areas in Yunnan Province went to Chinese areas to learn advanced techniques in fertilizer accumulation, irrigation development, and use of modern farm implements, the paper noted.

The improved level of political ideology of the minority nationalities is leading them on the economic road to Communist prosperity, according to this account. In 1958, agricultural cooperatives in areas occupied by various nationalities signed mutual assistance pacts. Minority nationality peasants in the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region said that the party is their mother; the cooperative, their home; and the Chinese, their elder brother. The slogan of these peasants is "learn from the Chinese; imitate the Chinese."

During 1958, according to the 8 May Jen-min Jih-pao, the Chinese will make an all-out effort to promote the big leap forward in industry among the minority people of Yunnan Province. Chinese technicians recently left K'un-ming for the T'ai, I, Hani-I, and Te-hung T'ai—Ching-po minority areas to build 655 small plants. The government appropriated 5 million yuan for conservation projects throughout the minority areas. Experts from engineering institutes in K'un-ming will assist the minority nationalities in developing mines for nonferrous metal smelters. Although minority areas are economically backward, they are rich in minerals.

An editorial in the 19 October issue entitled "The National Minorities Are Advancing at Great Speed" pointed out that "in fact, backwardness will not hamper the national minorities in their pursuit of a forward leap in construction. On the contrary, it demands that they carry out their construction at a greater pace."

An item in the 29 April issue said that, with the exception of the Kawa nationality, the T'ai, Ching-po, Li-su, Han-i, La-hu, and other minority peoples live in compact communities along a 2,000-kilometer stretch of China's southern border. There are 20 nationalities in Yunnan totaling 5.6 million. Of this number, 3.8 million live in 8 autonomous chous and 11 autonomous hsiens. In the Hsi-shuang Pan-na T'ai-ching-po and Hung-ho Han-i Autonomous Chous, 40 percent of the households have joined cooperatives.

"The Yuan-en area of Yuan Chiang in Yunnan Province is occupied by the Pai, Ha-ni, Yao, and others totaling 13 nationalities, the 17 July 1958 K'un-ming Yunnan Jih-pao said. Although their feudalistic practices have not changed over the centuries, they have completed land reforms since the liberation and introduced cooperativization. They have improved production relations and are promoting the big leap forward in agriculture. They have learned to accumulate and use fertilizer. They have overcome taboos for women. Women formerly did not thin plants because this might kill off the family. They did not work the soil because it might offend the dragon. They could not use the plow because it would harm the menfolk. Women could not carry fertilizer because it smelled offensive to the men, the paper said.

Other common taboos noted by the paper were against working on one's birthday or on the day of birth or death of one's parents and against being the first to plant grain, since this meant that person would be the first to die.

But with the promotion of the big leap forward in agricultural production, the people are not only working on former taboo days, but even at night, the paper reported. Women vying with the men are working in the fields to increase production. Small industries and handicrafts now dot the villages. Minority peasants can now produce artificial cotton fibers, turpentine, and No 200 cement, as well as mine asbestos, coal, and gold. Transport has been mechanized, and this is a great improvement over the back-breaking porter method.

As a result of the great big leap forward movement, according to the paper, the minorities have overcome their conservatism and superstitions. Under the guidance of the party committee, they held criticism and self-criticism meetings to convince people of the benefits of using fertilizer and modern farming equipment. Through such propaganda as blackboard newspapers, cartoons, "field schools," and group song-fests, the peasants are gaily sweeping white flags from the hills and replacing them with red ones, the account noted.

The 22 August 1958 Hsi-ning Tsinghai Jih-pao said that, as a result of the big leap forward and the socialist education movement, minority nationalities have wiped away a great many of their taboos which had been inhibiting production. For example, the Miao people in Lei-shan Hsien, Kweichow Province, formerly refused to build irrigation works because they might "interfere with the dragon." They fought plagues with

offerings to the spirits. They had 100 taboo days a year. In the struggle for accumulating fertilizer, the Chuang people in Kwangsi Province invaded bats' caves, which they had believed haunted by spirits, to collect guano. Youth groups among the minorities are taking the lead in smashing age-old superstitions.

In the Hsi-shuang Pan-na T'ai minority area of Yunnan Province, the paper said, Yu-ai-yang, a young woman, took the lead in breaking the national tradition that women must not handle plows. She succeeded in the face of ridicule and was awarded a red flag by the party committee. Now the T'ai women are emulating her technique.

In the T'ung, Yao, Miao, and T'u-chia nationality areas in Hunan Province, the minorities have changed work-taboo days to high-production days, according to the paper. Instead of offering cattle as sacrifices in cases of sickness, the Miao and Li minorities of Hainan Island now organize health centers. The people of Liang-shan in Szechwan Province formerly did not use fertilizer; now they realize the importance of spreading fertilizer and are building latrines to accumulate it.

The November 1958 issue of the Peiping Min-tsu T'uan-chieh (Minzu Tuanjie, Solidarity of the Nationalities) carried a letter written by T'ien Hsing-ch'eng calling on minority cadres engaged in government work to reform themselves. He said that despite the brilliant achievements of the party and government there are still minority cadres who consider themselves people apart from the masses of the homeland and refuse to understand the policies of the party. In opposing the party, they exposed themselves as exploiters. Citing his native place, Hui-li Hsien in Yunnan Province, he said that cadres there did not have the proper outlook because they were not reformed.

Continuing, he pointed out that, although leading minority cadres had supported the struggle against Kuomintang reactionaries, worked for national solidarity and autonomy, and wiped out local bandits and special agents, many cadres from the upper social strata of the minority nationalities have retained vestiges of exploitation. They have failed to improve their relations with the masses. This danger to socialism must be corrected, he said. They must undergo positive self-reform. To achieve reform, they must positively participate in manual labor and understand its dignity. They must strengthen their ideology and relate theory to practice. They must criticize themselves and confess everything to the party. They must work out a plan for self-reform and actively participate in political movements, he said.

. Commenting on this letter, the paper's editor pointed out that a united front among the upper strata of the minority nationalities is one of the long-range policies of the party. He said that the party had striven over the years to unite upper strata of all minority nationalities which could be united. The party will continue this policy of uniting minorities who love the party and government and work for socialism. However, he continued, with the upsurge of socialism, the need for reform among the upper strata of minority nationalities becomes more urgent. The upper strata must divest themselves of remnant thoughts of the exploitation class in order to keep up with socialist development of the homeland and the progress of the party.

Despite its rosy propaganda about the minority areas, the regime often finds it necessary to stage "show trials" to make minority leaders hew to the party line. Important personages, some high in the party and government, have been publicly humiliated. Possibly because Sinkiang is under the control of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the attack against "local nationalists" there has been the strongest.

Pu-i-na-sheng wrote that under the brilliant leadership of the party, the Mongolians in Sinkiang have made rapid progress in cultural development, according to the Urumchi Sinkiang Jih-pao of 4 May. Continuing, he said that in the old days a man had to ride for miles to find a person who could write a letter for him. Now Mongols are enrolled in Sinkiang College, Sinkiang Medical College, and institutions of learning in China.

He attacked local nationalists who advocate the organization of Uighuristan and pledged a struggle to the end against local nationalists who are creating dissension in the ranks of the people.

Without the Chinese brothers, he concluded, the minorities of China would not be able to develop modern industry and culture. The Mongolians, he said, would welcome more Chinese cadres to Sinkiang for the construction of socialism.

A similar reaction was expressed in the 17 May issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao. In an article attacking the local nationalist attitude toward the reform of intellectuals, Lin Po-min pointed out that such statements as "there are no rightists in Sinkiang" and "since Sinkiang is near the Soviet Union, its intelligentsia have not been exposed to the influences of bourgeois nations" are erroneous. He said that, opposing the party's policy of reform for the intelligentsia, local nationalists claim that such reform is in reality labor reform and would injure minority cadres. They insist that the intelligentsia in Sinkiang do not need reform.

Admitting that exposure to the Soviet Union was helpful, Lin Po-min pointed out that this was not a decisive factor in revolutionizing the intelligentsia of Sinkiang. Continuing, he said that cases have come to light of Chinese who had studied in the Soviet Union, yet they opposed the Soviet Union and Communism because of remnant bourgeois thinking and a lack of a firm political ideology. Concluding, he called on the intelligentsia in Sinkiang, especially the students, to overcome remnant bourgeois ideology and to oppose local nationalism by isolating elements advocating a "Great Sinkiang" independent of the homeland.

In support of this stand, an item in the 2 June issue of the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao said that, attacking Te-pu-hsin's criticism of minority language work, Tsao-tu-pi-li-k'o denied that Mongolian was being treated in such a way that it would soon become archaic because "many people are forgetting Mongolian," so that although it has made progress along certain lines, it has receded in the over-all picture. To the contrary, Tsao-tu-pi-li-k'o said, old works in Mongolian have been dug out of storage and popularized because more people can read Mongolian now. With the organization of four universities in Inner Mongolia, more Mongolians now can get a higher education. Concluding, he warned against rightists who claim to "defend the rights of minorities" but are actually utilizing their love of the nationalities to serve the bourgeoisie.

The 22 August issue of the Lhasa Tibet Jih-pao reported that party, government, and ecclesiastical officials had met recently in Lhasa to express their support of the Mao-Khrushchev statement and to attack Anglo-American "aggression" in the Middle East. Bringing the discussion closer to home, Ngapho Shape, secretary-general of the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee, pointed out that "the important spirit of the communique of the Mao-Khrushchev talks is to prevent the Anglo-Americans from playing with fire in the Middle East and to protect the people all over the world who love peace. The 800 million people of China and the Soviet Union love peace, support national independence movements in all countries, and firmly oppose the criminal aggressive acts of the imperialists. At present, counterrevolutionary cliques in Tibet are stirring up rebellion under the direction of imperialists. In consultation with each other, the Tibet party work committee, the Tibet Military Region, and the Tibet local government have worked out peaceful methods for the solution of this problem. If these methods fail, then we are determined to suppress and wipe out all rebels."

Echoing these sentiments, the newspaper reported on the 23d that women's circles in Zhikatsé no longer look askance at politics as something beyond their ken. After hearing reports on the Mao-Khrushchev communique and Anglo-American "aggression" in the Middle East, they have increased their political alertness against the rumormongering and sabotage activities of counterrevolutionaries, the paper said.

Similar sentiments were expressed in an item in the 24 May issue of the Jen-min Jih-pao. Marking the seventh anniversary of the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet, the Dalai Lama and Panchen Erdini sent felicitations to Chairman Mao. Pledging loyalty to the party and government, their messages expressed determination to combat local chauvinism, to strengthen Sino-Tibetan relations, and to fully implement the 17-point agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

Ngapho Shape, secretary-general of the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee; and Thupten Tendar, director of the civil affairs department of the preparatory committee and concurrently secretary-general of the local Tibet government, pointed to improvements in the status of Tibetans by saying that most of the personnel of the government offices are now Tibetans. Over 5,000 Tibetan cadres were trained in the past years.

C. Unrest Among Local Minorities

Reports of growing unrest among the local nationalities in the Chinese press continue to increase. Slight mention of dissatisfaction among the minorities had appeared along with other criticisms during the "Hundred Flowers" period. Although positive steps were taken subsequently to quell any open criticism, the "speaking up" which began as a trickle apparently gushed forth with the pent-up fury of a downtrodden people. Social reforms had to be "delayed" in Tibet. Local nationalists in Sinkiang wanted to organize a completely independent "Uighur Republic." Moslems throughout northern and northwestern China raised their arms as well as their voices.

The 29 March issue of the Tsinan Ta-chung Jih-pao reported that at the 24 March 1958 fourth Shantung nationality work conference, cadres found growing local nationalism among the minorities in Shantung since the socialist transformation in production. The manifestations of this feeling are found in the refusal of the minorities to acknowledge the advanced status of the Chinese, the refusal to offer help, and open hostility to Chinese cadres working in the area, the paper said. They refused to belong to the same cooperative as the Chinese who eat pork. As

a result, rightists are isolating the minorities by creating dissension under the guise of protecting the interests of minorities and their religion. Such actions not only endanger the solidarity of the nation, but also the peaceful development of the national minorities, according to this account.

The newspaper added that the conference decided that the solidarity of the nationalities must be strengthened by giving every minority nationality family a thorough socialist education and by organizing them to learn advanced experiences from the Chinese so that the great unity of all nationalities will be consolidated around the Chinese.

The 16 May issue of the Jen-min Jih-pao reported that during the previous 5 months Moslem circles in Honan Province staged a vigorous struggle against rightists. During the "contending" period in 1957, Hsieh Hsi-san, Mai Ming-tao, Pai Ch'ing-chang, and Wan Chin-jung posed hypocritically as defenders of the Moslems in order to attack the party and government, the paper noted. They said that the Moslems of the world are one great family and that "religion comes before country." They called Moslem cadres traitors and said that the growing farm cooperative system was leaving no future for the Moslems.

The 29 March issue of the Cheng-chou Honan Jih-pao reported that local nationalism problems dominated the recent nationalities work conference of the United Front Department of the Honan party committee. Painting a dreary picture of disunity, Chinese delegates accused the Moslems of emphasizing the gap between nationalities, black-marketing, illegal slaughtering, and violations of the law. A new growth of local nationalism was reported stemming from the selfishness of petty producers, remnants of age-old differences among the nationalities, unsolved problems among the minorities, and activities of the rightists in 1957. Over 30 Moslem households which were resettled in Tsinghai Province came back to Honan; then they left again for Tsinghai.

The conference called on the cadres to urge the minorities to strengthen the unity of nationalities, to distinguish right from wrong, to solve the problems of resettlement, to find new methods of production, to stop black-marketing, to return to the farms, and to accept the leadership of the party, the paper reported.

The situation in Tibet is not showing any improvement despite stern measures by the Chinese authorities to pacify the local populace. According to a dispatch of the Hsin-hua News Agency dated 25 March 1958,

when the Tibet Autonomous Region Preparatory Committee held a routine meeting on 24 March to discuss current tasks, officials were called on to guard against schismatic elements and to improve their political consciousness by studying government policies and current events. The meeting also called for intensification of ideological and socialist education for the masses. It pointed out that, since the abolition of the corvee, the recruitment and training of Tibet cadres are greatly facilitated.

Reflecting the current situation in Tibet, the 12 November issue of Jen-min Jih-pao carried a terse item reporting the initial organization of a people's armed unit in Lhasa. Although the unit includes both Tibetans and Chinese, the item reported, most of the men were members of the Tibet Expeditionary Force which entered Tibet 8 years ago.

The situation in Sinkiang reached such serious proportions that the Sinkiang party committee had to call a plenary session to discuss it and to expel members from its "inner circle" for advocating local nationalism. The 14 May issue of the Sinkiang Jih-pao reported that on 28 April 1958 the Sinkiang party committee met in Urumchi to review the 4.5 month struggle against local nationalism. During the period, local nationalists in the Urumchi area were exposed and purged from the government. They had not only obstructed the building of socialism in Sinkiang, but also gave aid and comfort to the imperialists. Calling for a determined struggle against imperialism, the meeting urged cadres to first overcome sectionalism and subjectivism among their ranks, the paper said.

The newspaper reported on 4 May 1958 that the editorial staff of the monthly Shu-kuang (Light of Dawn) recently wrote in praise of the party's nationality policy. The journalists said that the party must be protected "like one's eyes" and that all nationalities must support racial solidarity and the unity of the country. They also praised the action of the Sinkiang party committee in exposing the rightists in the course of the struggle against local nationalism.

In closing, the writers pledged to carry out the spirit of the Sinkiang party conference by initiating a broad struggle against local nationalism and dealing powerful blows against its leaders.

Another item in the same issue said that A Said, mayor of Urumchi, was accused of antiparty rightist activities. He was a loyal servitor of the Kuomintang and a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek's statement that "there is only one nationality on China," the paper said. After he joined the party, he continued his attacks by calling for an independent Uighur Republic. While mayor of Urumchi, he threatened to move the

several tens of thousands of Chinese in the city out of town and bring in Uighurs in order to make it a Uighur city. He filled government positions with minority nationalities in complete disregard of their qualifications. He even used nationality cadres who were rich landlords or counterrevolutionaries. He continually plotted to separate Sinkiang from the homeland, the item added.

The item said he accused the Chinese of occupying the best parts of Urumchi. Praising the Kuomintang, he attacked Marxism and the Soviet Union. He said, "There is no truth in the Soviet Union," and "the Soviet Union is red imperialism," and called the attackers of the Kuomintang "red running dogs." His record shows that he was Sheng Shih-tsai's running dog in 1938 and graduated from the Kuomintang party school in 1942. He acted as a special agent under several aliases, according to the item.

The item continued: Abdul-Rizak Kari, deputy director of the Sinkiang department of commerce, an enemy of the Chinese, gained admission to the party to attack it. He promoted movements to divide the homeland by advocating the organization of a Uighur Republic. Saying that he was holding a position without authority, he delayed the work of his office. Working with Aisa (another rightist) and Said, he plotted to seek greater power for the Uighurs by demanding that Uighur be placed above the Chinese language. He plotted to prevent A-t'u Shih from being included in the K'o-tzu-le-su-k'o-erh-k'o-tzu Autonomous Chou and I-li in the Ha-sa-k'o Autonomous Chou. At a party conference in May 1957, he opposed a proposal to transfer Chinese workers and cadres to Sinkiang with the statement that no Chinese were needed and that the Uighurs in Sinkiang could take care of everything. He said that he would be very happy to see the Chinese leave, since, he said, they treated the Uighurs like the way the Americans treated Negroes. He looked on the department of commerce as his little "kingdom" and took every opportunity to drive Chinese cadres out. Under the pretext of improving living conditions of the local nationalities, he demanded more minority cadres. He refused to give the Chinese credit for the swift progress of Sinkiang. He not only diverted public goods to his private use, but also padded his accounts. His morals were so bad that he was arrested in Peiping while attending a conference there.

The 28 June issue of the Nei-meng-ku Jih-pao carried an item on the plenary session of the Sinkiang party committee held in April 1958 to combat local nationalism. After hearing comprehensive reports by Wang En-mou and Saifudin, the meeting passed a resolution to expel the following ranking party members: Zainuddin, director of the Sinkiang department of culture and noted writer; Abraham Turdi, director of the Sinkiang department of civil affairs; Abdurahim Aisa, deputy chairman, of the I-li Kazakh Autonomous Chou; A Said, mayor of Urumchi; and Abdul-Rizak Kari, deputy director of the Sinkiang department of commerce.

In his report to the committee, Wang En-mou, first secretary of the party committee in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, delivered a severe indictment of local nationalism in Sinkiang, the Jen-min Jih-pao reported on 27 June 1958. Citing attacks against local units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army as a glaring example of alienating the Chinese who are assisting in the construction of Sinkiang, Wang En-mou said, "The appointment of minority cadres is a nationality policy of the party. However, it is not the only principle. The prime principle of the party's nationality policy is the communization of cadres. Some local cadres are alienating Chinese cadres by emphasizing the nationalization instead of the communization of cadres. This is erroneous."

A 4 May 1958 dispatch of the Hsin-hua News Agency from Urumchi said that, while addressing a recent Sinkiang party conference, Tseng T'iao pointed out that a member of the Communist Party must not promote local nationalism. He summed up the weaknesses of local nationalism as follows.

"Poorly organized party members are strong in local nationalism. They fail to observe party directives and consider local nationalism above party and class. They may even oppose the party.

"Some members are subjective and are willing to sacrifice the good of the party for selfish interests.

"Some have no confidence in the party, but trust only in themselves or blindly in certain personalities.

"In matters of party policy, some members are taking an independent attitude and violating party discipline by failing to carry out directives.

"Some place individual leadership above collective leadership in party affairs. They freely disobey party directives and pit personal responsibility against collective leadership.

"Some party officials use only cadres of their own nationality. In their efforts to promote local nationalism, they appoint cadres without considering their ideological qualifications.

"Some cadres are proud and sensitive to criticism. They seek revenge and suppress democracy.

As some 80 per cent of the coal deposits of the whole Soviet Union are in Eastern Siberia, and most of these coals are cokeable, the fuel necessary for these huge new works is also near the ore deposits.

On the basis of all these factors it is planned to increase the production of pig iron to 15-20 million tons in this area, within the next fifteen years. The production of coal and electric power is planned in proportion.

According to the present plans the Tajset Combine will be the first important steel works here. The quantities of iron ore will be mainly supplied by the Angara mines but partly also from the Irkutsk district, and the fuel from the Kuznieck coal mines. The production of this new plant together with the steel works in Kuznieck (which is partly in

operation already), Karaganda (in construction) and Barnaul (planned) is estimated to exceed 20 million tons in 1972.

These, however, are not the only plans to develop the Eastern Siberian area. Final details of other plans have not yet been disclosed but it is announced that detailed planning is in progress regarding new steel works near Krasnoyarsk and beyond the Lake Baykal.

The latter would be partly built in the Yakout Republic (upper right-hand corner on the map), partly in the Csita district, based on the Aldan and Southern Yakout ore deposits.

These heavy investments are supposed to transform this part of Siberia into an important industrial centre within the next twenty-five years.

Until China emerged as a Communist Power, no Communist frontier had been felt as abutting aggressively on an Asian State... Nor, and this is often overlooked, have the Russians spread across Asia in the past as traders and administrators.

—*The Times*, February 5, 1955 (leading article).

Exploitation here (in Russia) took the most cruel and reactionary form. In almost all the colonial areas of Tsarist Russia there was practised the direct expropriation of the basic means of production at the disposal of the indigenous population, namely, land.

—*Soviet Encyclopaedia* 1938, Vol. XXXIII, p. 446

2. Political Status of the Asians in the U.S.S.R.*

By Geoffrey Wheeler

NO country has been louder in its condemnation of western, and particularly of British, colonialism than the Soviet Union. And no country has been more insistent on its own unblemished record as the selfless champion of the rights of oppressed and exploited peoples. These charges and claims have gained a considerable measure of approval in eastern countries, and at least part of the Soviet contention appears to be supported in somewhat unexpected quarters in the West. The object of the present article is to consider how far Russia's claim to freedom from the taint of colonialism can be substantiated.

There is no Russian word for colonialism, nor does it figure in the 20,000-word Dictionary of Foreign Words used in Russian, which contains most of the other isms in international use. It may, however, be assumed that the Russians now regard colonialism as synonymous with "kolonizatsiya" which they define as "the seizure of a country or region by imperialists accompanied by the subjection, brutal exploitation, and sometimes by the annihilation of the local population."

These are in fact the charges which the Soviet Union persistently brings against the West and has in the past brought against Tsarist Russia. The

English definition of colonialism is in principle the same although expressed in much milder terms—"the treatment of settlements abroad as proprietary domains exploited for the benefit of the mother country." In order to decide how far these charges are applicable to the Soviet Union, it is first necessary to consider the nature of the territory and peoples involved and the circumstances in which they came under first Russian and then Soviet control.

The broad facts and chronology of Russia's acquisition of her Asian empire are not, generally speaking, in dispute. Soviet maps showing the dates and extent of successive Russian advances to the west of the Urals and across the Caucasus differ hardly at all from similar maps published in the West during the past 60 years. Very briefly, what happened was that the Russians, after having been confined for 250 years to their European homeland by the Mongol domination, threw off this domination at the end of the fifteenth century.

At the end of the sixteenth century they began to spread across Asia. Their first expansion was due east along the line of least resistance, and the Pacific was reached by the end of the seventeenth century. Later, in the first half of the eighteenth century, Russian trading operations began to extend from Siberia towards the south. They now began to encounter less primitive and

more warlike peoples, who interfered with Russian trade and had to be subdued or absorbed.

This process, a familiar one in the history of all expanding empires, went on until 1881, by which time the Asian empire of the Tsars stretched from the Urals to the Pacific, and from the Arctic to the frontiers of China, Afghanistan, and Persia.

All this vast area, comprising more than half the total area of Asia, was under direct Russian administration, with the exception of the Central Asian Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, which retained a semi-independent status analogous to that of the Indian States of British India. The Russians had, in fact, *pace The Times*, spread over Asia as traders and administrators.

In some respects the Russian empire resembled other empires: it had its origin in trading operations which eventually involved conquest and annexation; and it included peoples who were materially under-developed, and whose culture was widely different from, although in some cases older than, that of the newcomers. There were, however, certain important differences.

In the first place it was not an overseas empire but geographically contiguous to the Russian homeland. This meant that the Russians, and particularly the millions who were permanently settled in the empire, came to regard it as an integral part of Russian territory. Secondly, to the Russians the Turkic peoples who made up the bulk of the population of their new lands were "Tatars," the descendants of those same Tartars or Mongols under whose domination they had themselves lived for 250 years.

* This article first appeared in *Political Quarterly*, London, July, 1958.

This meant that feelings of superiority and inferiority were never so prevalent as in other empires. Finally, the native population which came under Russian domination was far smaller, less heterogeneous and less exposed to cosmopolitan influences than the dominated peoples of the empires of western countries.

In all, the native population of the Caucasus and the whole of Asiatic Russia has never amounted to more than thirty million, or rather less than the present population of Nigeria; but more than half of it is concentrated in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

A feature of the Russian empire which was by no means unique but still deserves mention was that, so far as is known, no hopes or promises of self-government or independence were ever held out to the Tsar's subject peoples.

There do not even appear to have been any plans for the eventual "nativisation" of the administration. On the other hand, there was very little interference with religious and other established practices, and until 1916 the peoples of Central Asia were not subject to any kind of compulsory military service.

It is still not possible to express a completely informed and unprejudiced opinion of Tsarist administration in Asia. Relatively impartial accounts like that of the American Schuyler were written before the Russian conquests were completed, and full official reports, such as those of the Palen Commission published just before the first world war in nineteen volumes, are now unobtainable.

Soviet reports must be regarded as heavily biased as well as inconsistent in a number of important respects. There is, for instance, a remarkable difference between the long articles on Colonies in the first and second editions of the *Soviet Encyclopaedia*: the first castigates Tsarist Russia at considerable length for cruelly exploiting her colonial possessions; but the second makes no mention even of Russia having or having had any colonial possessions.

In fact, there is no doubt that colonialism in the sense of the definitions given above was practised in the Asian empire of the Tsars, although there is no record of the annihilation of local populations.

The liquidation of the Russian empire and the grant of self-determination and independence to the various nationalities formed an important part of the pre- and early post-Revolutionary programmes of the Communist Party, and the sudden

inheritance of a large Asian empire sparsely inhabited by relatively backward peoples confronted the Soviet régime with a serious embarrassment.

At first there was some idea of creating a kind of loose Muslim federation which would eventually, it was hoped, embrace the neighbouring Muslim peoples of Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey. Among the considerations which caused this plan to be abandoned was the widespread conviction already referred to that the vast area stretching from the Urals to the Pacific was not so much an empire as an integral part of Russia, to which the Russian people had a prescriptive right.

Another reason was the development among the Asian peoples of nationalist and separatist tendencies; they soon came to think of the Revolution, which they welcomed in principle, not so much in terms of a class war as of a "colonial revolution" directed against metropolitan governments everywhere. Finally, the chaos caused by the civil war in the Caucasus and Central Asia confronted the Soviet Government with the purely administrative problem of how to restore law and order.

The "Nationalities" Policy

Once the decision had been taken to keep the Russian empire in being, the Soviet Government had to devise a way of administering it and securing its frontiers while continuing lip-service to the requirements of Communist ideology. A solution was found in the "nationalities" policy, which consisted in labelling the principal races and in demarcating republican frontiers on what was ostensibly the broad basis of language.

This operation was carried out in 1924, and the inter-republican frontiers then aligned have been subjected since only to very slight modification. Today the confines of the Asian part of the Soviet Union are precisely the same as those of Imperial Russia.

As an administrative expedient the Soviet plan had something to recommend it on ethical as well as on practical and material grounds: in a brief space of three years from the Revolution until the end of the civil war paramount power over the whole of Russia had passed from the Tsarist to the Soviet régime. The sudden abdication of that power would have resulted not only in the loss to Russia of such vital resources as the Baku oil and the Central Asian cotton,

but in a state of complete anarchy which could hardly have profited the peoples concerned.

The premature termination of colonial rule may, in fact, prove to be a worse evil than its institution. The basis of the Soviet claim, however, is not that their action in retaining the *status quo* was justified, but that they have broken away from the old colonial system and set up a new and enlightened one according to which the hitherto subject peoples enjoy complete freedom and sovereignty.

So steady has Soviet insistence on this claim been that they have been able to persuade other Asian peoples of its validity. In the West, reaction has varied from violent rejection to fulsome approval; a dispassionate appraisal of the facts is rarely attempted.

The first matter to be considered is that of colonisation, or settlement, as the Russians prefer to call it. There are at present at least forty million non-Asians from the western part of the Soviet Union settled in Asia. The great majority of these are in Siberia where the native population has always been extremely small. But there has also been extensive colonisation in the more populous parts of Soviet Asia.

For instance, in Kazakhstan and Soviet Central Asia the total of the non-Asian population now amounts to between six and seven million—that is to say, about half the total native population of thirteen million. The non-Asian element has very greatly increased since the Revolution; according to the Soviet census figures, the native population increased by about 5 per cent between 1926 and 1939 whereas the non-Asian settler population increased by over 70 per cent.

The extent of the Russian colonisation of Asia does not necessarily call for condemnation, but it is essential to remember it when considering Soviet claims, and particularly those relating to industrial and agricultural output, literacy, and the standard of living. All these, it is asserted, are far higher in the eastern republics of the U.S.S.R. than in most of the independent or colonial countries of Asia and Africa, and those unaware of the facts are encouraged to believe that the undoubted material progress achieved in Soviet Asia is the work of the Asian peoples themselves with some assistance from Russian technicians.

The proportion of non-Asians to Asians naturally varies: it is over 50 per cent in Kazakhstan and less than 15 per cent in Uzbekistan; but in the Tashkent

oblast (province) of the latter republic, probably the most highly industrialised area in the whole of Soviet Asia, the non-Asian settler population amounts to over 30 per cent.

Once these little known facts about population are grasped the essentially colonial character of the eastern republics becomes a foregone conclusion. The system of administration is on the standard Soviet model, bearing no trace of local tradition. The real rulers of each republic are the Communist Party, which is geared to Moscow by the fact of either the First or Second Secretary of each republican Party being a non-native, usually a Russian. The same goes for the vital office of Chairman of the Committee of State Security and many other key posts.

The peoples of the republics have played no part in shaping their own economies: they had no say in, and indeed opposed, Moscow's decision to give over-riding importance to the cultivation of Central Asian cotton to the detriment of food crops; nor had they any control over the development of such industries of Union-wide importance as oil and coal or over vast irrigation projects, some of which, like the Main Turkmen Canal, have been dropped without explanation after billions of roubles had been invested in them.

In spite of the fact that all the republics adjoin foreign countries, they have no direct diplomatic, commercial, or cultural relations with any of them. They have no national armies, all national military formations having been abolished after the last serious outbreak of nationalism in the 1930s. Finally, and perhaps most important, there is the systematic campaign against established tradition in religion, language, and the arts.

The regimentation exercised in the matter of language has been particularly marked: national languages have had the Russian script, a large Russian loan vocabulary and various Russian grammatical features grafted on to them; and higher education and professional advancement is impossible without a thorough knowledge of Russian.

It is significant that whereas in the early years of the Revolution great emphasis was laid on the need for settlers and others working in the eastern republics to learn the national languages, it has recently been clearly stated by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan that Russians working in the republics are

under no obligation to learn Kazakh and that complaints by the Kazakh intelligentsia of their failure to do so have no justification.*

The Soviet definition of colonisation mentions annihilation of populations but not mass deportation, which may, however, amount to much the same thing. Towards the end of the last war the entire populations of the Crimean Tatar, Kalmyk, and Chechen "Autonomous" Soviet Socialist Republics, amounting with some smaller communities to nearly a million people, were uprooted from their homes and deported to other parts of the U.S.S.R. For over ten years there was no mention of their fate—they were simply liquidated as peoples.

The first edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* had contained glowing descriptions of their achievements, but in the second post-war edition they were not even mentioned as existing or as having ever existed. In 1956, this act, reports of which had previously been dismissed as imperialist fabrications, was for the first time admitted as one of the many mistakes of Stalin. It was described as a crime against humanity and rehabilitation was promised.

"Not from Overseas"

In spite, or perhaps because, of this exposure, the Soviet Government has continued with unabated violence its charges against the West of "colonialist" crimes which pale into insignificance by comparison with the Soviet deportations.

The Russians have good reason to be satisfied with their success in convincing at least part of the outside world that they are not and never have been guilty of colonialism. One reason for this is that in Middle Eastern eyes, for instance, imperialists and colonialists come from overseas, whereas the Russians do not. The Muslim peoples of Soviet Asia, on the other hand, are unfamiliar with the phenomenon of overseas imperialism; the only imperialists of whom they have any first-hand experience are the Russians.

The attitude of the Asian peoples of the U.S.S.R towards the Soviet régime is a matter of which it is impossible to speak with precision. The impression which the Soviet authorities wish to make on the outside world is that these peoples are perfectly satisfied with their present lot, that they regard themselves as fully independent but at the same time

look up and defer to the Russian people as to an "elder brother."

Soviet writers are, indeed, at particular pains to emphasise the great love which the people of Asia have felt for the Russians ever since they were first brought into contact with them by the Russian conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is true that there are few outward signs of discontent in the eastern republics and it is probable that many of the material achievements of the Soviet régime are respected and even appreciated.

Since they have no first hand experience of independence and are segregated from the outside world, it is more than likely that the people of the eastern republics believe they are better off both materially and politically than the people in neighbouring Muslim countries. Passive acquiescence and expressions of satisfaction and loyalty, even if sincerely felt, do not necessarily indicate a state of freedom and independence.

In fact, however, there are certain circumstances which suggest that the absence of open opposition to the present régime springs more from resignation and fear than from real contentment. In the early days of the Revolution, one of the most important planks in the platform of Asian nationalist leaders was the removal of Russian settlers whose number has in fact been more than doubled.

Again, all the early nationalist leaders such as Sultan Galiyev, Baytursunov, Zeki Velidi Toghani, Fayzulla Khodzhayev, and Akmal Ikramov were either executed or are living in exile. There are no Gandhis, Nehrus, or Nkrumahs who, after long struggles against their colonialist masters, lived, not only to tell the tale, but to lead their peoples after independence had been won.

Finally, during the second world war, over 200,000 Soviet Muslims who had deserted or had been taken prisoner by the Germans were organised to fight the Russians, thousands of them losing their lives at Stalingrad. The fate of the remainder after they were handed back under the Yalta Agreement has never become known.

Even at the present time, when all the nationalist leaders have disappeared, there are constant complaints by the Soviet authorities of stubborn adherence to traditional customs, of slowness in adopting the reforms of national languages, and of failure to learn Russian.

The impartial student of Soviet affairs

* *Kommunist Kazakhstan* No. 7, 1957.

must reach a conclusion something on the following lines. Territorially the Asian empire of the Tsars is still in being and it retains such established features of colonialism as extensive and increasing colonisation, economic exploitation, the arbitrary treatment of populations, including their segregation from the outside world, regimentation of traditional culture and the suppression of genuine and spontaneous nationalism.

Soviet Asia is now the only colonial territory in which all these features of colonialism are present at the same time. Moreover, Soviet Asia is almost the only colonial territory from which foreign conquerors and colonisers have not yet receded nor shown any signs of receding. On the other hand, if Russian colonialism is considered as a whole, and without the high-sounding nomenclature by which its existence is now partially obscured, its purely material record is seen to be ahead of that achieved in many other colonial territories.

The presence of large numbers of Russian and Ukrainian settlers, who are hard-working and to a large extent free from colour prejudice, has contributed considerably to the development of industry and agriculture and thus to the material well-being of the native population. Indeed, it would be not unfair to say that the Soviet experiment in

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Central Asia and Transcaucasia is a good example of what a deliberate and determined policy of colonialism can achieve.

But it is none the less colonialism and, which is worse, it seems to be chronic colonialism, for there is no glimmer of those hopes of real independence which in other parts of Asia and in Africa have either come to fruition or have long been stirring.

Sooner or later both the independent and the still dependent peoples of Asia and Africa will have to face the fact that just as their newly won independence is emerging or about to emerge from the ebbing tide of western colonialism, it will be threatened by the rising tide of Russian colonialism. That they are far from realising this and even imagine that the Soviet Union is an ardent and disinterested champion of their freedom and independence can be seen from many of the public utterances of eastern statesmen.

Even the statement of Mr. Nkrumah, at the Conference of Independent African States held in Accra in April, that Africa is "the last remaining stronghold of colonialism" shows the extent to which the truth about Soviet colonialism has escaped the Africans. Earlier, he rightly spoke of the impact which independent African countries were already having on international affairs.

How many of the countries of Africa and the Middle East realise that the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union, which are described as "fully sovereign states," have never had and show no prospect of ever having any impact on international affairs whatever?

It had already been shown that one of the reasons why eastern and African countries ignore the facts of Russian imperialism is that the Russians have always been regarded as different from western imperialists because they do not come from overseas. Other reasons are to be found in the undeniable skill and scope of Soviet propaganda and in the dividends which the policy of playing off Russia against the West seem to offer to eastern governments.

An important contributory cause of the rapid spread of Russian influence is the West's persistent failure to appreciate the potentialities of the Soviet appeal for the peoples of under-developed countries. Even since 1955 when it first became apparent that the Soviet Union intended to intervene actively in Middle Eastern and African affairs, there has been little

or no attempt in the West to analyse and determine the nature of this Soviet appeal as it is reflected in the vast mass of Soviet literature on every conceivable aspect of eastern politics, economics, and culture.

It is not simply a question of charge and counter-charge, of propaganda and counter-propaganda; the prime need is for understanding, not only of the facts of Russian colonialism, but of the methods which Soviet policy adopts to attract the attention and confidence of Asian and African peoples. In eastern Europe the Soviet pose as the champion

of freedom and independence has been exposed because the people have remained convinced of the spiritual—if not the physical—superiority of western democracy over the Soviet system.

It is largely because of the setback she has encountered in eastern Europe that Russia is now intensifying her efforts in Asia and Africa where most of the peoples have no first-hand knowledge of Soviet methods. Yet the West is still far from appreciating the danger of the Soviet appeal, let alone from matching it.

Reforms in Laos

By a Correspondent

RELATIVELY small, land-locked Laos has recently shown to the World that she is no mere pawn in the historic chess-game now being played in S.E. Asia, but intends to maintain the independence she fought for and achieved in October, 1953.

Alarmed by the unexpected successes of the left-wing Party, the Neo Lao Hak Sat, at the supplementary elections held in May of last year, the Nationalist and Independent Parties formed a united, anti-Communist front—the Rally of the Laotian People (RLP).

With the support of the RLP and CDIN (another strong new group comprising a more youthful element) a Government was formed which has already illustrated that the grave difficulties facing Laos are not being ignored and that the country is trying, by its own efforts, to find a solution to its most pressing problems.

Declaring its objective to be "to preserve our newly-won independence and unification" and to fight against the spread of Communist ideology, the Government has dedicated itself to cleaning up the internal situation, which was rapidly deteriorating as a result of the vicious procedures and practices accompanying the distribution of U.S. aid that has been pouring in since the establishment of the sovereign state in 1955.

In October, the new Government, despite concentrated left-wing opposition, successfully introduced devaluation—a proverbially difficult task for any government but one essential to the present state of the Laotian economy.

The artificial dollar exchange rate of 35 kips to the dollar—a third of the unofficial exchange rate and for long a source of speculation and corruption—

was raised to 80 kips to the dollar. Free convertibility at this rate was introduced and import licences, for long the basis of profitable illicit trading, consequently abolished. At the same time, the kip was made freely convertible into certain other currencies at the free market rates determined by demand and supply in the main financial centres, these rates being reflected in Vientiane through the operations of the local exchange banks.

The rate for sterling is now in line with the official sterling/dollar rate, and the franc/kip rate equivalent to recent official market rates for the franc. Thus, although the acquisition of currencies other than dollars depends on free market arrangements, ordinary trade with Laos can be financed in any currency.

Far from being in effect part of the dollar area, Laos remains, at least as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, in the transferable sterling area.

Although some of the usual adverse short-term effects of extensive monetary reform are to be expected, these have already been overcome to a large extent and will in any case be more than compensated for in the long-run. That nowadays ever-present bugbear, inflation, has largely been avoided by the Lao Government's management of public finances and the note issue in such a way as to maintain balance between monetary demand and the supply of goods, and by the fact that prices in Laos had for long reflected the unofficial exchange rate before devaluation was introduced.

The former large-scale diversion of imported goods, financed by dollars at a cheap rate, to profitable markets outside Laos (principally Bangkok) has been substantially reduced, although, with the

money supply necessarily under strict control to prevent inflation, some goods bought with dollars can still secure better prices elsewhere.

The flight of capital that was feared in view of the absence of restrictions on kip/dollar exchange transactions has also been successfully checked by the continuing need for kips to meet current expenditure, the difficulty of finding an acceptable market for capital assets, and the growth of confidence that foreign exchange will continue to be available as required.

More Counterpart Funds

In the long run, with a more realistic dollar exchange rate, U.S. aid to Laos will generate more counterpart funds, which can therefore be directed towards

the development of the country's economy rather than solely to defence expenditure.

The importation of goods essential to the local economy (e.g. petrol and oil, building materials, chemicals, aircraft engines and transport equipment) is now being given every encouragement by both the Lao and U.S. Governments, the latter having simplified the necessary import procedures, and lowered the deposits required from importers.

The acquisition of these essential productive goods plus U.S. "project aid" will enable Laos to look at last to the exploitation of her natural resources. The development of mineral resources, light industries and handicrafts, irrigation systems, and better farming techniques will mean an increase in the country's productive capacity, whilst the introduction of wider communications, and

better primary education facilities and public health services will improve the lot of the villagers, who have been long discontented with the failure to redistribute the benefits of U.S. aid dollars to the rural areas.

Self-Imposed Honesty is Essential

The problems, both economic and political, that face any young, undeveloped country today are many and the fact that the Laotian Government, further faced with unrelenting Communist subversion, found strength to put through a vital but controversial reform is commendable.

It realised, however, that if Laos is to uphold her independence, the self-imposed honesty that monetary reform has placed on vested interests is essential to the survival of the country.

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RELIGION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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RELIGION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Harold C. Hinton

SUMMARY

Like other Marxist-Leninist parties, the Communist Party of China (CPC) is committed to the eventual destruction of religion. The nature of the CPC's anti-religious policy receives an added importance from the fact that the CPC regards its own institutions as a model for the rest of the underdeveloped world.

Between 1949 and 1956 the CPC established a very considerable degree of control over the organized religions of China, with the partial exception of Catholicism, by means of manipulation, propaganda, and terror. Popular religion suffered somewhat less. Since the middle of 1957, when Communist China's "socialist forward leap" began, both organized and popular religion have been subjected to intensified and extreme pressure, including a headlong assault on popular religion and "ancestor worship" and the creation of a "national" Catholic Church partially in schism with Rome.

The Chinese Communists have proclaimed their regime to be the principal example and model for the nonindustrialized countries of the world (the "colonial and semi-colonial countries"). It is very likely, therefore, that in any such country which came under Communist control the policies and institutions of the Chinese Communists would be introduced sooner or later, at least in their essentials; this has happened already in North Vietnam. Few, if any of these policies would have more effect on the people of such a country than would religious policy. The present paper examines Chinese Communist religious policy with this possibility in mind.

1. Lu Ting-yi, "The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution," People's China, July 1, 1951; Chen Yun, "In Memory of J. V. Stalin," People's China, March 16, 1954.

I. Religion in Chinese Life

Religion, in the broadest sense of the term, has traditionally occupied a very important position in Chinese life, although it has been strongly tinged with scepticism among the educated and with superstition among the uneducated. At the base of Chinese religion lay popular religion, which contained many superstitious elements but also others, such as the ceremonies of respect misleadingly known as "ancestor worship," which cannot be dismissed as mere superstition. The principal organized religions were the Mahayana School of Buddhism (including lamaism in Tibet and Mongolia), Theravada (Hinayana) Buddhism among the Ch'uang (Thai) of South China, Taoism (an indigenous mystical cult), Islam, and Christianity. Confucianism, although not strictly a religion, had points of contact with popular religion and even with Taoism and Buddhism. The Chinese tended toward a tolerant, pragmatic, and synthetic approach to religion, and many a Chinese held and practised -- alternately or simultaneously -- tenets of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and popular religion.

Although the influence of religion on educated Chinese has tended to decrease in recent times, the history of religion in modern China has by no means been one of total decline. On the contrary, there have been movements of intellectual and spiritual renewal among the various religions, including popular religion.² It therefore cannot be assumed that religion in China, if left to itself, would have died a natural death.

II. The Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Religion

The Chinese Communists, like other Marxist-Leninists, hold the view that all religion is objectively false and constitutes the "opium of the masses," or in other words the means by which the ruling class lulls the exploited classes into accepting their lot. From this assumption it follows that the disappearance of class exploitation -- which Communists claim will occur under "socialism" and "communism" (as Communists define those terms) -- will lead sooner or later to the disappearance of religion.

2. Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, Columbia University Press, 1953, passim.

The early leaders of the Chinese Communist movement were frank in proclaiming their hostility to religion. The constitution of the "Chinese Soviet Republic" (November 7, 1931), for example, included Buddhist monks among the "exploiting and counter-revolutionary elements" who were to be denied the right to vote. A land law passed at the same time provided for the confiscation of all land belonging to religious institutions.³

Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, who rose to power within the party at the end of 1934, the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted for a time a somewhat more moderate tone and policy toward religion without modifying its basic attitude. The latter can be discerned, for example, in Mao's scornful allusion of 1927 to Buddhism and popular religion:

The gods and goddesses are indeed pitiful; worshipped for hundreds of years, they have not knocked down for you [i.e., for the peasants of Hunan] a single local bully or one of the bad gentry."⁴

Despite the Chinese Communist claim that all religions were tolerated in the areas under the CPC's control,⁵ Mao and the CPC have associated -- in their own minds before 1949 and in public since 1949 -- Christianity with "imperialism" (i.e., Western influence in China), and the other religions of China with "feudalism" (i.e., precapitalist features of the Chinese scene, such as rural landlordism).⁶ One of the principal characteristics of "Maoism" as a revolutionary strategy is that it identifies foreign "imperialism" and domestic "feudalism," rather than Chinese capitalism, as the main enemies and targets of the Communist revolution in China.⁷ Religion has therefore appeared to the CPC as both the prop and the instrument of its principal enemies.

3. C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, and J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. 220, 225-226.

4. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 4 vols. to date, New York: International Publishers, 1954 --, vol. 1, p. 48.

5. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 309.

6. "....religion has been utilized by imperialism, the landlord class and the bureaucratic class...." (Chang Chih-yi, "Atheists and Theists Can Cooperate Politically and Travel the Road of Socialism," Che-hsueh yen-chiu (Philosophical Research), Feb. 15, 1958).

7. "....the Chinese revolution at the present stage....[has as] its central task [that] of combating foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism...." (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3, p. 152).

As Mao Tse-tung pointed out in 1940, any toleration of or collaboration with religion by Communists could only be temporary and a matter of expediency, and be practised only toward those "religious followers" who satisfied the Communists that they were opposed to "imperialism" and "feudalism," or in other words that they were prepared to accept a degree of Communist leadership.⁸ In short, "religious followers" were asked, and since 1949 have been expected, to collaborate with the CPC on its terms, with a view to promoting among other things the eventual elimination of religion.

III. Chinese Communist Religious Policy

A. General

It is not an easy task to summarize Chinese Communist religious policy from 1949 until the beginning of the current anti-religious campaign, which will be discussed separately. The policy has been essentially one of combining manipulation through organizational techniques, hostile propaganda, and outright terror, and not one of relying exclusively on any one of these three weapons. As Mao has put it,

We cannot abolish religion by administrative orders;
nor can we force people not to believe in it.⁹

The CPC's organizational approach to religion has been greatly simplified by the fact that none of the major religious bodies, except for the Catholics, had a tightly knit organization and that none of them (except for the Catholic Church's Central Bureau in Shanghai) had an effective directing headquarters at the national, or all-China, level. This has left the way clear for the CPC to set up such national organizations, ostensibly in the name of patriotism and national unity. Confucianism did not have to be organized in this way, since it had been moribund for some time and in any case was not truly a religion. Popular religion was too amorphous to be capable of organization.

8. "Communists may form an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front for political action with certain idealists and even with religious followers, but we can never approve of their idealism or religious doctrines." (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3, p. 155).
9. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," New China News Agency despatch (hereafter NCNA), Peking, June 18, 1957; the speech was actually delivered on February 27, 1957.

The Protestant churches were organized in 1954 under a National Committee of Protestant Churches in China for Self-Administration. The China Islamic Association was set up in 1953 under the chairmanship of Burhan, a Uighur, so as to embrace Moslems of all ethnic stocks and of all three major schools or sects of Islam in China (Traditionalists, Reformists, and Modernists). The China Buddhist Association was established in 1953 under the chairmanship of Hsi-jao-chia-ts-u, a Tibetan, over the Chinese Mahayana Buddhists, the lamaists of Tibet and Inner Mongolia, and the Theravada Buddhists of South China. A China Taoist Association made its appearance at the end of 1956. The supervision of these organizations, and of religion in general, was (and is) a function of the CPC Central Committee's United Front Work Department, under Li Wei-han, and of the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council (cabinet), established in 1954 under the chairmanship of Ho Ch'eng-hsiang, also a Communist.

Chinese Communist anti-religious propaganda is accompanied by a virtual prohibition against propaganda or proselytization by the various religious bodies, under the guise of a guarantee of freedom of religion. In the Chinese Soviet constitution of 1931, which was modeled on the Russian constitution of 1924, a guarantee of "true" religious freedom was balanced by an insistence that "All Soviet citizens shall enjoy the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda."¹⁰ In the relatively moderate Common Program of 1949 (Article 5), the latter provision was dropped, and a guarantee of religious freedom was accompanied by one of "freedom of holding processions and demonstrations." In the constitution of September 1954 (Articles 87 and 88), these guarantees are retained.

In practice, however, propaganda and proselytization by religious bodies are severely restricted. The CPC's strong objections to such activity are the main explanation of its repressive treatment of the Legion of Mary, an organization of Catholic laymen devoted to spiritual work of this sort, including the recovery of lapsed Catholics. They also explain in part the nearly total control which the CPC has imposed on religious schools. Given the virtual prohibition on proselytization (recently described as "religious propaganda in public resorts or areas plagued with complications of class relations") and the severe restrictions on religious education, the CPC's guarantee of freedom of worship and its prohibition of "anti-religious propaganda in churches or temples"¹¹ means little. Presumably the CPC expects organized religion to die out gradually for lack of recruits.

10. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbanks, op. cit., p. 223.

11. Chang Chih-yi, loc. cit.

The CPC's anti-religious propaganda has on the whole been fairly subtle and indirect. It has taken the general line that "religious followers," like other Chinese, must give up all ties with and affection for "imperialism" and "feudalism" and must espouse "socialism." In that case, and only in that case, coexistence between Communists and "religious followers" will be possible and the religious freedom of the latter respected. The difficulty with this seemingly reasonable position is that for a "religious follower" to accept it means giving at least passive support to a program many of whose features -- such as atheism, materialism, and police terrorism -- are incompatible with the principles of any religion, and with many ethical systems other than the Communist.

The CPC has not confined itself to organizational manipulation and anti-religious propaganda in its efforts to promote the eventual elimination of religion. It has also employed persecution, presumably because the other methods seemed inadequate or too slow. This persecution has always been masked, with varying degrees of skill, so as to make it appear as something else. Thus adherents of the various religions of China have been persecuted from time to time on the ostensible grounds that they were "reactionaries" or "counterrevolutionaries," or that they were Nationalist or "imperialist" (i.e., American) agents. Chinese "religious followers" and foreign missionaries whom the CPC considered dangerous have been accused of upholding "feudalism" (particularly the former rural landlord system), of maintaining organizational or financial relations with foreign "imperialist" organizations, of espousing "local nationalism" (in the case of the national minorities), of opposing the "leadership" of the CPC, and similar alleged offenses. The persecution has taken various forms, ranging from house arrest followed by expulsion from the country (for some foreign missionaries) through exclusion from public office to forced labor and execution.

X In many cases, Chinese "religious followers" and foreign missionaries have been made to "confess" to the charges against them. These "confessions," like other similar ones extracted by Communist police from their prisoners, have no necessary validity as evidence against the accused. This is because the techniques used are capable of extracting a "confession" to nearly anything from nearly any one, and in some cases of producing semipermanent obedience and psychological conformity as well. These techniques rely mainly on extreme fatigue, psychological pressure, and imprisonment under extremely unpleasant conditions. In most cases these deprive the prisoner of the will to resist, and the threat of their repetition is usually enough to prevent the prisoner from repudiating

his "confession" later.¹²

The application of these three forms of pressure -- organizational manipulation, propaganda, and persecution -- by the CPC began in some Communist-controlled areas (especially North China and Inner Mongolia) before 1949, has been extended to China as a whole since 1949, and seems likely to be a continuing feature of Chinese Communist religious policy in the future. The exact nature and degree of the pressure have of course varied with the time and place, and as expediency seemed to indicate. Probably the most interesting variation has been a marked apparent improvement in the treatment of Buddhism and Islam since 1955. The main reason is that the CPC learned from the Bandung Conference how much damage its religious policy, as well as some of its other policies, was doing to its standing in non-Communist Asia, where it was and is trying to pose as a champion of peaceful coexistence. Since that time the CPC has allowed visits by handpicked delegations of Chinese Buddhists and Moslems to other Asian and Middle Eastern countries and by foreign Buddhists and Moslems to carefully selected and often restored religious showplaces in China, and has cited these contacts as fresh evidence for its allegedly friendly policy toward religion. Not only has there been no real change in Chinese Communist religious policy and religious controls, however, but the CPC has actually intensified its anti-religious pressures since about the middle of 1957 (see Section 4, below).

B. Popular Religion

Until 1958, popular religion was much more nearly exempt from Communist pressures than were the organized religions. The CPC made no serious or systematic attempt to interfere with traditional beliefs or customs such as "ancestor worship." Presumably this was because popular religion was both too amorphous to constitute a serious obstacle to CPC's short run objectives and too deeply rooted in the minds of the people to be attacked without careful preparation. To some extent the CPC prepared the way for an eventual assault on popular religion by drastically overhauling certain features of traditional Chinese society, notably the concept of male supremacy within the family.

12. The most factual and scientific study of this "brainwashing" process yet published is Drs. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., and Harold G. Wolff, "Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of 'Enemies of the State'," American Medical Association, Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, Aug. 1956, pp. 115-174.

C. Taoism

Taoism has suffered severely under the CPC for two reasons. Although moribund as a religion, it was closely associated with a number of secret societies, which the CPC was determined to stamp out because they constituted centers of political and social power independent of and indeed opposed to the CPC. Secondly, Taoism has no offshoots or connections in other Asian countries which might have tended to deter the CPC from repressing it. Consequently, Taoist sects and secret societies have been subjected not only to organizational controls and hostile propaganda but to outright persecution. This persecution was especially severe during the terrible campaign against "counter-revolutionaries" of 1951-52 and during the similar but less intense campaign of 1954-55.

D. Buddhism

As a religion, Buddhism has been somewhat more vigorous in modern China than has Taoism; furthermore, it has numerous co-religionists elsewhere in Asia. Mainly for these reasons, Buddhism has suffered less severely under the CPC than has Taoism. Nevertheless, it has by no means escaped pressure. Buddhist monks have occasionally been executed as "counter-revolutionaries," and a much larger number have been forcibly returned to secular life and compelled to take up "productive labor." Land and buildings belonging to Buddhist monasteries, except to some extent in Tibet, have been confiscated on a large scale in the course of "agrarian reform." Buddhist monks and laymen, in addition to receiving the usual political indoctrination given to virtually every one in Communist China, have been asked to accept the idea that Buddhism and Communism are compatible, and indeed that Buddhism can find its true expression in Chinese secular life only in an environment controlled by the CPC.¹³

In Tibet, the expropriation of some monastery lands and efforts by the CPC to monopolize the instruction of the youth were among the causes of widespread though uncoordinated popular revolts which broke out in eastern Tibet in 1956 and are still (December 1958) in progress.¹⁴

13. Yang I-fan, Buddhism in China, Hong Kong: Union Press, 1956.

14. The Sino-Tibet agreement on the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet (May 23, 1951) had provided for complete religious freedom and non-interference with the lamaseries (text in supplement to People's China June 16, 1951).

These revolts have produced some temporary modifications in the CPC's timetable for "reforms" (pointing toward the establishment of "socialism") in Tibet, but no fundamental changes in policy.¹⁵

E. Islam

The CPC gives the total number of Moslems in Communist China as 10 million and recognizes ten national minorities among them, the most numerous being the 6 million Hui (Chinese speaking Moslems) and 3.5 million Uighurs. These minorities generally live under "autonomous" governments which serve as elaborate disguises and transmission belts for a centralized control which is not only Communist but Chinese in character. One indication of this is the fact that in "autonomous" areas of importance the First Secretary of the local CPC apparatus is generally a Han (i.e., racial) Chinese rather than a member of the local minority. The division of the various national minorities, including Moslems, among numerous "autonomous" areas helps to prevent united action on their part.

The fact that Moslems are treated as a group of racial minorities, as well as a single religious minority, has nevertheless given them a status which, at least until recently, has been somewhat better than that of other religious groups which have no comparable political standing.

The CPC has discouraged the building of new mosques, confiscated a great deal of land owned by mosques, and severely restricted the Islamic education of Moslem youth. These policies provoked armed revolts by Kazakhs in Sinkiang and by Hui in Kansu in 1952, which were forcibly suppressed. In 1955 the CPC established an Institute of Islamic Theology to monopolize the training of ahung (akhun, or Islamic teachers) and see to it that they were given political instruction, including indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism. Another blow to Islamic culture was the replacement of the Arabic by the Cyrillic alphabet in Sinkiang, in 1956.

15. For example, a Tibetan Branch of the China Buddhist Association was formed in October 1956.

F. Christianity

Christianity has occupied a special place in Chinese Communist religious policy, because the Christian churches in China have in the past been supported, if not controlled, by countries and institutions now labelled "imperialist" by the mainland regime. Furthermore, the Catholic Church in China formerly had considerable land-holdings, so that like the Buddhist monasteries and Moslem mosques it could be accused of "feudal" tendencies. These characteristics contributed to making Christianity probably the most dangerous, the most hostile, and yet the most vulnerable of the major religions from the Chinese Communist standpoint.

The essence of Chinese Communist policy toward the Christian churches during the first year or two after 1949 was to offer them toleration (as understood by the CPC) on the same basis as other religions, provided Chinese Christians proved their "patriotism" by cutting their ties with "feudalism" and above all with "imperialism," and by accepting the "leadership" of the CPC in all but purely religious matters. The CPC insisted that the Christian churches implement what it called the "Three Autonomies." These were "Self-Administration" (an end to any degree of control by foreigners, whether within or outside China), "Self-Support" (the repudiation of foreign financial aid), and "Self-Propagation" (the eventual expulsion of foreign missionaries). These demands sounded superficially reasonable, and in fact the various churches had been moving in these directions for about a generation. The difficulty of course was that the "Three Autonomies" were regarded by the CPC as merely a first step toward the total elimination of Christianity from China.

The Protestant churches, from a variety of motives, went far toward accepting and implementing the "Three Autonomies;" foreign missionaries, in particular, began to be progressively withdrawn. With the launching of the "Hate America" campaign after the outbreak of the Korean war, however, Communist pressure on the Protestant churches, most of which had American connections, sharply increased. Their schools, colleges, and hospitals were seized and converted into state institutions and the foreign missionaries expelled or jailed. The churches themselves were brought effectively under Communist control.¹⁶

16. Helen Ferris, The Christian Church in Communist China to 1952, Human Resources Research Institute, 1956.

The Catholics refused to accept the "Three Autonomies," except to a very limited degree and mainly in the matter of finances, primarily because they implied a repudiation of the spiritual authority of Rome. This refusal brought down on their heads a wave of persecution. Catholics, including Chinese clergy and laymen as well as foreign missionaries, were arrested in large numbers during the campaign against "counterrevolutionaries" of 1951-52. Some were executed, and a much larger number were sent to forced labor or placed under house arrest. The CPC tried in particular not only to deprive Chinese Catholics of leadership by foreign missionaries, but to discredit the latter in the eyes of Chinese Catholic and the Chinese people as a whole. Thus the CPC extracted "confessions" to "counterrevolutionary" activity from a number of missionaries, by means already described, and lodged fantastic propaganda charges, involving the alleged maltreatment and even killing of Chinese children, against orphanages conducted by Catholic nuns.¹⁷ This persecution slackened somewhat after 1952, but the activities of the Catholic Church in China continued to be severely restricted,¹⁸ and the issue between it and the CPC remained unresolved.

In 1955 Bishop Kung Pin-mei (Ignatius Kung) of Shanghai was arrested on charges of counterrevolutionary activity; he has been held in prison ever since without having been formally sentenced. The CPC then manipulated the election of Francis Xavier Chang (Chang Shih-lang), a priest of the Shanghai diocese, as acting bishop (vicarius regiminis). The Holy See refused to recognize this election and threatened with excommunication any Chinese Catholic who collaborated with the CPC to the detriment of his church. Early in 1956 the CPC intensified its pressure on Chinese Catholics to form a "national" Catholic Church, or in other words one with few or no ties with Rome. The result was the formation of a Preparatory Committee for the China Catholic Patriotic Association, which committee held a conference in Peking in July 1956.¹⁹

17. Thomas J. Bauer, The Systematic Destruction of the Catholic Church in China, New York, 1954.

18. See Robert Guillian, 600 Million Chinese, New York, 1957.

19. Statement by Li Wei-kuang and Hu Wen-yao to National People's Congress, People's Daily, July 20, 1957.

IV. The Current Anti-religious Campaign

A. General

By about 1956 the severity of the CPC's dictatorship (including of course its oppressive religious policy) and the feverish speed of socialization in 1955 had generated a number of serious tensions. The CPC's conclusion, as set forth in Mao Tse-tung's speech of February 27, 1957, on "contradictions," was that while these tensions were serious enough to require remedial action, they were for the most part "contradictions within the ranks of the people" rather than "antagonisms." They could therefore be alleviated by permitting greater freedom of expression, including even some public criticism of the CPC itself. As it turned out, the CPC had underestimated the severity of the tensions, for the criticisms which it finally elicited from some non-Communists (in May 1958) were much more forceful than it had expected. Among other things, the CPC's religious policy came in for its share of criticism. A Moslem speaker, for example, complained that the State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau "was not interested in supporting the Islamic religion nor was it giving sufficient financial assistance for the upkeep of mosques."²⁰

In June of 1957 the CPC struck back at its critics in an "anti-rightist struggle" which effectively silenced them. It then launched a massive "socialist forward leap" designed to accelerate the "transition to socialism" and bring China abreast of Great Britain in total industrial output by about 1972. This "forward leap" had several inter-related aspects. On the economic side, it involved an effort to increase production by transferring hundreds of thousands of people from the cities to the countryside, the establishment of large numbers of small-scale local industries, and (since the spring of 1958) the formation of agricultural "people's communes." On the ideological side, there was a reversion to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, symbolized by such things as an attack on Yugoslav "revisionism" and the termination of the official birth control campaign (both in May 1958). Furthermore, the intellectuals and remaining private businessmen, who had shown themselves in May 1957 to be ideologically unreliable, were subjected to intensified "ideological remoulding," at the same time that the CPC was trying to render itself less dependent on them by establishing small, simple industrial installations which would not require many highly skilled

20. Kwangming Daily, May 25, 1957.

personnel. Finally, the ideological aspect of the "forward leap" also included an intensification of the CPC's pressure on religion.

X Nevertheless, the CPC has continued to take the line that true religious freedom is possible only under Communist rule. The CPC remains committed, of course, to the ultimate extinction of religion, but it now maintains that the disappearance of class distinctions from the Chinese scene will not be enough to bring about the disappearance of religion. Religion, it says, has ideological ("cognitive") as well as social causes, and the former cannot be eliminated without positive anti-religious propaganda and pressures.²¹

The CPC's current anti-religious campaign has been marked by an intensification of organizational controls over the various religions, especially Protestantism (in which they had previously been slight at the provincial level)²² and Catholicism (in which they had been almost nonexistent at either the central or provincial levels). The volume of anti-religious propaganda has swelled to even greater proportions than usual and has been directed in particular against Catholicism and popular religion. Persecutions and other types of pressure, including denunciations of alleged "rightists" among the various religious groups and abolition of some popular religious festivals, have been freely employed.

Two interesting recent features of the anti-religious campaign are a visit to the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary by a delegation representing the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council and led by Ho Ch'eng-hsiang himself in July 1958, presumably to seek advice on how to conduct the campaign;²³ and a tendency to hold meetings of "religious followers" at which all the organized religions are jointly represented.²⁴

21. Chang Chih-yi, loc. cit.

22. NCNA, Foochow, March 22, 1958, for example, refers to a Preparatory Committee of the Protestant Self-Administration Movement in Fukien.

23. NCNA, Peking, July 25, 1958.

24. Kwangming Daily, August 8, 1958.

B. Popular Religion

Of all aspects of the current anti-religious campaign, the drive against popular religion is probably the most complex, the most important, and the most novel. On the whole, the CPC had not previously launched a frontal assault on popular religion to the same extent as against the organized religions. This comparative toleration could not last, however, both because of the CPC's hostile attitude toward all religion and because of the fact that many attitudes and practices associated with popular religion are incompatible with the CPC's "socialist forward leap," and in particular with the "people's communes."

The campaign, which began in earnest in the spring of 1958, allegedly at the demand of the masses and under the guise of a campaign against superstition, has been directed mainly at two sets of targets, the popular deities and the dead.

On the ground that they are superstitious and extravagant, many local cults and festivals have been abolished. This has been true not only among the Han (Chinese) but among the minority peoples, whose undoubted backwardness as compared with the Chinese the CPC chooses to attribute mainly to superstition.²⁵ Religious holidays have been converted into workdays, and religious images have been converted to economic purposes. As in dealing with the organized religions, the CPC has made extensive use of carefully organized meetings and "debates," at which its own viewpoint is explained and other viewpoints are refuted.²⁶

Still more important is the CPC's campaign against the dead, or in other words against traditional Chinese burial customs and "ancestor worship." Elaborate funerals and mourning have been discouraged; simple, non-wooden coffins, and in some cases cremation, have been encouraged; old tombs have been obliterated, newer ones have been moved to economize space; many coffins have been converted into latrines or manure carriers; in some cases decomposed bodies have actually been used as fertilizer; and "ancestor worship" is being gradually eliminated.²⁷

25. "Emancipation from Superstition," People's Daily, August 22, 1958.

26. E.g., Kwangming Daily, Sept. 18, 1958.

27. Chao Chien-min, "Reform Funeral Customs, Encourage Thrifty Burials Without Coffins and Graves Without Sepulchral Mounds," People's Daily, June 17, 1958.

These measures, which would be extreme in any country but are doubly so in China, are clearly intended to eliminate not only the economic but also the ideological importance of popular religion. As the People's Daily (September 4, 1958) has put it, "Spiritual fetters which have bound the people for the past several thousand years will become a thing of the past."

C. Taoism

Relatively little information is available on the fate of Taoism during the current anti-religious campaign, but the indications are that its status has been essentially no different from that of the other religions. Taoists like other "religious followers" have been compelled to hold "socialist study sessions" at which they are exhorted to uphold the "leadership" of the CPC and the cause of "socialism."²⁸ At the end of 1957 the Shanghai Public Security Bureau claimed to have smashed an attempt by remnants of a "reactionary Taoist sect" to "revive the sect and resume counter-revolutionary activities."²⁹

D. Buddhism

The "anti-rightist struggle" of 1957-58 claimed to have uncovered a number of "rightists" among China's Buddhists, the most prominent being Liu Ya-hsiu and Ch'en Ming-shu, two well known laymen,³⁰ and Pen Huan, a Ch'an (Zen) abbot.³¹ They were accused, in essence, of using Buddhism as a cloak for "counter-revolutionary" anti-Communist propaganda. Pen Huan acquired the doubtful distinction of being the most prominent Buddhist yet arrested by the CPC. As in most such cases, some of the charges against these men dated back several years, so that their denunciation at that time rather than earlier was clearly done for propaganda effect. The CPC press has acknowledged the arrest of a few other Buddhist monks and the execution of at least one of

28. E.g., Kwangming Daily, August 8, 1958.

29. Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, Dec. 28, 1957.

30. Hsien-tai Fo-hsueh (Contemporary Buddhism), Dec. 1957.

31. Hong Kong Wen Hui Pao, June 13, 1958.

them.³² Persecution has, of course, been accompanied by intensive propaganda; during 1958 the CPC press reported numerous conferences and "socialist study meetings" among Buddhists of all schools and in various parts of China, for the purpose of upholding the CPC and "socialism."³³

In the lamaist areas, including Tibet, the current campaign has brought intensified pressure against "superstition" and for support of the CPC and the "forward leap." Lamas are expected to work like anyone else, under penalty of not eating.³⁴ In Tibet, the CPC, without repudiating its promise of 1956 not to introduce "democratic reforms" until after 1962, has made it clear that propaganda in favor of the CPC and "socialism" will be carried on continuously during the interval.³⁵ Revolts are still in progress among the Gologs of Tsinghai and the Khams of Sikang, both of whom are predominantly Buddhist.

E. Islam

It has already been pointed out that the CPC's policy toward Islam has a very important political aspect in the sense that Moslems are treated as distinct racial and political minorities, as well as a single religious minority. Similarly, the CPC's difficulties with its Moslems and its current anti-Islamic campaign have strong political overtones. The CPC has repeatedly admitted that Moslems, especially those of Sinkiang, are infected with "local nationalism," or in other words that they resent Communism, Chinese control, Chinese immigration, and collectivization, and in many cases would like to secede.³⁶ Five (nominal) Moslems were expelled from the CPC apparatus in Sinkiang in May 1958, on the charge of "local nationalism."³⁷ The establishment by the CPC of a Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region in 1957-58 evoked a number of Hui revolts in the spring of 1958. Their alleged leader,

32. Changchun Kirin Jih Pao, June 20, 1958.

33. E.g., Hsien-tai Fo-hsueh, July 1958.

34. E.g., Ulanfu's talk on the situation in Inner Mongolia in Kwangming Daily, August 14, 1958.

35. E.g., Chang Kuo-hua's speech in Lhasa Hsi Tsang Jih Pao, October 19, 1957.

36. E.g., speech by Saifudin, NCNA, Peking, December 25, 1957.

37. Speech by Wang En-mao, People's Daily, June 27, 1958.

Ma Chen-wu, was branded a "rightist" and presumably dealt with accordingly.³⁸ Shortly after the announcement of this affair, the China Association for the Promotion of Islamic Culture (not to be confused with the China Islamic Association) met in Yinchuan (Ningsia) and dissolved itself.³⁹

While political considerations bulk largest in the CPC's Moslem problem, as reported in the CPC press, there can be no doubt that strictly religious grievances are also very important. Since Moslems, virtually alone among the religious groups of China, have a political and territorial base, religious discontent tends to assume a political appearance.

F. Christianity

Like other public bodies in Communist China, the Protestant churches were compelled during the second half of 1957 to uncover "rightists" in their midst. This process began at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of Protestant Churches in China for Self-Administration, held in Peking on November 28-December 4, 1957. A number of "rightists" who had spoken out during the preceding spring were criticized, and "In the course of heated debate, the rightists were silenced by reasoning, finding themselves completely isolated."⁴⁰ Numerous similar meetings were held at the provincial and local levels during the following spring. Among the "rightists" denounced at these meetings, and in some cases imprisoned afterwards, were many of the leaders of Protestantism in China.⁴¹ In the summer of 1958, the CPC prevented the attendance of some Chinese Anglican bishops at the Lambeth Conference in London.⁴² Protestantism in China seems to be well on the way to total subjugation at the hands of party and state.

The same trend also applies to the Catholic Church. One of the earliest manifestations of the CPC's "anti-rightist struggle" was a renewal of pressure for the formation of a "national" Catholic Church.

38. People's Daily, October 17, 1958.

39. Chinese Home Service Despatch, Peking, October 31, 1958.

40. NCNA, Peking, December 5, 1957.

41. China Bulletin, National Council of Churches of Christ, New York, August, 1958.

42. Ecumenical Press Service, World Council of Churches, Geneva, August 8, 1958.

On June 17 - July 13, 1957, the CPC convened a "preparatory meeting" attended by 241 bishops, priests, and laymen, at which the Vatican was denounced vehemently as usual.⁴³ Then the CPC, ignoring a stern warning to Chinese Catholics from the Vatican against collaboration with Communism, convened a National Catholic Conference in the second half of July from which emerged a Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association pledged to maintain with the Vatican nothing but "purely religious ties that do not violate the interests and independence of China."⁴⁴

Numerous similar conferences were held at the provincial level during the next several months at which provincial Catholic Patriotic Associations were established and various Catholic "rightists" denounced. More important still, the CPC undertook in earnest the creation of a Chinese Catholic Church formally in schism with Rome. This it did, beginning in the second half of 1957, by manipulating the election of a total (as of December 1958) of fifteen bishops by the clergy of their respective dioceses and their consecration by other bishops, without reference to Rome. In at least one case a bishop agreed to perform a consecration only after he had spent a week in the hands of the secret police.⁴⁵ The CPC realizes that these elections are valid under Catholic canon law, even though the Vatican has refused to recognize the elections and consecrations and has excommunicated those bishops who have consecrated or been consecrated without its approval. In other words, the CPC has successfully begun the creation of a Chinese Catholic hierarchy whose orders are valid but which is in schism with Rome. These are lengths to which no other Communist regime has yet gone in dealing with its Catholic population, with the single exception of the forcible russification of Uniate Catholics by the Soviet government after the Second World War.

V. Conclusions

From this survey of Chinese Communist policy toward popular religion and both indigenous and foreign organized religions, it is clear that the CPC has used manipulation, propaganda, and terror to achieve an almost total degree of control. The CPC exercises this control under the guise of ensuring "true" religious freedom, but with the actual purpose of eliminating religion by destroying both its social and its ideological bases. Such is the religious aspect of the model which the CPC holds up for imitation to the peoples of the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries.

43. NCNA, Peking, July 30, 1957.

44. NCNA, Peking, August 2, 1957.

45. The source for this information is the Most Reverend Patronius Lacchio, O.F.M., formerly archbishop of Changsha, as reported in The Washington Star, November 29, 1958.

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PEIPING ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM LEADERS

By A. J. Roy

(Observer of East Asian Diplomacy and Politics)

SUMMARY: Since early 1958 the Chinese Communists have been organizing mass "struggle meetings" where Buddhist and Muslim religious leaders are accused of fraud, crimes, and counter-revolution. This article is principally concerned with the campaign against Chinese Muslim imams and Tibetan Buddhist lamas in Tsinghai province. Popular opposition to Communist control and Peiping's collectivization policy has caused a number of armed revolts. The Communists hope to discredit the leaders of the minority peoples, many of whom are religious figures.

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PEIPING ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM LEADERS

By A. J. Roy
(Observer of East Asian Diplomacy and Politics)

In an attempt to consolidate control over China's restive national minorities, Peiping is now attacking their religious leaders and undermining their beliefs. Communist officials organize mass "struggle meetings" at which Muslim imams and Buddhist monks belonging to the Tibetan, Thai or other minority groups are accused of "oppression and exploitation."

This campaign has two purposes. The Communists wish to reduce the influence of the minority peoples' leaders, many of whom are religious figures. Peiping also wants to destroy the religious beliefs of the minorities and persuade them to accept Communist ideology.

This long-run objective was discussed in an article in the January 12, 1959 issue of the Peiping Kuang Ming Daily, which said that "The most basic obstacle which prevents the people of the national minorities from mentally accepting Communist thought is idealism — theism."

During the early years of the regime this problem was approached with caution. The Kuang Ming Daily pointed out that "In some places we also had many misgivings. We dared not publicize materialism and atheism out of fear that this would come in conflict with religious policy and arouse the apprehensions of the masses."

In early 1958, however, the Communists decided to ignore such apprehensions. Chinese Muslim imams and Mongolian lamas first came under attack. Religious leaders of Thai and other Buddhist tribes were also put

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under pressure, and since August 1958 an intensive campaign against Tibetan Buddhist lamas has been in progress in Tsinghai province. Tsinghai, a broad arid plateau north of Tibet proper, has a large Tibetan population.

These attacks follow a distinct pattern. Party officials organize large public meetings, often attended by thousands of persons. Leaders of several different religious groups are often attacked at the same meeting.

Lamas and imams are charged with charlatanism, robbing the people, torture, rape, incest, and fraud. Buddhists and Muslims are told that gods and supernatural forces do not exist. They are urged to "eliminate superstition."

Religious leaders are put on platforms and the people are directed to hurl accusations at them face to face. The procedure is similar to that used in the mass meetings called during "land reform," when landlords and village leaders were also required to face popular accusations staged by party workers.

Red and Expert, a Tsinghai party journal, said in its October 1, 1958 issue that "campaigns of struggle and prosecution were carried out with much fanfare. According to incomplete returns, by early September over 5,770 such meetings were held with over 600,000 people attending."

There is an immediate political reason for this campaign as well as a long-term ideological one. Tibetans and Chinese Muslims in Tsinghai have long been restive under Communist control, but during the past several years they have had two specific grievances: they oppose Peiping's attempts

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to organize them into collective farms, herdsmen's collectives, and communes; and they resent the massive immigration of ethnic Chinese organized by the Communists.

According to Red and Expert, 50.28 per cent of herdsmen in Tsinghai had been enrolled in collectives by the end of August 1958. These were transformed into communes almost immediately.

Tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese have been transferred to Tsinghai and other border provinces during the past few years. Most have come from Shanghai and other coastal cities where unemployment is a major problem. The official Peiping People's Daily periodically asks young people to emigrate to frontier areas. There they are establishing state farms and communes which encroach on land used by Tibetans and Chinese Muslims for grazing and farming. They are considered outsiders who threaten the way of life and the economic well-being of the minority peoples.

Opposition to Peiping's policy has for the most part been passive, but there have been a number of armed revolts. In 1956 the Communists attempted to form collective farms in the Kantzu district of Szechuan province. There, as in Tsinghai, Tibetans constitute a large part of the population. The Tibetans, encouraged by their lamas, refused to accept collectivization. When the Communists applied force the Tibetans took to the mountains and began an uprising which has since spread to Tibet proper.

The People's Daily reported on October 18, 1958 that "several hundred counter-revolutionaries" led by a Chinese Muslim imam in Nighsia named Ma Chen-wu had taken part in two revolts on April 4 and June 1.

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Ma was charged with planning to form an "Islamic Democratic Party" and a "Chinese Muslim Republic." He opposed collectivization of the herds and was said to have used a mosque as a base for his activities. His slogan was "glory for Islam."

The Tsinghai Daily of Sining for November 14, 1958 reported the mass trial of another imam named Mai Ch'eng-ch'ang. He was termed a "counter-revolutionary working under the cloak of religion." He reportedly said that "If a Hungarian-type uprising takes place in China, I will certainly join it."

Tibetan opposition to the Communist regime in the Kannan district was revealed by the Peiping magazine Nationalities Unity for January 6, 1959. It said that lamas there "publicly sell arms and ammunition, harbor counter-revolutionaries and wicked elements and try to overthrow the people's regime. From 1955 to February 1958, no less than 40 counter-revolutionaries and criminals were found and arrested in the Lapulen monastery alone. At the same time, large numbers of military weapons and counter-revolutionary documents including seals and documents of the so-called 'Allied Anti-Communist Nationalities Army' and the 'Kuomintang Branch for the Lapulen Region' were seized from the monastery."

The lamas were also accused of telling the people that "the Communist Party will abolish religion," "pastoral tax is robbery under a beautiful name," and "the policy of the Communist Party is sweet first but bitter later."

Red and Expert explicitly linked the Tsinghai uprisings with the drive to collectivize herdsmen. It said that "When the great socialist

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revolution in the pastoral areas of our province was still in its primary stage, the die-hards among livestock-owners and counter-revolutionaries in religious circles staged an armed revolt against socialism, the people, and the Communist Party."

(It can be presumed that the Communists were also alarmed by the possibility that the revolt in Tibet, which began in 1956 and became more extensive in 1958 and 1959, would spread to Tsinghai. The attacks on lamas in Tibet has, however, involved the Communists in a contradiction. In Tsinghai they say that "reactionary lamas" should no longer retain their "feudal privileges." In Tibet proper, however, the official Communist policy is to permit lamas to preserve their high position in Tibetan life until 1963.)

Although the campaign against religious leaders of national minorities has been most intensive in Tsinghai, it has also been carried on in other areas where non-Chinese nationalities predominate. The Peiping Kuang Ming Daily for February 12, 1959 described the activities of a "government work team" in Chinghung county, Yunnan province.

The party functionaries carried on propaganda activities among the Hani, Ake, and Pulang minorities. According to the newspapers, "law-defying headmen, landlords and other bad characters manufactured rumors design to undermine the work of the team." Mass meetings were organized at which the Communists attempted to discredit the headmen and ridicule the religious beliefs of the people. The newspaper noted succinctly that "There is now less feudal superstition among the masses, and production activities are no longer suspended during Buddhist festivals."

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These mass meetings often conclude with a summing-up by a Communist official. The Tsinghai Daily for October 23, 1958 quoted from the summing-up delivered at one meeting by the chief of the Communist Party's propaganda department for the province.

He said that "There are no such things as spirits and gods. All this religious nonsense was designed to deceive the people. The reactionary lamas and imams speak good but do evil."

He concluded by saying that "Elimination of religious superstition, bad customs, and taboos from the thoughts of the people is a long-term, difficult task."

It would appear, however, that the Communists expect to substitute their own type of superstition. The Tsinghai Daily declared that "As a result of the great debate, the people are spiritually revitalized, and a high tide is steadily rising in which feudal and superstitious beliefs are being completely destroyed and materialistic, Communist ideas are being established.

"Ka-ya, a poor herdsman, said: 'We are now thoroughly liberated. Feudal superstitions, through which we have been oppressed and exploited for several thousands years, are now being demolished. We shall never believe in gods again.' He then hung pictures of Marx, Lenin, and Chairman Mao in his tent."

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